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Abstract 
The choice of appropriate collaborative partners has consistently been reported as a key issue for 
contemporary managers.  This study reports findings from a study which explored the process 
and criteria of partner selection - how and why partners are chosen.  The results show multiple 
cycles of deal-making, partnership roles and organizational approval.  Partner choice criteria 
focused on partnership requirements, but was influenced by additional factors.  These results 
suggest that partner selection may be much more complex than previously recognized and could 
be better described as partner negotiation. 
 
The researcher reviewed recent literature on partnerships, decision-making, and partner 
selection. Concepts from this previous work were updated with data from three initial 
interviewees experienced in university-industry partnerships.  A conceptual Partner Negotiation 
Model was developed including three cycles of Deal-Making, Organizational Approval, and 
Partner Role/Selection.  Our hypothesized Partner Choice Criteria centred on requirements, but 
were influenced by resource availability, social network, reputation, politics, and ambiguity.  Two 
Canada-wide distance education consortia were identified as large-scale case studies for 
investigation of the research theory.  A total of 34 informants were contacted.  Written business 
plans, contracts, documents, partner network diagrams and 231 archival e-mails from 36 
correspondents were collected and analysed for the two consortia. 
   
The results showed strong support for partner selection included in negotiation cycles of deal-
making and organizational approval.  Partner choice criteria supported the need to meet 
documented requirements, but was also strongly influenced by resource availability, social 
network, and reputation.  Additional issues of interest to the interviewees were motivation, 
operations, unit of partner, self-sustaining income, and integration to one consortium.  As well, 
the Case Study Narratives offered deep, interesting insight into two specific cases of Canadian 
consortia. 
 
The findings suggest that the formation of partnerships and the process of partner selection are  
both very complex.  This research has provided new insights linking business negotiation 
concepts with partner selection.  A model has been developed for viewing partner selection as 
negotiation.  Three negotiation cycles of deal-making, organizational approval, and partner 
role/selection have been proposed.  The research has identified four criteria that influence why 
specific partners are chosen – requirements, resource availability, social network, and reputation. 
Finally, based on the complexities and issues from this work, a number of ideas for future 
research have been summarized. 
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The goal of this research is to provide a framework to improve the understanding of partnerships.  
Given limited resources, organizations want to select the best partners for their purposes.  This 
research explores the partner selection process in business partnerships.  Through this 
exploration, the researcher discovered cyclic processes of deal-making, organizational approval 
and partner negotiation.  This research also identified critical influences that may have 
contributed to partner selection such as reputation and social network.   
 
The research explores an understanding of how and why partners are chosen for business 
partnerships.  This entails a description of the partner selection process as well as the underlying 
causes. Research questions are: 
1. How do organizations choose collaborative partners? 
2. Why do organizations choose a particular partner?   
 
Current literature on alliances, on partner selection and on decision-making were reviewed.  
The researcher then informally interviewed key people who had been involved in partner 
selection for business alliances.  From this literature review and the initial interviews, a 
conceptual model of partner selection was developed.  To assess the model and to provide case 
study material, formal interviews were conducted with people from a number of Canadian 
universities involved in distance education collaborations.  From the formal interviews, the 
researcher documented two case studies.  Interview material was also analyzed with respect to the 
conceptual model and the model was adjusted accordingly.  Finally a number of propositions 
were suggested from the data. 
 
In particular, the researcher investigated: 
• Partner selection processes 
• Specific partnership requirements 
• Resource availability 
• Social network 
• Reputation 
• Organizational politics 
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• Ambiguity 
The overall research objective was to understand the partner selection process in 
interorganizational relationships, including the choice of specific partners for a particular 
organization.  Results of this research have produced three main deliverables.  First, a partner 
selection model was developed, which may help practitioners and researchers better understand 
the conceptual process.  Second, the researcher identified key criteria used to choose partners in 
the partner selection process.  This provides a foundation for future partner searches.  Third, the 
specific partner selection process was documented in two case studies, which may serve as 
learning tools for new partnerships. 
 
Specific short and long-term objectives included: 
 
Short-term Objectives 
• Document theoretical alliance literature 
• Document partner selection theory 
• Document key decision-making theory 
• Document actual decision-making patterns and process 
• Develop a partner selection model 
• Identify and categorize decision factors 
• Relate theory and actual partner selection  
 
Long-term Objectives 
• Understand the partner selection process in business alliances 
• Understand how to choose among a number of partners 
• Create decision criteria to aid in partner selection  
 
For the purposes of this research, a partnership is defined to be any interorganizational 
relationship, such as an alliance, consortium, joint venture and so on.  The researcher observed 
that the academic literature is rife with formal definitions for these categories of partnership 
(Hagedoorn 1993; Kanter 1994; Doz and Hamel 1998; Barringer and Harrison 2000), but 
interviewees in academia and industry seldom used the terms with precision in accordance with 
these definitions. Rather than add confusion with academic definitions used inappropriately in 
practice, this research includes all forms of partnership. 
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1.2 Methodology  
 
The researcher used multiple-case studies for this work.  Data were collected using written 
documentation, archival data and personal interviews of key Canadian university personnel 
involved with distance education partnerships.  Analysis of the data provided the basis for a 
conceptual partner negotiation model. 
 
The researcher identified a small number of Canadian distance education consortia to be 
potential cases for study.  Two small university partnerships served as initial interviews.  Open-
ended semi-structured interviews were conducted with personal contacts at each of these 
organizations.  The data collected from these interviews allowed the researcher to revise 
interview questions and methodology, so that significant information about partner selection 
could be identified.  Data were analyzed based on organization and alliance characteristics 
identified from management literature.  The results of the initial interviews provided the basis for 
the conceptual model described in Chapter 3.  The model was modified as additional data were 
collected and analyzed from the distance education consortia. 
 
This study is divided into two distinct phases.  The first deals with the ‘inductive’ process of 
identifying a conceptual categorization of organization and partnership characteristics.  The 
second explores the ‘deductive’ process of defining the relationship between those characteristics.   
This two-stage ‘inductive/deductive’ approach is consistent with research with similar goals 
(Powell and Dent-Micallef, 1997; Kohli and Jaworski, 1990; Jaworski and Kohli, 1993) and 
conceptual foundations (Hall 1992). 
 
The first phase was the development of a conceptual partner negotiation model.  This model 
has been documented in Chapter 3 and was used to focus the formal interviews of phase two.  
The model identifies three cycles of deal-making, organizational approval and partner selection.  
As well, partner roles are identified and a number of criteria for specific partner selection. 
 
The second phase consisted of in-depth interviews with twelve senior managers of distance 
education organizations.  This number is in line with similar studies in the literature (Kohli and 
Jaworski, 1990).  Since this phase of the research is essentially concerned with conceptual 
development of issues of importance in partner selection, a variety of alliance experiences is 
desirable.  For example, it was important to sample both large and small universities, Canadian 
and international consortia, at different geographical locations, and so on (Kohli and Jaworski, 
1990).  By obtaining a sample that reflects a diverse set of respondent organizations, the study 
obtained a rich set of ideas and insights (Parkhe 1993).  In order to strengthen internal validity, 
care was taken to interview marginal organizations and, where possible, failures in addition to 
successful consortia.  Resources identified from the field were compared to those in the research 
literature.  
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1.3 Research Problem and Questions 
 
Alliances, collaborations and consortia are becoming ubiquitous in today’s competitive 
environment. (Doz and Hamel 1998; Barringer and Harrison 2000; Das and Teng 2000) The 
current problem is not whether to partner, but to decide among a variety of collaborators. 
(Beamish 1987; Angeles and Nath 2000; Dussauge, Garrette et al. 2000)  How do organizations 
find and choose among a number of potential partners?  How do organizations choose the best 
partner for a particular situation?   
You don’t want to be left standing alone, but you also want to 
secure the best partners you can and avoid being pulled down by 
someone else’s poor partnering. 
 (Kanter 2001, p. 138) 
 
The researcher observed a number of organizations involved in partnerships.  Many 
organizations knew they needed to be involved in such alliances, but they had no idea how to go 
about establishing partnerships or choosing appropriate partners.   
 
This study seeks to answer two main research questions.  They are: 
 
1. How do organizations choose collaborative partners? 
2. Why do organizations choose a particular partner?   
 
Question 1 can be answered by looking at an organization’s actual decision-making process.  
Question 2 can be answered by extending the process data to include specific factors of interest 
and the selection criteria.  Question 2 can be further refined with additional questions such as ‘Is 
there an optimum partner? What qualities does each partner look for in the other?’   
 
This research studied the process of partner selection through interviews, written artifacts, 
contracts, e-mails and so on.  What do people really do compared to what they say they are going 
to do?  The process described could be a proactive list of characteristics, criteria, and use of a 
formal Decision Support System.  Conversely, it could be the sending of a large number of 
blanket e-mails and a selection of organizations from the e-mail replies.  If the latter is true, then 
particular partners may have been chosen only because they expressed interest rather than 
because they are appropriate partners.   
 
Because of the worldwide, shared nature of the current business environment, firms have no 
choice but to cooperate and even collaborate with their suppliers, customers and competitors.  
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Firms such as General Motors are establishing electronic supply chains with their suppliers.  
Airlines are establishing large repositories of shared airplane parts.  Software companies see the 
need for shared banks of software components, although actual sharing of components among 
firms is not widespread today.  Universities and other teaching organizations are sharing teaching 
materials, overheads, lecturer’s notes, assignments, examinations, and so on.  Textbook 
publishers are making their books available online, plus overheads and test materials for 
instructors, additional case studies, CD ROM materials, and interactive study resources for 
students. 
 
The problem for organizations is that they must engage in interorganizational relationships to 
survive in the current market.  They must choose from a variety of firms who want to partner.  
They must choose the type of partnership that will be best for them in particular circumstances.  
They must choose the number of partnerships they can handle.  This work provides a framework 
for partner selection; that is, the choice of the best partner for a particular organization in a 
particular situation.   
 
Some research questions of interest were found in (Saltiel, Sgroi et al. 1998), adapted from 
(Baldwin and Austin 1995): 
• How do partners find each other and initiate their work? 
• What qualities does each partner look for or find in the other?  Why is this important?  
How does it contribute to the dynamic? 
• What factors from the particular setting or context affect the success of the partnership? 
• How do partnerships change over time? 
• What stages do they pass through? 
 
The above questions were related to research on faculty collaboration, using individual 
researchers as the unit of analysis.  The researcher adapted some of these questions to 
interorganizational relationships, using the organization as the unit of relevance.  This research is 
interested in particular in ‘Why do partners choose each other?’ and ‘What qualities does each 
partner look for or find in the other?’ 
 
Technology and the widespread use of the Internet are supporting this collaborative move 
among traditional competitors.  As well, the notions of ‘reuse’ and ‘connectivity’ and the global 
shortage of information technology workers support this partnership effort.  This study is about 
helping organizations with collaborative decisions, assuming that most organizations must be 
collaborative in today’s economy.  The results of the study provide several examples of working 
collaborations, extend the results of these working collaborations and add modeling and theory 
literature to help organizations to choose their cooperative partners, to organize their 
relationships, to communicate with their partners, to establish a collaborative marketplace or 
repository, and to create maximum synergy from their partnerships.   
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1.4 Research Significance 
 
Interorganizational relationships help firms create value by combining resources, sharing 
knowledge, increasing speed to market, and gaining access to foreign markets. (Yan and Gray 
1994; Doz and Hamel 1998; Dussauge, Garrette et al. 2000) Since 1987, the number of strategic 
alliances worldwide has grown by 25 percent annually. (Bleeke and Ernst 1995; Harbison and 
Pekar 1998)  Partner selection is of significant importance in the success of these collaborative 
interorganizational relationships. (Beamish 1987) There are thousands of articles in a wide 
variety of academic and practitioner literature (management, psychology, economics, business 
ethics, sociology) on alliances in general and on various aspects of alliances, such as alliance type 
and formation.  Despite this plethora of alliance literature, there does not appear to be a general 
theory on partner selection.  The small numbers of partner selection articles are limited to specific 
locales or domains: Electronic Data Interchange (Angeles and Nath 2000), high touch partnering 
(Duysters, Kok et al. 1999), web browsing (Payton 1999), Turkish firms (Tatoglu and Glaister 
2000), or selected North American and European firms (Hitt, Dacin et al. 2000).  This existing 
research, adjusted by the initial interviews and field study data, was extended to a general theory 
that will be useful both for managers and researchers.  
 
The study of partner selection, defined here as finding and choosing good matches for 
interorganizational relationships, is important for several reasons.  First, understanding 
relationships among different types of organizations can help to reveal individual organizational 
characteristics and help organization members to evaluate the underlying logic of partnership 
strategies.  Second, a fundamental decision confronting most organizations concerns the type of 
institutions to involve for joint work.  Knowledge of one’s own and a potential partner’s 
organizational characteristics can serve as input to that decision.  Third, this model permits 
multiple alliance types unlike most existing research which includes only one of consortium, joint 
venture, strategic alliance, and so on.  Finally, the Canadian distance education field cases used as 
the domain provide deep, narrow research that can be extended and generalized into a partner 
selection theory in combination with the existing literature noted above. 
 
This study will be of interest to organizations that need to establish worldwide partnerships in 
order to thrive in today’s worldwide markets.  It will also be of interest to universities that want to 
know what existing partnerships are in place by providing a summary of existing consortia.  It 
will be of interest to specific industry groups that need to collaborate for reuse and people 
shortage issues, such as the software development and component industries.  The study will be 
of interest to governments in establishing standards and limitations for collaborations, so that they 
can better define acceptable and unacceptable alliance behavior. 
 
One contribution of this study to the practice of management will be to provide managers with 
an aid in partner selection decisions.   The list of partnership issues and organizational and 
alliance characteristics resulting from this study will assist managers in implementing, or 
considering, interorganizational relationships.  The study provides both a rich description of 
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partner selection issues in the final model and an analysis of the relationship between these issues 
and real-world consortia with field interview data.   
 
At an individual firm level, the results of this work will save time and aid the decision-making 
process in terms of partner selection.  This work will allow firms to choose among potential 
collaborators more easily, more fairly and in a more structured manner than an ad hoc approach 
by providing a list of partner characteristics most important for partnerships.  Organizations may 
even decide not to join a particular consortium if the available partners are not suitable. 
 
This report makes a number of research contributions.  Perhaps the most important is an 
increased understanding of partner negotiation and selection from a firm perspective.   An 
understanding of this area is, as yet, extremely limited (van der Heijden, 2000).   This study 
provides a model and list of resources that can lead to more successful partner selection.  This 
research is unique with the focus on partner selection, processes, and multiple partnership types.   
The Canadian distance education field cases also provide a distinguishing perspective for this 
research.  Finally, the conceptual partner negotiation model is distinctive in the literature. 
 
1.5 Research Overview 
 
Chapter 2 of this paper reviews recent work in a number of fields related to partnership. The 
research examines interorganizational relationships as a whole, followed by alliance motivation, 
decision-making and partner selection, and finally organizational and partner characteristics. 
Chapter 3 describes the work involved in development of the Partner Negotiation Model.  First 
the initial cases are described, providing the context for the model.  Next, the variety of models 
are presented leading up to the final model.  Third, the researcher describes the processes and 
cycles of the model, and the chapter concludes with four propositions from the final model.  
Chapter 4 details the overall research design and methodology.  Qualitative design and case study 
research are identified first, including a discussion of rationale, limitations of the methodology, 
and the researcher’s resolution of the limitations.  Reliability and validity in general and in terms 
of this research follow as well as a review of the researcher’s role.  Data collection includes a 
choice of cases or research domain, rationale for the choice, development of interview materials, 
research methodology, and details of data collection and recording.  A list of data used in the 
research and an overview of data analysis complete this chapter.  Chapter 5 presents a descriptive 
narrative of the two case studies.  This provides an initial data analysis and gives a general high-
level view of the data.  Chapter 6 documents detailed data analysis with coding including the data 
analysis software used for coding of interview materials.  The data analysis method was described 
and detailed analysis with coding identified the major issues pulled from the interviews.  Chapter 
7 communicates results as major findings tied to an appropriate proposition.  Other findings are 
also noted as well as an interpretation and discussion of the results.  The overall work concludes 







Business alliances for cooperative or competitive advantage have become ubiquitous over the 
past ten years. (Davidow and Malone 1992; Landay 1996; Barringer and Harrison 2000) Firms 
are purchasing in bulk from each other, manufacturing cooperatively (Chen and Ross 2000), 
servicing each other’s customers, and so on in reciprocal agreements that are meant to increase 
revenue and profit for both partners.  Strategic alliances encourage alliance partners to become 
customers too. (Perks and Easton 2000)  Airline alliances, some formed in the early 1990’s, are 
providing customer benefits worldwide. (Economist 2000)  Recently, a new fraud analysis and 
protection alliance was developed to protect against Internet deceit. (InfoWorld 2000) Indeed, 
alliances are becoming so prevalent and important that formal academic models are being 
developed to aid in trading partner selection (Angeles and Nath 2000). 
 
This work encompasses a number of subcategories within management sciences literature.  In 
information systems, the work includes business partnerships sharing information or technology.  
Such partnerships can be included in electronic commerce, in particular in supply chain 
partnerships where companies are buying and selling from each other electronically.  On the 
technology side of information systems, the work may include decision support systems or expert 
systems to aid in partner selection.  Organizational behavior incorporates organizational 
decision-making, interpersonal communication, global diversity and organizational culture and 
change, each of which can be part of the collaborative partner selection process.  Finally, in 
strategic planning, this work is part of strategic decision-making, outsourcing, collaboration, and 
international strategies. 
 
The organizational literature, including strategic management, organizational learning and 
knowledge management theories, investigates factors leading to corporate success.  As these 
theories are very broad and all encompassing, they are discussed only in the context of 
interactions among firms, a subset of this literature.  Alliances and consortia are two types of 
interorganizational relationships that are of particular interest to us.  The issues of interest within 
alliances and consortia are partner selection and alliance performance.  How does one firm 
choose another firm from a number of potential partners?  Is this choice significant in the success 
of the partnership?  Because of the large number of factors impacting success, this research does 
not attempt to prove success based on partner selection. 
 
The domain of interest is the field of education, in particular distance education in Canadian 
universities.  This research investigated alliances and consortia among distance education 
providers.  There is an abundance of educational literature on collaborations and partnerships, but 
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the majority is personal learning and mentoring relationships.  Some of this literature has been 
explored for factors that may be extended to the organizational relationships of interest in this 
study. 
 
This chapter is organized into sections on Interorganizational Relationships, Alliance 
Motivation, Decision Making and Partner Selection, and Organizational and Partner 
Characteristics.  Section 2.2 discusses Interorganizational Relationships, including their 
advantages and disadvantages.  Section 2.3 on Alliance Motivation looks at an organization’s 
goals for partnership formation. Section 2.4, Decision Making and Partner Selection, reviews 
general decision-making theory, as appropriate for partner selection.  This section also included 
recent literature on domain-specific alliance partner selection.  Section 2.5, Organizational and 
Partner Characteristics, provides organizational and partner characteristics of interest in 
partnerships.  The chapter concludes with a summary of the relevant literature for the conceptual 
framework. 
 
2.2 Interorganizational Relationships 
 
Alliances are formed as firms seek new market opportunities under conditions of increased 
uncertainty and competition. (Beverland and Bretherton 2001)  ‘Alliance’ and ‘strategic alliance’ 
terminology is often used to mean a wide range of different partnership types. (Porter 1990)  A 
strategic alliance is an enduring interfirm co-operative agreement for the joint accomplishment of 
individual goals. (Parkhe 1993)  The notion of a strategic alliance may include strategic 
outsourcing and global strategic alliances in particular to gain access to new markets.   
 
A number of authors have identified positive reasons for becoming involved with other 
companies.  The initial advantages are economic – gain access to a particular resource, economies 
of scale, and risk and cost sharing, particularly in a large venture. (Barringer and Harrison 2000) 
Alliances can provide access to foreign markets, can enable corporate learning, and can pool 
resources for the development of new, better, bigger products and services.  Speed to market, 
structural and regulatory flexibility, lobbying power, and market power for competitive advantage 
all add to the potential advantages of partnerships. (Barringer and Harrison 2000, Table 3)  There 
are four alliance categories: equity joint venture, minority equity alliance, bilateral contract-
based, and unilateral contract-based.  There are four types of alignment: supplementary, surplus, 
complementary, and wasteful. (Das and Teng 2000)  
 
Many articles suggest that there is a concrete ‘alliance lifecycle’ which describes the processes 
and tasks involved in alliance creation.  The process includes a number of issues and activities, 
such as motivation, formation, structure, and performance.  Some models include cycling back to 
begin the alliance process again or to revise the alliance that has been started.  Most models, 
however, propose a straight-line alliance process with each activity clearly completed before a 
move to the next one.   
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Overall, most articles suggested a simple alliance process such as that described in Figure 2.1, 
Current Alliance Theory.  The scope of this research is Alliance Formation only, as noted on 
Figure 2.1.  This research concentrates on how partners are chosen and why particular partners 
are chosen.  Motivation, however, affects Alliance Formation since particular partners may be 
necessary to meet particular goals.  Similarly, Alliance Formation affects Alliance Structure since 
some partners because of their reputation and power may produce more hierarchical rather than 















Figure 2.1 Current Alliance Theory 
 
Kogut  (Kogut 1988) first proposed three simple sequential stages of alliance formation, 
operation and termination.  Lorange and Roos (Lorange and Roos 1992) altered the Kogut model 
to alliance formation, implementation, and evolution.  This added a dimension of active rather 
than passive process, moving from operation to implementation.  This also suggested that 
alliances could move on and change rather than just stop completely when the original alliance 
was finished.  A slightly more complex and lengthier process was that of Murray and Mahon 
(Murray and Mahon 1993) who extended the three phases to five, with their ideas of courtship, 
negotiation, start-up, maintenance, and two possible endings.  The endings could be either 
amicable separation or an extension of the alliance, combining the ideas of Kogut and Lorange 
and Roos.   
 
Ring & Van de Ven (Ring and Van de Ven 1994), Gulati, (Gulati 1995), Gomes-Casseres 
(Gomes-Casseres 1996) and Doz, Olk and Ring (Doz, Olk et al. 2000) have proposed more 
complex alliance frameworks.  Alliances can be social entities, useful for personal and political 
motivations.  Alternatively, they can be serious, rational business relationships, meant only to 
create wealth and increase profit.  Finally, they may include alliance constellations, groups of 
alliances competing against each other and other firms. 
 
Recently, Das and Teng (Das and Teng 2000) showed a straight-line process of resource-based 
rationale, alliance formation, structural preferences and alliance performance.  Reid, Bussiere, 
and Greenaway (Reid, Bussiere et al. 2001) altered the Das and Teng model to include partner 
characteristics, structural choice, operating structure and norms, and performance for knowledge-
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based enterprises.  Other similar straight-line alliance processes are given in Das and Teng (Das 
and Teng 2002) (single direction, single dimension alliances and constellations), Koch (Koch 
2002) (straight-line process, formation and life cycle) and Varis and Conn (Varis and Conn 
2002). 
 
Alliances have limited lifespans. (Ajami and Khambata 1991)  The median lifespan of alliances 
is about seven years, failure rate is high, and seven out of ten joint ventures fall short of 
expectations and thus disband. (Kanter 1994; Bleeke and Ernst 1995)  In spite of the 
disadvantages, “…factors such as dependence on external resources or pressure for legitimacy 
can lead organizations into difficult alliances…” (Barringer and Harrison 2000, p. 369) Alliances 
between competitors require a fair balance of skills, market access and capital between the 
companies. (Bleeke and Ernst 1994) 
 
The single most critical concern about corporate partnerships “is the risk of loss of proprietary 
information.” (Barringer and Harrison 2000, p.369)  Firms want to be involved in alliances and 
joint ventures, but are concerned about corporate secrets, finances and other vital information 
getting into either the wrong hands or into the public domain.  Other concerns are management 
complexity, financial and organizational risks, the risk of becoming dependent on a partner, and 
partial loss of decision autonomy.  Less common concerns include conflicting corporate cultures, 
loss of organizational flexibility, and antitrust implications. 
 
2.3 Alliance Motivation 
 
“Firms tend to have a portfolio of reasons for alliance formation, such as cost minimization, risk 
sharing, and learning, rather than just one reason.” (Barringer and Harrison 2000, p.369) 
Consequently, just one theoretical paradigm does not appear to be sufficient to explain alliance 
formation. Some other issues involved in alliance formation include firm legitimacy, perceived 
fairness of a potential alliance partner, organizational and people issues, and corporate culture. 
 
Combining economics and resource dependence views, alliances are a means to reduce market 
uncertainty while obtaining needed resources. (Beverland and Bretherton 2001)  Strategic 
alliances are formed primarily to take advantage of new market opportunities.  Uncertainty drives 
the formation of an alliance.  The most common motivation for forming an alliance is the “joint 
maximization of complementary assets”. (Koza and Lewin 1998)  Other motivations from the 
same research are to seek new knowledge and to explore new market opportunities. 
 
A large number of theoretical principles have been proposed attempting to explain why 
organizations want to participate in alliances. Theories come from a wide variety of management, 
economic, and sociology journals, as well as practitioner literature.   
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Some of these principles are: 
• Maximize ability to offer excellent products and services; produce better quality products 
(synergy) 
• Strong synergistic opportunity to extend existing scope of operations (Bleeke and Ernst 
1995) 
• Competitive strengths, additional sources of capital, access to new technology, 
opportunities for rapid expansion into new markets, products or locations (Cateora 1996) 
• Increase efficiency 
• Decrease costs; cost minimization 
• Gain fast access to new technologies or new markets (Powell 1990) 
• Market dominance (Harrigan 1985; Tallman and Shenkar 1994); decrease competition 
• Gain economies of scale in joint research, production, purchasing and lobbying 
• Tap into knowledge outside of the firm (Inkpen and Beamish 1997); organizational 
learning 
• Share risks that are beyond the scope of the individual firm (Buckley and Casson 1988)  
• Expansion of business operations (Sankar, Boulton et al. 1995) 
• Social exchange theory, the study of relationships among organizations 
• Access complementary marketing skills, quick access into foreign markets, cost reduction 
of doing business in foreign markets, circumvention of tariff and non-tariff barriers 
(Contractor and Lorange 1988; Kotabe and Swan 1995)  
• Obtain legitimacy 
• Exert power or control 
• Fill a perceived internal resource need 
 
Barringer and Harrison (2000) provide a broad overview of six theoretical paradigms used to 
explain interorganizational relationship formation.  Their work is summarized in Table 2.1 below, 
from their Table 1, p. 370.  For each of the six theoretical paradigms of interest, they provide a 







AREA OF EXPERTISE ALLIANCE MOTIVATION 
Institutional Theory Sociology Obtain legitimacy 
Conform to social norms 
Organizational Learning Organization Theory Absorb as much knowledge as 
possible from partners 
Resource Dependence Social Exchange Exert power or control 
Obtain needed resources 
Sell desired resources 
Stakeholder Theory Business Ethics Align interests with stakeholders 
Reduce environmental 
uncertainty 
Strategic Choice Strategic Management Make a profit 
Increase product delivery 
Grow the organization 
Decrease competition 
Transaction Costs Economics Economics Minimize production and 
transaction costs 
Reduce market uncertainty 
 
Table 2.1 Alliance Formation Theories 
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2.4 Decision Making and Partner Selection  
 
This section contains literature on decision-making theory and partner selection theory.  The 
former assumes that the choice of an alliance partner is just another decision that must be made 
by business people every day, so provides a broad context and process for the partner selection 
decision.   The latter includes a summary of the rather sparse existing work on partner selection in 
very narrow interorganizational domains.  The focus of this existing partner selection theory is on 
partner selection criteria or desirable partner characteristics rather than the process of choosing a 
partner. Both sets of theory were used in Chapter 3 to develop the Conceptual Framework. 
 
2.4.1 Decision-Making Theory 
 
Traditional theory identifies three phases of decision-making: intelligence, design and choice.  
(Simon 1960; Simon 1977)  In this model, there is a continuous flow of information from one 
stage to the next, and at any phase there may be a return to a previous stage.  The intelligence 
phase is the information gathering, problem identification and classification stage.  Design 
involves the development of a model by setting criteria for choice and searching for alternatives.  
The choice phase selects a solution, plans for implementation and designs a control system 
around the choice. 
 
In all decision-making models, there are three basic components: decision variables, 
uncontrollable variables and result variables. (Turban, McLean et al. 1999)  Result (dependent) 
variables indicate how well the system attains its goals.  Decision (independent) variables 
describe the alternative courses of action.  Uncontrollable (independent) variables or parameters 
often come from the environment surrounding the decision-maker and are therefore beyond his 
control.  Intermediate (independent) variables are any other variables that are necessary to link 
the decision and result variables. 
 
Decision-making is comprised of a number of interacting elements including a goal, decision 
type, alternative options, evaluation criteria, evaluation process, and selection process. (Moorhead 
and Griffin 1998) No single theory can explain the entire range of organizational theory. (Lutz 
1982)  The Rational Model is probably the most widely accepted decision-making theory.  
Evolutionary versions of the same model are the Behavioral and the Practical Models, varying the 
rationality with shortcuts and personal input.  Personal approaches, including the Conflict and the 
Garbage Can Models round out the discussion of decision-making theory.  A number of decision-






Rationality is central to the existing practice and ideology of management. (Pfeffer 1992)  Most 
decision-making theories are based on the notions of purpose, consistency and rationality. (Cohen 
and March 1992)  The rational model requires exhaustive searching for all possible alternatives.  
In fact, human mental exhaustion puts cognitive limits on the rational model. (Eisenhardt and 
Zbaracki 1992) 
 
Rational approaches are quantifiable, easy to understand and discuss, and therefore pervasive 
in the literature.  This causes researchers to implicitly ignore the two irrational processes of 
intuition, doing things without fully understanding why, and tradition or faith, doing things 
because that is the way they are done or have always been done. (Cohen and March 1992)  
Bureaucratic organizations rely on rules, precedent, and standard operating procedures for their 
decision-making. (Pfeffer 1992) This combines the rational model of rules and regulation with 
the tradition of following long-standing methods. 
 
Behavioral and Practical Approaches 
 
A person’s limited cognitive capabilities coupled with limited resources cause most decision 
makers to stop looking for alternatives once one or two satisfactory alternatives have been found. 
(Simon 1957)  The practical approach to decision making combines the steps of the rational 
approach with the conditions in the behavioral approach to create a more realistic process for 




The Conflict Model (Janis and Mann 1977) provides a personal approach to decision making for 
important decisions, including issues such as conflict, choice, fear, morality, and commitment.   
 
Public and private organizations may make decisions in different ways.  The anarchic view of 
decision-making, as espoused in the Garbage Can Model (Cohen, March et al. 1972), is 
appropriate in a complex, political public organization such as a university or government 
agency. (Pinfield 1986)  More rational models are appropriate or expected in a private 
organization, attributing structure and legitimacy. 
 
The higher the management level, the less structured the decision-making process. (Gorry and 
Scott Morton 1971)  This theory led to the development of Management Information Systems and 
Decision Support Systems to handle semi-structured and unstructured management decisions.   
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THEORY DESCRIPTION REFERENCES 
Classical Decision-Making Intelligence, design and choice Simon 1960; Simon 1977 
Rational Goal, problem, criteria, all 
possible alternatives, select 
Moorhead & Griffin 1998 
 
Behavioral and Practical Choose from 1 or 2 
possibilities 
Limited cognition, timing, 
luck 
Turban et al 1999; Simon 




Irrational, intuition, faith, 
tradition 
Social psychology conflict 
model 
Cohen & March 1992 
 




No goals, organized anarchy, 
inconsistent, ill-defined 
preference 




Higher management, less 
structure 
Decision support tools 
Gorry & Scott Morton 1971 
 
 
Table 2.2 Decision-making Theories 
2.4.2 Partner Selection Theory 
 
Partner selection literature is very limited and focused on the criteria for choosing partners rather 
than on the process of partner selection.  Most articles assume a rational decision-making process 
based on very specific selection criteria.  In fact, computers, search engines and pattern matching 
are now being used for partner selection.  For example, potential collaborators can be found 
through a software program that compares individual patterns of Web browsing.  Access logs are 
graphed and compared, so that similarities and differences can be discovered.  Mechanisms to 
overcome privacy concerns are noted.  Visual designs are used to enable users to explore possible 
matching interests with other users. (Payton 1999) 
    
Existing partner selection literature assumes a straight-line start-to-finish selection process, 
such as that shown in Figure 2.2, Rational Partner Selection. (Duysters, Kok et al. 1999; Angeles 
and Nath 2000; Barringer and Harrison 2000; Hitt, Dacin et al. 2000; Saffu and Mamman 2000)  
Depending on the motivation of the alliance as a whole, particular partner characteristics will be 
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more or less valuable.  A logical selection criteria is developed, often prioritizing the partner 
characteristics of interest.  Finally, a partner is rationally selected meeting all of the criteria. 
 
                                                             
         
     









Figure 2.2 Rational Partner Selection 
 
Some business alliances form as a result of personal ties between key decision makers. 
(Barringer and Harrison 2000) Conversely, some alliances may be avoided because of mistrust or 
personal differences among firms or decision-makers.   
 
Angeles and Nath (2000) used questionnaires to gather data from 152 respondent firms on their 
trading partner selection criteria.  Six factors appeared to be most important for both customers 
and suppliers, although they were more important for the customers.  The factors were strategic 
commitment, trading partner flexibility, joint partnering for EDI, readiness for high-level EDI, 
EDI infrastructure, and communications.  The focus for this article, however, was EDI and 
technology rather than just alliance partner selection.  For the purposes of this work, factoring out 
the technology, the issues of interest are strategic commitment, trading partner flexibility, and 
communications.  
 
High Touch Partnering theory stresses a balanced approach to alliance strategy, capability and 
partner selection. (Duysters, Kok et al. 1999)  The authors of this study believe that a new 
perspective on partnership is needed to handle recent rapid economic and technological 
developments.  They propose a more personal approach to partnership.  
 
A number of articles and theories have been developed regarding partner selection in 
international alliances.  Resource-based and organizational learning theory support observed 
partner selection among emerging and developed markets in North America and Europe. (Hitt, 
Dacin et al. 2000)  Emerging market firms from Mexico, Poland and Romania looked for 
financial assets, technical capabilities, intangible assets and a willingness to share expertise in 
their selection of partners.  The developed market firms from Canada, France and the U.S. chose 
their partners based on unique competencies and local market knowledge and access.  Potential 
contributions that universities could bring to their alliances are quality products, reputation, 
expertise, financial resources, and access to overseas markets. (Saffu and Mamman 2000) 
 
Similar results were obtained in a study of Turkish firms in international joint ventures with 
western partners. (Tatoglu and Glaister 2000)  This study not only identified some criteria used to 
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select partners, but they also tied the criteria to motive.  That is, as the motive for the alliance 
changed, so did the relative importance of some selection criteria. 
 
Based on the preceding theories, Table 2.3 identifies a variety of partner selection criteria for a 
successful alliance in a specific domain.  
 
PARTNER SELECTION CRITERIA SOURCE 
Personal contact and previous knowledge of 
partner 
Barringer and Harrison 2000 
Strategic commitment and support Angeles and Nath 2000 
Flexibility and willingness to adjust to change Hendrick and Ellram 1993; Angeles and Nath 
2000 
Communications including willingness to talk 
and make the alliance work 
Angeles and Nath 2000; Hendrick and Ellram 
1993; Moody 1993 
Personal interest in the alliance Duysters, Kok et al. 1999 
Financial assets available to put into the 
partnership 
Hitt, Dacin et al 2000; Saffu and Mamman 
2000 
Technical capabilities, people or machines 
needed for the alliance 
Hitt, Dacin et al 2000; Saffu and Mamman 
2000 
Intangible assets; other items of interest Hitt, Dacin et al 2000 
Willingness to share expertise and teaching 
resources 
Hitt, Dacin et al 2000; Saffu and Mamman 
2000 
Unique competencies Hitt, Dacin et al 2000 
Local market knowledge, access Hitt, Dacin et al 2000; Saffu and Mamman 
2000 
 




2.5 Organizational and Partner Characteristics 
 
From the foregoing literature on alliance motivation and partner selection criteria, a number of 
organizational and desirable partner characteristics have emerged.  Traditional organizational 
literature includes issues such as firm size, industry sector, corporate (organizational) culture and 
so on as firm differentiators.  Alliance literature also notes perceived fairness, innovation, agility, 
speed to market, decision-making speed, and similar or complementary distinctiveness.  The Das 
model of alliance success (Das and Teng 2000) contains mobility (ability to move resources from 
one firm to another), imitability (ability to imitate competitors), and substitutability (ability to 
substitute equivalent products).  Even more extensive is the Reid model (Reid, Bussiere et al. 
2001) for knowledge partners which mentions ability to develop and sustain valuable resources, 
absorptive capacity (ability to recognize the value of external knowledge, assimilate it, and apply 
it to commercial ends), combinative capability (ability to synthesize and apply knowledge to 
generate new applications), alliance experience, and appropriate design for knowledge exchange 
(ability to share knowledge, be flexible and responsive, non-bureaucratic, rapid decision-making, 
innovative, entrepreneurial). 
 
From the above criteria, the following issues were identified as potential organizational and 
partner characteristics of interest for an alliance.  These characteristics were used along with the 
previously identified alliance motivations to discover the ‘best’ partner in a particular situation.  
The list of characteristics was revised based on case study feedback. 
 
• Firm Size (number of employees) 
• Industry Sector (type of business) 
• Corporate culture (informal, formal) 
• Perceived fairness (honesty) 
• Innovation 
• Agility 
• Speed to market 
• Decision-making speed 
• People (compatibility, time) 
• Similar firm (supplementary value) 
• Different firm (complementary value) 
• Commitment to the Alliance (personal, strategic) 
• Flexibility (willingness to adjust as necessary to make things work) 
• Communications 
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• Assets (financial, technical, unique competencies, market knowledge) 
• Willingness to share skills and expertise 
• Mobility (ability to move resources from one firm to another) 
• Imitability (ability to imitate competitors) 
• Substitutability (ability to substitute equivalent products) 
• Ability to develop and sustain valuable resources 
• Absorptive capacity (ability to recognize the value of external knowledge, assimilate it, 
and apply it to commercial ends) 
• Combinative capability (ability to synthesize and apply knowledge to generate new 
applications) 
• Alliance experience 
• Appropriate design for knowledge exchange (ability to share knowledge, be flexible and 




This Literature Review included sections on Interorganizational Relationships, Alliance 
Motivation, Decision Making and Partner Selection, and Organizational and Partner 
Characteristics.  Section 2.2 discussed Interorganizational Relationships, including their 
advantages and disadvantages.  Section 2.3 on Alliance Motivation looked at an organization’s 
goals for partnership formation. Section 2.4, Decision Making and Partner Selection, reviewed 
general decision-making theory, as appropriate for partner selection.  This section also included 
recent literature on domain-specific alliance partner selection.  Section 2.5, Organizational and 
Partner Characteristics, provided organizational and partner characteristics of interest in alliances.  
The chapter concludes with a summary of the relevant literature for the conceptual framework. 
 
Related work on partnership types and partnership success has been omitted, so that this 
research can focus on partner selection.  Partnership types identify common definitions and 
terminology for alliances, joint ventures, consortia, and so on.  Partnership success identifies two 
measures of success: the strength of the ongoing relationship and the outcomes of the alliance.  
Power and trust were also deliberately not included as major issues since they are both widely 
covered in the literature. (Pfeffer 1992)  Finally, time has also deliberately not been included as a 
major factor in this work so that the research could concentrate on issues solely related to partner 
selection.   
 
This is the state of related work in decision-making and partner selection today.  This research 
extends existing work with the development of a partner negotiation model, documentation of 
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case study materials, and evidence supporting a number of propositions.  Currently, there are no 
partner selection or negotiation models including both decision-making and choice.  The 
researcher has developed this new model by combining existing partner selection and decision 
support theory with initial interviews to prepare a conceptual framework.  The research then 
investigated actual partner selection methods through interviews, and compared the actual 




Partner Negotiation Model 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Analysis of the existing alliance formation and partner selection literature identified a simple 
rational straight-line decision-making process for partner selection.  To verify these academic 
theories, the researcher interviewed people from two university-industry partnerships.  Their 
experience refuted the literature, showing cycles of partner selection, rationalization, 
organizational approval and a much more complex process than expected.  Contrary to 
established alliance literature, the observed partner selection decision process was irrational and 
better described as negotiation rather than selection.  Many partner choices were very personal, 
based on friendship, prior relationships and reputation. Contrary to accepted resource dependence 
theory, preliminary research also suggested that similar organizations made better partners than 
firms with complementary characteristics. 
 
Initial partner selection models were developed from analysis of the literature, gaps found in 
the literature, documentation of organizational characteristics, and from information gathered 
from initial interviews.  The researcher developed eight preliminary models based on rational 
frameworks, reputation, decision-making, waterfall and entity-relationship models.  Over a 
number of months, the models were discussed with the initial interviewees and with other faculty 
members and graduate students in Computer Science and Management Sciences.  After a great 
deal of thought and many revisions, the researcher finalized the Partner Negotiation Model.  This 
final model was used as the basis for propositions and formal interview questions. 
 
3.2 Initial Mini-Cases  
 
To verify and supplement the partner selection information from the Literature Review, the 
researcher interviewed people who had been involved with two university-industry partnerships.  
Names of the consortia and people have been changed for privacy. 
 
3.2.1 Mini-Case One, Computer Education  
 
The first organization studied was Computer Education (CE).  CE is affiliated with the University 
of Waterloo and provides continuing education courses in computer science to technical 
personnel in the software industry.  Customers include various levels of government and 
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corporate clients such as banks and insurance companies.  Students are employees who have not 
had formal technical education in 20 years or more.  Programs are available in person and by 
distance education.  At the time of this study, CE had six alliances: two universities in western 
Canada, a community college in Toronto, and three computer study institutes in Toronto, Halifax, 
and Denmark. 
 
CE has three methods of course delivery: lectures using Waterloo teachers, distance education 
with CD ROMs and Waterloo tutors, and lectures with other personnel.  As the Waterloo teachers 
and tutors were getting overloaded, CE decided that they needed to partner with other institutions 
in order to spread their courses to a broader audience and in order to get more instructors.  
Demand for courses was greater than the Waterloo instructors could handle, and the program was 
spreading geographically as well.  The first alliance was Humber College in Toronto, followed by 
the Technical University of British Columbia. 
 
A Steering Committee of experienced Waterloo professors approved the alliances as they were 
made.  This committee was looking for publicly funded organizations as partners since they felt 
that private, for-profit organizations would have fewer scruples, taint Waterloo’s reputation and 
would accept any student who could pay his tuition regardless of the student’s suitability for the 
program.  Since private companies are driven by profit, more students would make more profit. 
 
The problem with this philosophy for CE’s Director is that the public organizations work on a 
much slower timeframe than the for-profit sector.  The Director would present CE information to 
a group or committee and be told that it would be ‘considered’ at the next meeting in three 
months or six months.  The Director was a former IBM executive and expected to see things 
happen much faster than that.  So an interesting issue in partner selection already is that the 
committee was looking for a ‘similar’ partner (non-profit) while the Director was looking for any 
good partner at all, preferably one who would sign up quickly.   
 
Another interesting issue from the previous description is that the Director as the head of CE 
and the person making alliances has some clout in terms of which firms will be allies.  He doesn’t 
have as much clout as the committee, at least on paper, but since there are now for-profit 
alliances, he must have some influence.  So this may be another organizational characteristic: 
personal drive of the contact person. 
 
The Director started looking around in Canada for alliances.  He started on the west coast with 
a Community College recommended by Software Human Resources Canada (SHRC).  The 
Director investigated the British Columbia Institute of Technology (BCIT), a polytechnic 
organization, as an alliance partner.  It was not as acceptable to the Steering Committee as the 
Technical University of British Columbia, however, and CE only wanted one alliance in British 
Columbia.  Simon Fraser and the University of British Columbia were not interested because they 
had their own possibly similar organizations and courses and didn’t have enough staff to handle 
CE too. 
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When the alliance was formed with Tech BC, the organization had no permanent physical 
campus and a minimal course calendar so they were eager to set up this CE alliance to build 
capability.  The President of Tech BC pushed the alliance on their side.  A professor with a PhD 
in Education was running the courses for Tech BC, but there were no solid policies in place for 
how to deliver the CE courses.  This alliance gave them some real courses to offer.  Now that 
they have a campus in Surrey, B.C. and their own courses, they are less likely to push the CE 
offerings.   
 
Durham College was to have been the first alliance, but things did not work out.  Durham 
College found out about CE at a large community college conference in Halifax where the 
Director gave a presentation.  Durham College is close to General Motors in Oshawa, so the 
Director thought that this would make a good partner as they could draw GM employees and get 
GM to finance their CE education.  Durham put a large advertisement in the Toronto Sun, 
featuring a beautiful woman, and thus attracted 140 potential students to an Information Session.  
Durham funded their own teacher to oversee the alliance and set up a lab with 16 workstations for 
the CE course.  They got a number of students to sign up and went ahead and started teaching 
before the CE contract was signed.  
 
As the above was happening, an article appeared in the Toronto Sunday Sun about a student 
suing Durham College for unfilled promises regarding technology courses and teachers.  All 
technology courses at Durham then became suspect.  Several students dropped out of the CE 
course because of the bad publicity.  A Durham teacher cancelled all CE courses over a long 
weekend.  Finally, Waterloo had to take over the CE offering at Durham.  A total of 11 students 
graduated eventually. 
 
Centennial College in Toronto wanted a partnership, but the Director said no because they were 
too close to Waterloo and Durham.  In retrospect, Centennial might have been a good partner as 
they have a large market in Scarborough and probably lots of employers who would pay to have 
their employees study with the CE program. 
 
An alliance with Humber College was started from the Director’s personal friendship with the 
President of Humber.  They trained and certified a number of instructors.  They had just hired a 
teacher from TV Ontario and he understood the business world so was a good contact and 
salesperson for CE.  
 
Control Data Institute hired a public relations firm to make a big splash of the CE alliance.  It 
was reported that the public relations company forged the signature of the President of the 
University of Waterloo on an announcement.  Needless to say, the announcement was pulled and 
the alliance was temporarily stalled.  All advertising and public relations information must now 
go through CE. 
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The Broadleaf Institute alliance started in Halifax in the fall of 1999.  A professor from Prince 
Edward Island heard about CE after the Director’s conference talk.  The professor, affiliated with 
Broadleaf at the time, then approached the Director to take on this alliance.  The federal 
government was supplying funding for students to take the CE courses plus a number of other 
technical courses being offered by Broadleaf, such as Microsoft certification.  Broadleaf now has 
the CE jurisdiction and territory for all of the Maritimes. 
 
The Director first met IBS personnel when he presented CE at a Softworld conference in 
British Columbia.  They met again at Softworld in Newfoundland and formed an alliance shortly 
thereafter.  IBS jurisdiction is Denmark, and a few other European countries.  This alliance 
started with government funding in Denmark for unemployed workers. 
Mini-Case One issues are summarized in Table 3.1. 
 
Partner Selection Process 
Cyclic, depending on partner availability 
Organizational approval needed on an ongoing basis 
Director influencing the partners to be chosen 
 
Organizational Characteristics 
Good reputation because of affiliation with the University of Waterloo 
Technical course modules ready to be delivered 
High quality standards 
An administrative structure in place to offer professional courses 
Personal drive of the Director 
 
Desirable Partner Characteristics 
Publicly-funded (per Steering Committee) 
University level rather than Community College or private organization 
Quick decision-maker (per Director) 
Good geographical location, related to sales territory 
Resource dependency (partners must ‘need’ the alliance too for whatever reason) 
Personal friendship between peers (Director and President) at the partner organizations 
 
Alliance Motivation 
Increase geographical reach 
Increase numbers of students 
Increase revenue 
Increase numbers of instructors while maintaining quality 
Obtain external funding 
Expansion of any kind 
More power for the Director 
Legitimacy for the non-CE partners 
Access to markets 
Profit for the private companies 
 
Table 3.1 Mini-Case One Summary 
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3.2.2 Mini-Case Two, Software Alliance  
 
The Software Alliance (SA) was formed in 1992 and continued to 1996.  The alliance was made 
up of eight companies in four cities plus the University of Waterloo plus a project manager.  
Open Text Corporation and Fulcrum Technologies founded the SA to get Strategic Technology 
Program (STP) funding from Industry, Science and Technology Canada (now Industry Canada).  
A primary motivation then was research funding. 
 
The two major partners (Open Text Corporation, Waterloo and Fulcrum Technologies, Ottawa) 
were competitors.  Both companies were full-text database vendors, built text search engines, 
were dominant in their field, and had an interest in expanding to structured text, SGML, and 
relational databases (RDB).  They decided to work together to do joint research, to promote 
research with the University of Waterloo, and to get government funding.  This indicates multiple 
motivations then for their partnership.  The initial agreement was between the two Presidents, 
based on personal contacts. 
 
The focus of the SA alliance was text search in relational databases.  The partners felt that if 
they could get just a tiny piece of the RDB market, their organizations would acquire huge 
revenues.  The two companies wanted to build on existing RDBs, such as those provided by IBM 
and Oracle.  The text searching could either be built on top of the databases or built right in.  The 
RDB market was big enough for both Open Text and Fulcrum, even if one got IBM and the other 
got Oracle, for example.  They felt that their work would go faster and better, however, if they 
worked together.  Another long-term motivation then was company expansion into new markets. 
 
Project Objectives as later defined by the group included the following: 
1. Complete core research extending database management technology to text-intensive 
data 
2. Produce working prototypes 
3. Apply technology to real-world problems 
4. Present results to appropriate standards bodies, publications and third parties 
Major deliverables included HQP prototypes, add-ons and applications, standards, newsletters, 
and a SA website. 
 
Start up issues included finding the ‘right’ members, getting past their competitive natures 
(getting everyone to work together), defining a project where all partners win, financing, 
intellectual property rights, taxation issues, and agreeing on the mechanics.  A formal joint 
venture agreement was put in place defining ownership interests, intellectual property, 
management, and scope of work and deliverables.  Formal planning was done annually or semi-
annually from 1993 to 1996, to keep the project on track and up-to-date with changing members 
and technology. 
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The University of Waterloo is a large, research-based university.  It is known for industry 
contact, spin-off companies and for joint research with industry.  The University of Waterloo was 
a necessary partner for the alliance as the funding required a university partner, Waterloo 
provided neutral ground for meetings and joint work, Waterloo researchers provided research 
expertise, the University of Waterloo was glue for the partners, and the university connection was 
a draw for Fulcrum and some of the smaller partners. 
 
As noted previously, the two major partners (Open Text and Fulcrum Technologies) were 
competitors.  Both companies built text search engines, were dominant in their field, and had an 
interest in expanding to structured text, SGML, and relational databases (RDB).  Since the 
research funding was from Canadian government sources, all partners had to be Canadian to get 
this funding.  Partners were from Waterloo, Ottawa, Toronto and Montreal.  The Montreal partner 
may have been chosen because a Quebec partner was needed.   
 
The large RDB companies – IBM and Oracle - were invited to join the SA, but were not 
interested.  Open Text and Fulcrum needed RDBs, but IBM and Oracle didn’t need text searching 
at that time.  The alliance found additional partners by word of mouth, previous personal contacts, 
and suppliers to Open Text and Fulcrum. 
 
The two other groups in the alliance were SGML (document format) developers and system 
integrators.  The SGML developers were pretty much the only ones in the world at that time.  
They were small companies, and were tied closely to Open Text or Fulcrum.  SoftQuad Inc., 
Toronto, InContext Corporation, Toronto, and Software Exotica were the SGML tool developers.  
All are now out of business or have been bought out by larger companies. 
 
Any number of system integrators could have been chosen.  These particular small firms had 
personal contacts with Open Text or Fulcrum.  Open Text or Fulcrum may have been concerned 
that a large system integrator, such as Andersen Consulting, would take over the alliance.  
Graphnetix Systems Ltd., Montreal, Public System Software (PSS) Limited, Ottawa and Megalith 
Technologies in Ottawa were the system integrators.  PSS is now owned by Open Text. 
 
The SGML developers and the system integrators knew nothing about text, so were 
overwhelmed in the early stages of the alliance.  One of the partners left after six months 
(Software Exoterica), perhaps because they were overwhelmed or they didn’t know the text 
searching area enough or they had to put up a large amount of their own money to get the 
government funding.  Open Text and Fulcrum had to put up about $3 to $4 million in order to get 
matching government funding.  The smaller partners needed about $500,000 to get their matching 
funds. 
 
A contractual joint venture was established with a 36-page document approved by the Boards.  
The document covers ownership, intellectual property, management structure and responsibilities, 
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legal issues, and a statement of work and deliverables.  Intellectual Property belonged to the 
individual companies, but the other companies could share object code, see demonstrations, and 
get exposure to each other’s successes.  The companies jointly developed specifications and 
standards for text searching, but then individually developed prototypes and competing products.  
They were the biggest and best in the world, if not the only companies doing this work.  Ontario 
has world domination in text searching.  The alliance didn’t own anything because the 
specifications and standards were public.  The smaller companies got great exposure to big 
projects being done by Open Text and Fulcrum.  Open Text and Fulcrum got the smaller 
companies to develop SGML code for them, to integrate parts, to build front ends, and so on.  The 
larger companies also got more customers from contacts with the smaller firms. 
 
Project management was also absolutely necessary.  A consultant was hired to do all of the 
paperwork and arrange meetings and generally make the partnership work.  The project plan was 
fully documented with schedule, cost and effort, statement of work, architectural diagrams, and 
so on.  The project manager established planning rules as follows: 
• Every activity must have a tangible deliverable 
• Each team must deliver at least one result every 6 months for peer review 
• All schedules must be supported with forecasts of effort and cost 
• Executives of each partner must commit in writing to its part of the implementation 
 
Public specifications and standards were the major output of the alliance. Each firm also had 
individual deliverables as a result of this work.  The Alliance concluded its work in 1996.  In 
1997, the SA received a Conference Board of Canada and an NSERC award for outstanding 
university-industry research collaboration.  (University-Industry R&D Partnerships Award)  The 
lead Alliance people from Open Text and Fulcrum Technologies have both gone on to be 
recognized world wide for their contributions to XML.  As they were key personnel involved in 
the SA, their personal success may be identified as another indicator of positive alliance 
performance.  The companies’ combined income at the start of the project was only about $3 
million annually.  All of them grew immensely during the tenure of this alliance though, so all 
succeeded very well.  Some of Kenichi Ohmae’s (Chairman, McKinsey & Company, Japan) 
suggestions for a positive collaboration include personal commitment, allocation of management 
time, mutual respect and trust, mutual benefit (win-win), flexibility to change over time, and 
establishment of a tight legal contract. (Bleeke and Ernst 1994)  The SA partners did all of these 
things and produced a very high-performing consortium. 
 
Some lessons documented by the project manager and partners: 
• Devote about 5% of the project cost to centralized coordination and management 
• Document the alliance management structure and put it in place early 
• Ensure face-to-face contact early in the alliance 
• Ensure that leaders are objective and unbiased in this alliance work 
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• Obtain one strong team leader per partner 
• Obtain strong leaders for all working groups 
• Establish small dedicated teams rather than large part-time groups 
• Differentiate business and technical management 
• Define intellectual property rights before work begins 
• Be flexible; expect change 
• Focus work on specific end results, but be prepared for these to change 
• Specify plans, schedules, deliverables, and so on in writing 
• Schedule deliverables every 6 months or less to stay on track 
• Ensure that work is distributed equally among partners 
• Communicate regularly 
 
Mini-Case Two issues are summarized in Table 3.2. 
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Partner Selection Process 
Key partners were sought first 
Compromises were made when first choice partners were not available 




Young: less than 10 years old 
Aggressively growing 
Strong research links to the University of Waterloo 
 
Desirable Partner Characteristics 
Some similar firms  
Suppliers were smaller, so power and control issues in the alliance 
Small system developers meant that OT and Fulcrum could remain in control of the alliance 
Non-profit research facility: The University of Waterloo provided a large, research-oriented 
university with many industry contacts, spin-off companies, and joint research with industry.  
It also provided neutral ground, research expertise, glue to bind the industry partners, and a 
legitimacy draw for the smaller partners. 
IBM and Oracle were invited, but declined.  They didn’t need text searching at the time, and there 
would have been big power and control issues if they had joined. 
 
Alliance Motivation 
Obtain research funding 
Develop new products 
Increase revenue 
Obtain legitimacy (smaller companies in particular) 
Company expansion into new markets 
Resource dependence (Open Text and Fulcrum needed SGML developers and system integrators) 
Do joint research 
Promote research with the University of Waterloo 
 
Table 3.2 Mini-Case Two Summary 
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3.2.3 Analysis of the Initial Mini-Cases  
 
Referring back to the research questions, some answers from the mini-case studies may be 
identified as follows: 
 
1. How do organizations choose collaborative partners? 
 
CE found its collaborative partners through prior relationships, networking and advertising.  In 
general, CE had a particular territory of interest for expansion and found partners through 
personal contact initiatives. 
 
In the SA, collaborative partners were found through prior relationships.  Open Text knew the 
University of Waterloo researchers since the company was founded from the university.  Open 
Text knew Fulcrum Technologies as a competitor and the presidents knew each other on a 
personal level.  The other smaller partners were all suppliers to Open Text or Fulcrum. 
 
It should be noted that neither IBM nor Oracle joined the partnership although invited to do so.  
Since there was no prior business or personal relationship and no clear motivation for these 
companies to join, they didn’t.  The consortium would have certainly been much different if IBM 
or Oracle were involved, as the goals of these companies may not have aligned well with the 
smaller firms.  As well, there would have presumably been power issues in that the larger 
companies may have wanted to control the alliance. 
 
2. Why do organizations choose a particular partner?   
 
CE chose particular partners based on the partner characteristics identified as important from 
its board.  This selection was tempered, however, by the availability of partners and by the 
decision-making speed required by CE’s Director. 
 
Several factors affected the SA partnership.  The strong relationship between Open Text and 
the University of Waterloo made Waterloo a prime candidate to be the university partner required 
for research funding.  The personal relationship between the presidents of Open Text and 
Fulcrum made Fulcrum a good candidate as another major player.  Even though the companies 
were competitors, their executive leaders were moving the companies in the same direction so it 
made sense to have them work together as collaborators in new research.   
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The smaller companies were also chosen because of previous relationships with Open Text or 
Fulcrum.  Because the SGML developers were pretty much the only ones in the world at that 
time, they were necessary for the alliance.  The system integrators all had worked previously with 
the larger partners.  Larger companies, such as Andersen, were deliberately not chosen, as they 
would have upset the balance of power. 
 
Additional similar questions may be answered as follows:  
 
3. Is there an optimum partner? 
From the previous discussion, the University of Waterloo certainly seemed to be an ideal 
university partner because of its experience with industry and its founding role with Open Text.  
Similarly, the SGML developers were optimum as they were the only such firms in the world.  
Fulcrum Technologies and the system integrators could have been chosen from a number of 
competitors, but again all seemed optimum for this alliance because of their positive prior 
relationships. 
 
4. What qualities does each partner look for or find in the other? 
The qualities of interest for the SA related to the research funding requirements and to the type 
of new research that Open Text and Fulcrum wanted to explore.  Specific qualities for the 
partners of this consortium were that they were Canadian, had research experience, and expressed 
interest in text searching in relational databases. 
 
5. Why is this important?  How does it contribute to the dynamic? 
The joint effort to develop new text searching software for relational databases overcame the 
differences amongst the partners.  One partner, the University of Waterloo, was very large, but 
non-profit.  Two of the industry partners, Open Text and Fulcrum, were relatively large.  The 
other industry partners were very small.  Each partner, however, brought a particular expertise to 
the consortium – research experience, knowledge of text searching, SGML capability, and so on.  
The combination of talents plus the desire to work together to develop new standards and 
products jointly allowed the consortium to succeed. 
 
6. What factors are important in collaborative partner selection?   
Alliance motivation, personal connections and similar organizational characteristics affected 
the partnerships made by both of these mini-case studies.  Alliance motivation is the trigger for a 
serious search for a partner.  The final choice, however, is often based on prior knowledge of the 




3.3 Model Development 
 
Preliminary Partner Selection models were built on the basis of rational decision-making and 
straight-line processes as documented in the partnership literature.  As the models matured, 
however, it became obvious that they could not explain much of the empirical evidence gathered 
from initial case study interviews.  For example, both of the case studies indicated that they had 
‘first choice’ partners who had not worked out for whatever reason, leading to a new search for 
‘second choice’ partners.  The cases also implied the notion of ‘key partners’, which were not 
identified in the partnership literature. 
 
A variety of issues and data models were explored.  Linear and reputational frameworks were 
developed as shown in Figures 3.1 and 3.2.  Figure 3.1, a Linear Framework for Partner 
Selection, combines Alliance Motivation and Organizational Characteristics and compares them 
to the Characteristics of the potential Partner.  Then, moderated by Resource Availability and 
depending on Selection Criteria, a balanced Partner Selection can be made.  Similarly, Figure 3.2, 
a Reputational Framework for Partner Selection, compares Organizational Reputation to Potential 
Partners’ Reputations and makes a reasoned Partner Selection. 
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Figure 3.2 A Reputational Framework for Partner Selection 
 
Once it became obvious that the status quo models were not appropriate, other issues and 
models were considered that might be able to better explain the ‘real-world’ partnerships that had 
been observed. 
 
Two concerns that needed to be considered were ‘cycling back’ or negotiation and ‘key 
partners’. Engineering and Computer Science use a number of standard models, such as finite 
state machines, entity-relationship, waterfall, and spiral models.  Finite state machines are 
excellent for describing products that can be modeled in terms of states and transitions between 
states.  The method appeared to be too rational and mathematical, however, to explain partner 
selection.  Similarly, the spiral model did not appear to be appropriate because it does not allow 
for cycling back or negotiation.  It models just one circular motion, adding more and more detail.  





















Figure 3.3 Entity-Relationship Model 1 (Partner) 
Three variations of Entity-Relationship Models were developed.  Model 1, shown in Figure 
3.3, describes a Partner, Model 2, Figure 3.4, describes a Partnership, and Model 3, Figure 3.5, 
describes the beginnings of a Partnership Process.  While the models described the notion of 
different types of partners, such as a Key Partner very well, overall they appeared to be too open 
and uninformative.  As well, entity-relationship models are meant to describe data ‘at rest’ so 















































Figure 3.5 Entity-Relationship Model 3 (Partnership Process) 
 
The Waterfall Model, illustrated in Figure 3.6, began with the idea of a rational top-down 
choice of partner, but allowed cycling back from the Desired Outcome.  That is, once a 
partnership was formed, new funding could be obtained and new partners could be selected if 
necessary.  This model begins with negotiation between the Government and Principal 
Investigator (or any Funder and Partnership Driver).  Once the preliminary negotiation is done, 
the Key Partners are chosen by the Principal Investigator.  Lesser Partners are later chosen by 
both the Principal Investigator and the Key Partners.  All of the partners work together to achieve 
a Desired Outcome and then the process can be repeated for a new partnership. 
 
 
  Negotiation 
 
 











Principal Investigator Government 
Figure 3.6 Waterfall Model 
 
The Waterfall Model became the template for the final Partner Negotiation Model.  In 
considering the model, however, several questions came to mind.  Where does the partner 
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negotiation process begin?  With the partnership motivation, the government (or other funder), 
the principal investigator, or some synergetic combination of the three?  What do the lines in this 
model represent? 
 
The original Partner Negotiation Model only had two cycles – one for deal-making and the 
second for partner selection.  In a second version, connections from all partners to their 
organization were noted.  Finally, an Organizational Cycle was added after empirical 
confirmation from data collection and analysis.   
 
Naming conventions also evolved with the model.  The original model began with the notion of 
a Funder and Principal Investigator in the deal-making cycle since these are terms commonly 
used in university partnerships.  The terminology was changed to Sponsor and Driver as the work 
progressed to broaden the range of people or organizations involved in deal-making on both 
sides. 
 
3.4 Process and Model 
 
3.4.1 Partner Negotiation Process 
 
As noted in Section 3.2, research indicated that several elements were incorrect or missing from 
many academic partner selection models.  In particular, the following assumptions of existing 
models could be better described. 
 
1. Existing work assumes a straight-line start to finish selection process.  In practice, there 
appeared to be a back and forth negotiation process.   
2. The straight-line partner selection process was more likely a cycle. 
3. Existing literature did not differentiate among partners, other than perhaps the suggestion 
of an alliance ‘driver’.  Many differences were observed in partners and there appeared to 
be many different roles.   
4. Existing models did not differentiate informal personal negotiation (deal-making) among 
a small number of people from formal organizational documentation. 
5. There was no mention of organizational approval, negotiation or involvement. 
6. Choice of partners was often not a simple rational decision.  Social network, reputation 
and other factors could be key indicators of choice. 
 
38 
1  Partner Negotiation 
 
This research suggests that ‘partner selection’ is a misnomer; what is really happening is ‘partner 
negotiation’.  Academic literature describes a partner ‘selected’ based on a number of specific 
characteristics using a seemingly rational decision-making process.  If that partner is not available 
for whatever reason, however, partner negotiation (and rationalization) takes place for a second or 
third best partner.  Depending on the alliance and the various goals of each party, it may not be a 
simple task to just select a desirable partner. 
 
Negotiation also takes place when some partners are chosen before others.  The first or second 
partner may influence the choice of subsequent partners. 
 
Partner negotiation can begin with a partner, a funding agency, a principal investigator and/or 
each of their goals or motivations.  For one partner, the goal may be to find a partner or funder to 
achieve a specific goal.  Simultaneously, the funders are looking for partners to work for them.  
Government funders, for example, may have a goal of connecting Canada electronically or 
supporting higher education or getting re-elected.  By supporting graduate students or a research 
project, the funders can say that they are supporting higher education and distance education and 
connectivity Canada-wide.   
 
The funders cannot achieve their goals, however, without someone in higher education to help 
them.  Similarly, the university community cannot support its work without research money.  It 
appears that there must be at least one reciprocal goal to initiate a partnership.   
 
The process then is negotiation between principal investigator (organization or person) and 
funder for a tentative deal.  The deal is finalized.  Final partners are negotiated, depending on 
resource availability, constraints, and other issues.  The partner negotiation cycles back to the 
principal investigator as additional partners are added.   
 
2  Cyclic Process 
 
Partners are not rationally chosen one at a time.  The sponsor and driver may initially have 
particular partners in mind for  key partners.  Once those partners are approached, however, they 
may not be interested or they may have previous commitments.  As first choice partners are 
eliminated, the team will approach second and third choice candidates until suitable key partners 
have been found.  Once these critical partners have joined the partnership, they may have their 
own input regarding additional partners.  This cycle of partner negotiation and selection will 
continue until the partnership stabilizes. 
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3  Different Kinds of Partners 
 
Once the funding and terms of agreement are met, key and other final partners are negotiated.  
Some tentative partners may have been proposed during the proposal and negotiation stages, but 
final partners now need to be cemented.  The final partners would ideally be the tentative 
partners, but this is not always possible.  One or more of the tentative partners may now have 
another project underway and therefore not have time for this project. 
 
Different partners have different roles to play in the partnership.  The sponsor and driver make 
an initial informal deal and get the alliance underway.  The key partners form the cornerstone of 
the alliance and help determine its focus and strength.  Additional partners are added as needed to 
round out the partnership, but generally have less critical functions.  Partners are therefore not 
necessarily either equal or similar.   
 
Different kinds of partners may lead to diverse partnership structures, establishing hierarchies 
or peer-to-peer relationships.  Some networks, such as Amazon or Barnes & Noble, operate with 
a central star structure.  Others like Reuters Greenhouse Fund established networks of networks.  
A large social network is built of companies working with other companies. (Kanter 2001) 
 
4  Deal-Making Cycle and Choice Opportunity 
 
There were several levels or phases of partnership formation, including an early deal-making 
cycle and real or anticipated choice opportunity.  The deal-making typically takes place between 
a small number of people and is very informal until a tentative deal is reached.  Once that 
happens, the initial contacts may have to verify the terms of the deal or seek approval or provide 
benefits to others in their organization.  Formal organizational documentation may follow. 
 
Barnes & Noble has the manager who signs a deal for them also manage the deal.  (Kanter 
2001) The manager therefore becomes both the Sponsor and the Driver in the model. 
 
5  Organizational Negotiation 
 
Ongoing organizational negotiation was observed at all stages of partner selection.  During the 
initial deal-making cycle, the sponsor and driver may work one-on-one until they find a 
partnership template that is suitable for both sides.  At this time, both parties may need to 
negotiate with their organizations to obtain agreement in principle for the deal.  Similarly, as key 
partners and additional partners are added, the partnership is solidified and the partner negotiation 




Also, when a negotiator moves to another organization, two forms of organizational 
negotiation may be needed.  There must be a new negotiator at the first organization who may or 
may not want to be in the partnership.  Second, the original negotiator may want to bring his or 
her new organization into the partnership. 
 
6  Partner Choice 
 
Existing models assume rational decision-making, based on a rigid set of characteristics or 
criteria.  In fact, criteria may change depending on resource availability and other factors.  For 
example, current work offers no sense of ‘time’ or ‘timing’.  Once the partnership was 
established, there was more decision-making and less negotiation.  Some things were already set 
in stone, so the longer the partnership was in place, the less flexible or adaptable it was. 
 
3.4.2 Partner Negotiation Model 
 
The original view of a Partner Selection Model has instead become a Partner Negotiation Model, 
describing a group of three negotiation cycle processes.  Observations showed that partners were 
not being selected at all, but rather negotiated depending on a number of constraints.  Figure 3.7, 
the final Partner Negotiation Model, outlines the processes producing a final selection of alliance 
partners.  These processes include a Deal-making Cycle, an Organizational Cycle, and a Partner 
Selection cycle.  The result of negotiations is the selection of a number of appropriate partners. 
 
There is negotiation and adjustment throughout the partnership process.  First there is 
negotiation and adjustment of initial goals until a compatible match is found between the Funder 
and the Principal Investigator.  Since both sides generally will want to make a deal, there is good 
reason to believe that they will find common ground.  As part of this process, there is negotiation 
of the particular Choice Opportunity between the two sides.  A second negotiation with each 
Organization will finalize the specific deal and identify constraints.  Third is the negotiation and 
adjustment of Key Partners as first, second and sometimes third choice partners are approached 
and accepted or rejected.  Finally, negotiation of lesser Partners with both the Key Partners and 








   
 
 









Cycle => Approval 
2. Driver 
3. Key Partners 
4. Partners 
C. Partner Role/Selection 
Cycle => Alliance 
5. Organization 1. Sponsor 
A. Deal-making Cycle => 
Choice Opportunity 
Figure 3.7 Partner Negotiation Model 
 
Rectangles represent basic elements (people or organizations) in the model. 
Lines with double-arrows represent the two-way back and forth negotiations. 
Ovals represent the three negotiation cycles. 
 
3.4.2.1 Model Elements 
 
1. Sponsor 
The Sponsor is the person, organization or sponsor who has control over financial and other 
resources to allow the partnership to go ahead.  This terminology was deliberately changed from 
Funder to Sponsor to indicate a broader view than monetary resources. 
 
2. Driver 
The Driver is the person who is the motivating force behind the action and implementation of the 
partnership.  This person doesn’t necessarily do the work, but makes sure that the work gets done. 
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3. Key Partners 
Key Partners are the necessary partners with critical skills, access to resources, or other highly 
desirable traits.  They form the core of the partnership and help to attract other partners, to 
increase the visibility and reputation of the partnership and add to its status. 
 
4. Partners 
These are the people or organizations who round out the partnership to a suitable size or structure. 
 
5. Organization 
This represents the administration in each partner organization.  Approval is needed from at least 
one level of administration and often several levels, depending on the nature of the partnership. 
 
3.4.2.2 Model Cycles 
 
A. Deal-Making Cycle 
 
The first negotiation process is the Deal-making Cycle.  This identifies work back and forth 
between two negotiators to finalize a concrete Choice Opportunity (CO).  The two negotiators are 
people representing the Sponsor (i.e. government) and a Driver (i.e. a university).  The Sponsor is 
the organization or person with the financial or other resources to support the partnership.  The 
Driver is the person who will organize and control the work to be done, including gathering 
partners as needed.  The Sponsor and the Driver will both have sets of goals to be met and these 
will need to be mutually agreed and negotiated as part of this Deal-Making Cycle.   
 
The Choice Opportunity is a vague hypothetical deal that can be made between them.  The 
partnership exhibits a synergy of events, timing, and so on leading to a Choice Opportunity.  The 
two negotiators want to make a deal, based on their individual Organizational Goals.  The 
Sponsor, for example, might want to have universities using CANARIE, a Canadian government 
research network.  The Driver might want to bring research funds into the university.  The two 
negotiators work together until they find a suitable positive concrete CO, such as delivery of 
Online Course Materials using the CANARIE network.  During this initial negotiation, the Driver 
may propose a number of potential alliance partners for the Online Course Materials work. 
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B. Organizational Cycle (1) 
 
Once the two people or organizations have agreed that a deal is possible, they may have to check 
back with others in their organizations for final approval or authorization.  The two negotiators 
return to their respective organizations to obtain input and approval from the organization.  The 
higher the negotiators are in the organization, the less approval will be needed.  The better the CO 
for a particular organization, the less approval will be needed.  This second set of negotiations 
between the negotiators and their organizations is the Organizational Cycle.  Both the Sponsor 
and the Driver need to negotiate with their organizations to get corporate buy-in on the potential 
CO.  After organizational approval, the final deal is reached.  A critical mass of potential partners 
may need to commit to the partnership before a deal can be confirmed. 
 
C. Partner Role/Selection Cycle 
 
Once the CO approval is finalized, the deal can be signed and go ahead.  This begins the Partner 
Selection Cycle where actual alliance partners are chosen.  The Partner Selection Cycle is a 
process of negotiation to achieve mutually satisfactory partners.  Depending on the size of 
project, the Driver will choose Key Partners first.  Key Partners are those partners absolutely 
needed to make for a good alliance.  They might be better quality or better reputation partners, or 
the Sponsor might mandate them.  As the Key Partners sign on, they become part of the Partner 
Selection Cycle themselves by providing input on additional partners.  For example, a Key 
Partner may absolutely want or not want another Partner proposed by the Driver.  The Key 
Partners and the Driver will negotiate mutually acceptable goals, check with their organizations 
for approval, and then finalize their agreements.  There may be some minimal set of partners 
needed to establish feasibility, making the role of Key Partner significant in advancing the 
process. 
 
Similarly, other Partners will be chosen after Key Partners, negotiating their own goals and 
obtaining their own organizational approval.  At this stage, the Driver and the Key Partners may 
not need to obtain any further organizational involvement since presumably they have already 
obtained a high-level blanket approval to go ahead with the partnership as appropriate. 
 
B. Organizational Cycle (2) 
 
As the above Partner Selection Cycle is going on, another round of Organizational Cycle 
negotiation begins.  This time, all of the partners, including the Driver, the Key Partners and the 
other Partners, must negotiate with their organizations to obtain input and approval for the 
partnership. Once again, the higher the negotiators are in the organization, the less approval will 
be needed.  Once again, the better the CO for a particular organization, the less approval will be 
needed.  The higher profile the partnership, the less approval will be needed.  The higher the 





It was hypothesized in the early stages of this research that partner selection would be rational, 
straight-forward and simple.  Results were expected to include a linear process of partner 
selection based on rational decision-making.  Instead, there was a complex process of negotiation 
cycles, including funders, drivers, different types of partners, and organizational approval.  
Further, observation showed that decision-making was not only based on specific (or ambiguous) 
partner requirements, but also on resource availability, social network, reputation, and politics.  
 
Initial interviewees described a process of partner negotiation rather than selection.  Both of the 
initial case studies had potential partners that they would have liked to have in their partnership, 
but ended up without.  The potential partners perhaps were over-extended with other partnerships 
or they were too busy for a partnership at this time or they were not interested in a partnership 
with this particular group.  For each of these excuses and for each missed partner, the partnership 
team would just regroup and go out to find another appropriate partner.  The second partner 
would perhaps not be quite as good as the potential first, but they would provide some advantage 
for the partnership.  Drivers of the partnerships spent a good deal of time negotiating with 
potential partners to convince at least some to sign on.  There was a sense of discussion, 
conferencing, compromising, cooperation and collaboration.  The partnership drivers would have 
liked to have selected their first choices, but that often was not possible.  Partner selection is an 
interactive, dynamic process. 
 
Propositions were developed from the initial mini-case studies and the Partner Negotiation 
Model.  Four major issues were identified. 
 
3.5.1 Deal-Making Cycle 
 
P1: The process begins with a Deal-making Cycle of informal negotiation between a Sponsor and 
a Driver, leading to formal documentation of a Choice Opportunity. 
 
The first cycle described by the initial interviewees was one of deciding exactly what the 
partnership would encompass, who might be appropriate partners, how much money would be 
involved, the main focus of the collaboration, and so on.  This informal negotiation between the 
partnership catalysts later led to formal documentation of a final agreement.  During this cycle, 
the project details are negotiated, specific hard constraints are defined and funding is quantified.  
Once the detail is agreeable to both parties, a formal Partnership Agreement is documented. 
 
This proposition was measured by the number and nature of the preliminary negotiations 
identified in interviews and archival data.  As well, the number of instances of terms such as 
formal, bureaucratic, conventional, choice, opportunity, prospect and so on were counted. 
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3.5.2 Partnership Roles 
 
P2: Partners are chosen to play different Partnership Roles, both partner negotiation and 
operational roles. 
 
There are at least four partner negotiation roles.  The Sponsor provides the money, motivation or 
choice opportunity for the partnership to exist at all. The Driver gets the partnership started and 
keeps the momentum going.  Key partners are chosen based on experience or reputation to build a 
strong foundation for the partnership and as bait for future partners.  Other partners are chosen to 
round out the partnership and fill in gaps in requirements. 
 
Initial interviewees described different work to be done and different roles both in partner 
negotiation and operationally in the partnership.  In particular, in the Partner Selection process, 
they described the four roles which were noted previously: 
1. A Sponsor to provide resources  
2. A Driver to get the alliance going 
3. Key Partners to build the alliance and attract other partners 
4. Other Partners as needed to build the alliance 
 
Operationally, partners also have various roles and responsibilities, different amounts of time 
spent on the alliance, different influence in decision-making, different control issues, and 
different amounts of funding.  In terms of partnership development, the people involved vary 
from the Presidential level of the organization through middle management to the line workers in 
the organization who actually make the partnership work.  Similar roles often emerge within the 
partnership itself, depending on its size and structure. 
 
Since the research focus is partner negotiation and selection, the measurement of this 
proposition concentrated on the identification of the four roles of Sponsor, Driver, Key Partner 
and Partner.  Interview material, archival data and partnership documentation was searched for 
words such as role, responsibility, task, part, job, title, position and function.  The operational 
roles were separated from the partnership roles as needed. 
 
3.5.3 Organizational Approval Cycles 
 
P3: The process includes cycles of Organizational Approval. 
 
During partnership negotiations, observations showed that organizations and organizational 
approval are part of the negotiation process.  Many players checked back with their organization 
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periodically to ensure that the current deal was suitable for them.  This organizational approval 
cycle occurred during the initial deal-making, as key partners were negotiated, and even as lesser 
partners were added, depending on the partnership structure and the impact of the partnership on 
an organization.  Partners appeared to need more or less organizational approval depending on 
their position in the organization.  Those at an upper management level could single-handedly 
make decisions and approve partnerships with much less organizational approval than people at 
lower levels in the organization.  Similarly, people in more open, less-hierarchical organizations 
were able to negotiate with less approval needed. 
 
This proposition was measured by the number and nature of data related to organizations and 
approval.  Data were scanned for terms such as organization, institution, university, department, 
dean, manager, approve, endorse, support, grant, consent, sanction, allow, authorize, and so on. 
 
3.5.4 Criteria and Rationale 
 
P4: Partner choice is not a simple rational decision; it may be based on specific (or ambiguous) 
partner requirements, but also on resource availability, social networks, reputation, and politics. 
 
Partner negotiation, selection and choice is a very complex decision.  Many factors may be part of 
this decision, including personal relationships and previous knowledge of a partner or its 
reputation.  Partner selection literature and theory describe a simple rational process of decision-
making based on predetermined partnership criteria.  In fact, many partner selection processes 
and rationale were observed that were informal, undocumented, and irrational.  In some cases, 
changes in composition of the decision-making group changed the choice of partners.  If the 
process was indeed rational and firm, the choice of partners should not change. 
 
Initial interviews suggested that partners are selected based on a combination of the following 
criteria: 
(a) Specific requirements 
(b) Resource availability 
(c) Social network 
(d) Reputation 
(e) Organizational politics 
(f) Ambiguity 
 
(a) Key partners must meet one of the specific requirements, which may relate to resources, 
geography, reputation or other criteria.  Other partners are identified based on the choice 
opportunities.  Specific requirements are often established as part of the Deal-making Cycle 
described in Proposition 1. 
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(b) The more available potential partners, the more likely the partners will match specific 
constraints exactly.   
 
(c) Potential partners are identified and negotiated through a social network. This suggests that 
the partnership may be among People more than among Institutions.  The social network is work-
related and provides first or second-hand knowledge of people.  The more I’ve chosen you for a 
partnership (or the more experience I have with you), the more likely you will be to choose me 
for subsequent partnerships.  As well, the alliance process is more efficient because of a social 
network.  This ties to both how and why partners are chosen.  The partner selection goes faster or 
more efficiently because the decision-makers already have some knowledge of the potential 
partners.  There is an efficiency of finding people or organizations.  Past experience makes the 
deal-making easier and faster.  People trust each other and assume honest behaviour.   
 
Partner selection works with specific hard constraints first.  Once minimum criteria are met, 
however, the social network kicks in.  Story-telling can justify the choice of any partner by 
justifying the goal and the partner and the process.  That is, selectively telling the ‘good’ reasons 
why this partner was chosen rather than telling the real, underlying reason, which is that the 
partner is a friend and a favour was owed. 
 
People moving from one organization to another support this social network because all players 
now have the second-hand knowledge of the person who moved.  When partners move, they 
often get their new institution involved as a new partner.  The previous institution of such 
partners may leave the partnership, but often remains in the partnership with a new contact 
person.  The partnership and the social network have therefore both grown with a new institution 
and a new person. 
 
(d) Organizational reputation is key to partner selection.  (The term ‘reputation’ is used here as 
expressed by interviewees.  Brewer, Gates and Goldman (2002) use the term ‘prestige’ in their 
discussion of U.S. higher education.)  The higher the organizational reputation, within limits, the 
more likely the organization will be selected to be a partner.  Organizations are more likely to 
choose partners with similar reputations rather than those that are much higher or much lower 
than others in the partnership.    Significantly higher reputation partners are more likely to control 
both the partnership and the lower reputation organizations.  Higher reputation partners provide a 
lower partnership risk and therefore less justification to management.  Higher reputation partners 
can also provide more positive publicity for the partnership, thereby increasing the reputation of 
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Figure 3.8 Partner Reputation Issues 
 
(e) Politics may play a role in terms of whether a partner is selected or not.  The word ‘politics’ 
may be used in a number of ways.  In this context, the politics could be through government 
agencies such as the inclusion of a partner from Quebec or partners from across Canada.  The 
word could also be used, however, in terms of people who were in favour or not depending on 
past experiences.  In this regard, the politics is tied very heavily to the social network.  The more 
positively your organization or you as a person are perceived by the partner selection group, the 
more likely you will be chosen to be a partner.  The more past positive experience you have had 
with existing partners, the more likely you will be chosen to be a partner. 
 
(f) The extent to which a partnership agreement can contain ambiguous language determines how 
flexible partners can be in interpreting their obligations.  The more ambiguous the partnership 
agreement, the more likely that partners will feel that they are able to fulfill the terms.  As the 
flexibility increases (constraints are loosened or eased), then partner choice (variability) 
increases.   
 
An ambiguous Project Title or fuzzy language in the contract can allow a number of meanings 
for the same wording.  This ambiguity is part of the communication structure in formal 
documents, contracts, reports to government, and requests for proposal from government.  The 
more ambiguous the wording, the more likely that any partner will meet the criteria. 
 
Similarly, work to be done is constrained at different universities and other organizations, 
depending on their time and expertise.  The institutions may have a current focus on education, 
collaborations, wireless technologies, and so on.  Government constraints are tied to funding 
priorities, such as distance education, higher education, Canadian networks, and coast-to-coast 
coverage.  Ambiguous partnership agreements can allow many projects to appear to fit 
appropriately to the criteria.  Often partnerships are undertaken between existing university 
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projects and existing government programs, both of which have been adjusted slightly to meet the 
ambiguous partnership criteria.   
 
On the other hand, if organizational constraints prevent ambiguity in wording for flexibility in 
interpretation, partner selection will be constrained.  This can be particularly problematic in an 
innovation project where some degree of open-endedness in requirements may be necessary to 
limit the partners’ risk.   
 
This proposition was measured through observation of the decision-making process and 




The Partner Negotiation Model was developed over a long time period, including information 
from a variety of sources.  The process began with the existing models from recent academic 
writings, expecting that partner selection would be very simple and rational.  After initial 
interviews with people involved in industry-university partnerships, it appeared that partner 
selection was not as straight-forward as it has been proposed in the literature.  Information from 
these initial cases was summarized and analyzed to begin the thought processes for development 
of the model.    A variety of models were developed and explored – rational, reputational, entity-
relationship and waterfall models.  The final Partner Negotiation Model included two cycles of 
deal-making and partner selection.  A third cycle of organizational approval was added later.  The 
partner negotiation process and the elements of the final model were described.  From the model, 
four propositions were suggested related to deal-making, partnership roles, organizational 
approval and partner choice criteria and rationale.  The next chapter describes Research Design 






Research Design and Methodology 
4.1 Introduction 
 
To understand how and why organizations choose collaborative partners, the researcher looked at 
the actual decision-making process described in interviews, documents, self-reporting and partner 
reflection.  Descriptions of this process were compared to the decision-making theories presented 
in the Literature Review.  This method provided data on factors considered in partner selection, 
on selection criteria, and on steps or procedures followed to arrive at a decision.  Two Canada-
wide education consortia were the main focus for this case study.  Interview materials and 
additional data provided input for a description of the case, the partner selection process, selection 
criteria and subsequently a revised model.   
 
A quantitative research design was deliberately not used in this work.  Quantitative research is 
objective, singular, unbiased, formal, and static. (Merriam 1988)   Results require a large sample 
size and focus on numbers and statistical studies using quantities, amounts, counts, and 
frequencies.  Experimental designs, statistical studies, survey research and other quantitative 
methods did not appear to be appropriate since the work included only a small sample size and 
very deep, rich data.  Quantitative research emphasizes the measurement and analysis of causal 
relationships between variables, not processes.  This work was more process-based, descriptive 
and exploratory.  Quantitative results such as tables, figures, frequencies, counts and so on are 
included as supplemental data to reinforce the qualitative results.   
 
A qualitative design approach was chosen for this research beginning with a focused literature 
review to identify key issues.  Early in the work, three people who had been involved in software 
development or distance education partnerships or both were informally interviewed .  These 
initial interviewees were known to the researchers and provided valuable insight into how their 
partner selection had worked.  This limited empirical view was compared to the theoretical ideas 
of the literature and both were used to develop a Partner Negotiation Model.  The Model was 
used as a lens to view partner negotiation and selection, and provided the basis for propositions 
and additional formal interview questions.  The work was continued with a Multiple Case Study 
approach, using two Canadian education consortia as the cases.  An additional eleven subjects 
from universities and government offices across Canada were interviewed formally about these 
two partnerships.  The subjects were chosen based on their knowledge of the partner selection 
process at their location.  Official documentation, contracts, e-mail correspondence and other 
paper and electronic records were collected to supplement the formal interviews.  The interview 
and archival data were analyzed, both by interviewee and by consortia.  Later NVivo, a 
qualitative research tool, was used to help with the organization of the final results.  Comparing 
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the actual data with expected patterns from the model and propositions, significant issues for 
partner negotiation and selection were identified and the model was revised accordingly. 
 
4.2 Qualitative Research Design 
 
A qualitative design with a case study focus was employed for this work.  This method allowed 
consideration of a large number of chaotic factors, unlike experimental or survey approaches. 
(Galliers and Land 1987)  The first phase included an extensive literature review of alliances, 
partner selection issues and decision-making theory.  The literature was supplemented with data 
from three informal interviews of colleagues experienced in forming alliances.  Analysis of the 
Literature Review and initial interviews led to development of a proposed Partner Negotiation 
Model and related propositions.  Next, an Interview Question Guide was developed and eleven 
personal interviews were completed with key players in the targeted domain of Canadian distance 
education consortia.  Data from these additional interviews were collected, as well as archival 
data such as e-mail correspondence, contracts, web pages and other paper documents.  Data 
collected were analyzed and used to produce descriptive results and to update the conceptual 
model.  Finally, these research findings were translated into aids for future partnership 
negotiations. 
 
Qualitative research is appropriate when how and why questions are asked. (Perry 1999)  The 
researcher always “moves from a research question to a paradigm or perspective, and then to the 
empirical world.” (Denzin and Lincoln 1994, p. x).  This research began with two research 
questions – one ‘how’ and one ‘why’.  A model was developed, which became the perspective 
used for the research study.  Finally, a number of interviews were completed. Preliminary model 
designs were presented at a supply chain conference as well to gather further empirical evidence. 
 
The problem of partner selection in alliances is well suited to a qualitative study as there is a 
serious lack of theory and previous research in this area, although there is extensive research on 
alliance formation and typology.  The available literature, discussed in Chapter 2, is focused on 
specific domains and specific types of alliances.  This research focuses on the two consortia in the 
one domain of education consortia in Canada, but future research could propose a general partner 
selection theory based on alliance motivation.  A personal field study approach, such as a one-on-
one interview as part of case study research, is more appropriate than surveys or experiments to 
gather the process, meaning and understanding required for this work.    
 
Qualitative research emphasizes processes and meanings that are not rigorously examined in 
terms of quantity, amount, intensity or frequency.  Qualitative researchers “study things in their 
natural settings, attempting to make sense of, or interpret, phenomena in terms of the meanings 
people bring to them.” (Denzin and Lincoln 1994, p. 2). Qualitative research is concerned with 
process and meaning rather than products or outcomes.  Instead, qualitative research emphasizes 
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interpretation and naturalistic enquiry.  The qualitative researcher is the primary instrument for 
data collection and typically goes out to do fieldwork in the study setting.  According to several 
recent studies, there is a need for more field research in the management sciences. (Clark and 
Payne, 1997; Haynes, 1999)  This research was concerned with the process of partner selection 
and the meaning behind particular partner choice.  The researcher collected all of the data for this 
study.  Fieldwork included individual interviews in university offices, one conference to perform 
multiple interviews, and a second conference to present preliminary results and gather reaction to 
the model. 
 
Qualitative research is descriptive using an  inductive approach as the researcher builds 
abstractions, concepts, propositions, and theories from the details of the study. (Merriam 1988, 
pp. 19-20)  Qualitative work allows reality to be subjective with multiple viewpoints, evolving 
decisions, and emerging design categories identified during the research process. (Firestone 1987; 
Marshall and Rossman 1989)  These results began with a detailed description of the initial two 
case studies.  The cases provided evidence for development of a preliminary model.  The model 
was revised with additional data from e-mails, contracts, interviews and other material on the two 
larger case studies.  Propositions and models evolved as data were collected.  A number of 
viewpoints were found from the personal interviews, archival e-mails, contracts and additional 
data.  Detailed data analysis in Chapter 6 reveals a complex process of coding and recoding until 
the categories appeared appropriate for this work. 
 
Qualitative research may include ethnography, unstructured interviews, textual analysis, 
historical studies, participant observation, visual methods, or cultural and interpretive studies.  
Qualitative researchers collect and study a wide variety of empirical materials, such as case 
studies, personal experience, introspection, interview and so on, always hoping to get a better fix 
on the subject matter at hand.  Case studies were deliberately chosen for this study.  The case 
studies provided an opportunity for informal and formal interviews and data collection with a 
number of partners in existing alliances.  The theoretical model approach also allowed the 
researcher to analyze existing theory and to propose a new model from this work. 
 
Qualitative research is inherently multimethod in focus, involving broad interpretation of data. 
(Brewer and Hunter 1989; Denzin and Lincoln 1994)  Its practitioners are sensitive to the value of 
the multimethod approach. (Nelson, Treichler et al. 1992, p. 2).  The use of multiple methods 
allows the researcher to triangulate and better understand the data.  Multiple methods, empirical 
materials, perspectives and observers in a single study can add depth, rigor, and breadth to the 
study. (Flick 1992)  This work included case studies, interviews, fieldwork, textual analysis, 
historical studies of e-mail and existing theories, and archival data collection of contracts and 
statistical studies. 
 
Qualitative research is an interdisciplinary, transdisciplinary, and sometimes 
counterdisciplinary approach.  It crosscuts the humanities and the social and physical sciences.  
Common qualitative research methods come from a variety of disciplinary fields.  Some 
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approaches include ethnography from anthropology, case studies from political and social 
sciences, grounded theory from sociology and phenomenology from psychology. (Lancy 1993; 
Creswell 1994)  This work is based in management sciences (deal-making, decision-making, 
organizational approval, partner roles, reputation), but includes elements of sociology (social 
networks, role-playing), psychology (deal-making, ambiguity), political science (politics), 
education (the detailed cases) and technology (online course offerings, networks of institutions).  
Table 4.1 summarizes the characteristics of qualitative research and their instantiation in this 
research. 
 
QUALITATIVE RESEARCH THIS RESEARCH 
‘How’ or ‘Why’ research questions How were collaborative partners chosen?   
Why were particular partners chosen? 
Research questions lead to one perspective and 
then to empirical study 
Research questions led to Partner Negotiation 
Model followed by interviews 
Exploratory process and meaning Partner selection process and criteria 
Researcher is the primary instrument Researcher collected all data 
Fieldwork External interviews and two conferences 
Descriptive  Detailed descriptions of case studies 
Inductive approach Model and propositions evolved with data 
Complex data analysis and coding 
Multiple viewpoints Personal interviews, archival e-mails, contracts 
and additional data  
Multiple methods Case studies, interviews, archival data 
Interdisciplinary Management sciences, sociology, psychology, 
political science, education, technology 
Large number of chaotic factors Many motivations for new partnerships 
Multifaceted partner negotiation process 
Multiple, complex reasons for partner selection 
Small sample size Two initial case studies 
Two detailed large case studies 
Deep, rich data Multiple detailed interviews 
Archival e-mails and statistical studies 
Contracts and other written documentation 
 
Table 4.1 Characteristics of Qualitative Research 
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4.3 Case Study Research 
4.3.1 Characteristics 
 
A case study is an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-
life context when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident and in 
which multiple sources of evidence are used. (Yin 1989)  There can be single- and multiple-case 
studies.  Case studies can include quantitative evidence.  Case studies can be used in evaluation 
research to explain causal links, to describe a real-life context, to comprehend a phenomenon, or 
to explore a variety of outcomes from the same phenomenon.  Case study research allows 
detailed understanding of the case rather than conclusive generalization beyond.     
 
Table 4.2 summarizes case study research and its relevance to this research. 
 
 
CASE STUDY RESEARCH THIS RESEARCH 
Single or multiple objects Two education consortia 
Time boundary Six years: Start-up to 2005 
Activity boundary Formation and subsequent partner selection 
Variety of data collection procedures Interviews, e-mails, documents 
Multiple sources of evidence Partners, administrators, government, web 
May include quantitative evidence Numbers of universities, consortia, partners 
and criteria 
‘How’ or ‘Why’ research questions How were collaborative partners chosen?   
Why were particular partners chosen? 
Investigator has little control over events No control over partner choice 
Focus on real-world current phenomenon Alliances and consortia are ubiquitous  
Empirical inquiry Interviews of key and supporting partners 
Describe a phenomenon Description of case history and partner 
selection issues 
 
Table 4.2 Characteristics of Case Study Research 
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This research studies how and why alliance partners are chosen.  The case study approach was 
selected for this study as there are a small number of specific distance education alliances of 
interest.  This provided data for a multiple case study.  This method is suitable for this research as 
it provides a convenient method of data collection from known contacts in the Canadian 
partnerships of interest.  The multiple case study approach has also provided triangulated data to 
verify new theories for the development of a final Partner Negotiation Model.   
 
A case study focuses on a program, an event, an activity, a process or one or more individuals 
that are explored in depth by the researcher.  The scope of the case is bounded by time and 
activity.  Information is collected using a variety of data collection procedures over a sustained 
period of time. (Stake 1995; Creswell 2003)  Interest in the use of case study research increased 
in business schools in the United States in the late 1980’s. (Yin 1989) 
 
Case studies often involve the study of just one entity or phenomenon for a specific time 
period.  (Creswell 1994)  Detailed information is gathered through a variety of data collection 
procedures. (Merriam 1988; Yin 1989) Case study research can be extended with multiple cases 
and the comparison and triangulation of data.  A case may use single or multiple items for 
observation.  It may be simple or complex.  The study may be long or short-term.  The case is a 
specific, unique thing that can be clearly delineated.  In intrinsic case studies, the researcher 
wants to better understand this specific case.  The case itself is of interest.  The immediate focus 
is not to understand some larger problem, such as literacy or teenage drug use, nor is the purpose 
theory building although theories may evolve as the study progresses.  In instrumental case 
studies, a case is studied to shed light on specific issues or theories.  A collective case study 
studies a large number of cases to shed light on general theories or phenomena.  A teaching case 
study is used to illustrate a point in class rather than for research purposes.  This work is best 
described as an instrumental case study since the case studies are being used to better understand 




The use of only one case study with three organizational theories and three key research questions 
can still explain events.  An example in (Yin 1989) describes three theories that were compared 
with actual events to see which theory best explained what happened during the Cuban Missile 
Crisis. 
 
Case studies are preferred when how or why research questions are being posed, when the 
investigator has little control over events, and when the focus is on some real-world current 
phenomenon. (Yin 1989)  In this study, the primary research questions focus on ‘how’ and ‘why’ 
collaborative partners are chosen.  There is no control over the number or nature of 
interorganizational relationships under study.  Finally these partnerships are ubiquitous in 
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universities and most other business organizations today, so the case study method appears to be 
appropriate under all three conditions. 
 
“Case study is not a methodological choice, but a choice of object to be studied.  Case study is 
defined by interest in individual cases, not by the methods of inquiry used.”  (Stake 1994, p. 236).  
A doctor examining a sick child will have both quantitative and qualitative records, probably 
more quantitative.  A social worker examining a neglected child will also have both quantitative 
and qualitative records, but probably more qualitative.  The object being examined makes this a 
case study, not the way that the object is studied.   
 
Case studies include what is common and what is particular about the case and they always 
provide a unique result.  (Stouffer 1941)  The uniqueness may include: 
1. the nature of the case 
2. its historical background 
3. the physical setting 
4. other contexts, including economic, political, legal, and aesthetic 
5. other cases through which this case is recognized 
6. those informants through whom the case can be known 
 
Although each case is unique, the complexity of its history and environment and other similar 
cases can make its results useful for a broader audience.  Because of this complexity, the case 
may be very difficult to delineate.  Examination of diverse issues and contexts allows a broad 
study of this complexity.  Methods and items of study are chosen based on their potential to 




Potential problems with the case study method are lack of rigor, biased views either from the 
researcher or the case participants, and very little basis for scientific generalization. There are 
practical limitations on the number of people interviewed, the time available to interview and the 
amount of paper and e-mail data collected.  (Parkhe 1993)  A further complaint is that case 
studies take too long and produce massive, unreadable documents.   
 
Standardized guides, protocols and a formal data collection and analysis process can help to 
provide thoroughness and reduce researcher bias.  Participant bias may be reduced with multiple 
interviews, multiple interviewers or several ways of asking the same question.  Case studies may 
provide theoretical results rather than large-scale evidence of a phenomenon.  “Case studies are 
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generalizable to theoretical propositions and not to populations or universes.” (Yin 1989, p. 21)  
The restriction on people, time and materials, although constricting in itself, will help to minimize 
the length of time and volume of documents produced in a case study.  Comparison of results 
with known theories and multiple data collection methods allow triangulation and breadth. 
 
To increase the rigor and reliability of the data collection, a standardized Interview Protocol 
Form, Interview Question Guide and a pattern-matching matrix for data collection were 
developed.  Field study data was also formally compared with existing partner selection theories.  
This allowed a focus on very specific issues of interest.  Biased views from the researcher were 
reduced with the structured methodology.  Biased views from the case participants were tempered 
through the collection of multiple mini-cases from a number of participants in the same 
partnership.  The researcher does not intend to generalize this data to a universal population, but 
only to a potential partner selection theory.  Finally, since the fieldwork is very focused on the 
specific issue of partner selection, a limited number of university partners were interviewed.  
Concentrating on the particular partner selection characteristics identified in existing theory 
minimized the time for data collection and the volume of data. 
 





Lack of rigor Standardized Interview Protocol Form, Interview Question Guide, 
formal data collection and analysis process 
Researcher bias Standardized processes as above 
Participant bias Multiple interviewees, similar questions 
Minimal generalization Generalized to a model, not to a population 
Practical restrictions Limited time, people and materials to use 
Lengthy process Restrictions above will limit the process 
Vast documentation Limited to thesis length plus appendices 
 
Table 4.3 Limitations of Case Study Research 
4.4 Reliability and Validity 
 
Common strategies used to check the accuracy of findings in qualitative research include the 
following ideas (Creswell 2003), which were used in this work.   
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1. Triangulate the data with a variety of interviewees and a variety of data sources 
2. Take the major findings to an interviewee or another knowledgeable source and have 
them verify its accuracy (member-checking) 
3. Provide a rich, thick description of the case studies 
4. Clarify researcher bias 
5. Present negative or discrepant information 
 
To ensure that this work is accurate, generalizable, and able to be replicated, it is important to 
discuss the notions of reliability and validity in the context of qualitative research. (Miles and 
Huberman 1984; Merriam 1988; Creswell 1994)  Reliable and replicable work can be achieved 
through multiple cases, a variety of data sources, multiple interviewers, and multiple data analysis 
methods.  Interviews may be tape recorded to maximize accuracy.  Inter-rater reliability can 
confirm coding accuracy. 
 
In this study, the multiple case study approach with multiple interviews, contracts, and other 
documentation provided triangulated data for the development of a Partner Negotiation Model.  
Two large-scale cases were used plus initial case studies of other partnerships.  A variety of data 
collection types were used, including interviews, document collection, e-mails, government 
websites and contracts.  Written Cases and interviews were sent back to verify information with 
interviewees and the Consortium 1 Executive Director.  Reliability and three types of validity are 
discussed below. 
 
Reliability is being able to demonstrate that the operations of a study, such as the data 
collection procedures, can be repeated with the same accurate results.  In a case study setting, 
case study protocols can be used and a case study database can be developed during the data 
collection phase.  The documented interview protocols and interview question guide should allow 
replication of study results, with the same or different interviewees.  The case study database will 
provide a standardized format for data reporting.  Reliability will give researchers accuracy and 
consistency over time. (Yin 1989)  The results of the interviews provided comparable answers 
from different interviewees at different times and locations, indicating reliability for this work. 
 
Three types of validity will be discussed.  Construct Validity is establishing appropriate 
operational definitions for the concepts being studied.  In a case study setting, multiple sources of 
evidence can be used, a chain of evidence can be established, and key informants can review the 
draft case study report during the data collection and composition phases. (Yin 1989) For this 
study, the researcher chose the specific partner selection criteria that were to be studied in relation 
to the original objectives of the study and demonstrated that the selected measures of these 
criteria did indeed reflect the specific criteria that have been selected.   
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For example, the research could begin by saying that a prior personal relationship is one reason 
that an organization might partner with another.  Then the researcher could provide a standard 
measurement for such a relationship by saying that two executives, one in each organization, 
must have known each other for a minimum of three months.  The time limit establishes the 
notion of a ‘prior’ relationship and the one-on-one between two executives establishes the 
‘personal’ relationship.  Alternatively, the researcher could have established limits of ‘anyone in 
the organization knowing anyone else in the other organization for a minimum of a year’.   
 
Table 4.4 summarizes issues around reliability and validity and identifies solutions for this 
research. 
 




Multiple cases  
Multiple interviewees, similar questions 
Multiple sources of data 
Standardized interview guide and interview protocol 
Interviews tape-recorded for accuracy 
Standardized format for data collection, reporting and analysis 
Construct Validity 
- operational measures 
Multiple cases  
Multiple interviewees from each consortia 
Proposition measurement 
Expert review of results 
Internal Validity 




Both positive and negative experiences 
Compare multiple data sources – interviews, e-mails, contracts, 
government documents 




Generalized to a model, not a population 
Perhaps applicable for Canadian Distance Education consortia 
Results compared with known theories from Literature Review 
Table 4.4 Reliability and Validity Summary 
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Internal Validity establishes patterns or a causal relationship whereby certain conditions are 
shown to lead to other conditions, as opposed to spurious relationships. (Yin 1989)  For this 
work, the researcher does not want response bias based on prior personal relationships with the 
subjects.  The research includes both successes and failures.  Responses come from more than 
just the one organization under study, but also its partners to confirm the answers.  In a case study 
setting, pattern matching, explanation-building, and time-series analysis in the data analysis phase 
of the work can provide internal validity.  For this study, standardized processes were used as 
well as multiple cases and interviewees, both positive and negative experiences and a variety of 
data sources and analysis methods. 
 
External Validity identifies the domain for which the results can be generalized.  In a case 
study setting, replication logic can be used in multiple-case studies during the research design. 
(Yin 1989)  For this study, the research should be generalizable to other distance education 
partnerships in Canada as this is the basis of the two case studies.  Research data has been used to 
develop the Partner Negotiation Model, but field results should not be expected to be appropriate 
for universal populations.  
 
4.4.1 The Researcher’s Role 
 
To prevent potential confounds or bias and to increase internal validity, it is important to discuss 
any impact of the researcher’s prior knowledge.  The researcher has not done previous work in 
alliance motivation, partner selection or the distance education domain.  Subjects for the initial 
interviews, however, were known as peers at the University of Waterloo.  Some informants for 
the study were known at other Canadian universities.  The topic of corporate alliances has been of 
great interest to the researcher for a number of years.  Some research was done in 1999 on 
interorganizational structures, identifying a number of types of networks of organizations.  Local 
software development companies in particular have identified interest in theories of partner 
selection as they are rapidly moving in and out of a number of interorganizational relationships.  
The researcher deliberately chose not to study these firms, however, because of the rapid turnover 
of organizations and partnerships. 
 
For the initial interviews, the interviewees were approached personally and agreed to discuss 
their partnerships.  Since they knew the researcher and offices were nearby, there was no problem 
getting together and gathering data.  For the main study, informants were spread across Canada.  
Informants attending a 2003 conference in St. John’s, Newfoundland were interviewed there.  
Other local contacts in southern Ontario were interviewed as possible.  Long distance data were 
collected through telephone consultation, supplemented with written material by e-mail and fax.  
Finally, the Partner Negotiation Model was presented to business people and academics at a 
supply chain management conference in Toronto in 2004.  Empirical evidence was collected from 
the audience in terms of their reaction to the model in the real world and their positive or negative 
experiences related to partner negotiation and selection.  
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4.5 Data Collection 
 
4.5.1 Choice of Cases (Research Domain) 
 
This research is limited to Canadian universities in distance education partnerships.  This non-
profit domain was deliberately chosen because the speed of alliance formation and dissolution is 
much slower than the for-profit sector, allowing for time to perform research.  The domain also 
provides a convenient base of potential subjects accessible to the researcher.  This university 
realm differs from the traditional business environment in that individual success is measured less 
in profit and more in research funding, innovation, and numbers of students or courses. Measures 
such as knowledge created or gained, fast access to critical resources, and opportunities to extend 
the existing scope of operations are important for both sectors. (Contractor and Lorange 1988; 
Powell 1990; Bleeke and Ernst 1995; Kotabe and Swan 1995; Sankar, Boulton et al. 1995; 
Cateora 1996; Inkpen and Beamish 1997) Since the focus of interest is not on the measure of 
partnership success but on initial partner selection, this domain meets these needs.  
 
The specific partnerships studied were two Canada-wide education consortia.  Consortium 1 
included thirteen Canadian universities during the study period in 2003.  Consortium 2 is made up 
of eight Canadian universities.  Table 4.5 summarizes the consortia and universities included in 
this study.  These two consortia are discussed in further detail in Sections 4.5.1.1 and 4.5.1.2. 
 
Other university consortia, such as Global University Alliance and Universitas 21, came up in 
discussion but were not a main focus.  The Global University Alliance included ten international 
universities in 2003 and includes six universities in 2004.  Universitas 21 is a network for 
international higher education including sixteen universities with McGill and the University of 
British Columbia in Canada.  The University of Toronto was a partner, but pulled out in April 
2001 over operational concerns.  Examples of the large number and wide variety of educational 
consortia are included in Appendix A. 
 
In summary, there were a total of 21 universities between the two consortia.  Ten contacts were 
interviewed from eight universities: Athabasca, Laurentian, Memorial University of 
Newfoundland, Alberta, Dalhousie, Guelph, Saskatchewan, and Waterloo.  E-mail and telephone 
interviews were conducted with another five contacts from BCOU, UCCB, UNB, Calgary, and 
York.  As well, an Education Director from the University of British Columbia was interviewed, 
a member of neither consortium.  The University of British Columbia was approached by both 
consortia, but declined to join either, so was of interest for this partner selection study. 
 
Of the universities with no interviewees, all but Manitoba and Simon Fraser University were 
‘provider’ universities.  That is, they ‘provided’ courses through the consortium but otherwise 
were not considered to be nor considered themselves to be a real partner.  The contact person for 
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Manitoba was at the 2003 conference, but not available for an interview.  The contact at Simon 
Fraser University did not respond to requests for information or meetings. 
 
CONSORTIUM 1 CONSORTIUM 2 
Athabasca University University of Alberta 
Brandon University University of Calgary 
University College of Cape Breton Dalhousie University 
Laurentian University University of Guelph 
University of Manitoba University of Saskatchewan 
Memorial University of Newfoundland Simon Fraser University 
University of Moncton University of Waterloo 
Mount Saint Vincent University York University 
University of New Brunswick  
Open Learning Agency (now BCOU)  
Royal Roads University  
Tele-Universite du Quebec  
University of Victoria  
 
Table 4.5 Consortia in 2003 and Universities of Interest 
 
4.5.1.1 Consortium 1 
 
Consortium 1 is a partnership of universities across Canada, committed to delivery of education 
anytime anywhere.  Partner universities in 2003 were Athabasca, Brandon, Cape Breton, 
Laurentian, Manitoba, Memorial, Moncton, Mount Saint Vincent, New Brunswick, Open 
Learning Agency, Royal Roads, and the Tele-Universite du Quebec.  The University of Victoria 
was not a full partner, but provided complementary distance education programs.  As of 2004, 
there are eleven partner universities - Acadia and the Royal Military College have been added as 
new partners and the Open Learning Agency has changed its name to the British Columbia Open 
University.  As well, Brandon, Moncton, Mount Saint Vincent and Victoria have left the 
partnership. 
 
Consortium 1 is funded by its partners and by Industry Canada.  The consortium identifies 
accredited courses, provides access to courses developed by partner universities, provides a 
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clearing house for students wanting to mix and match courses from various universities, 
facilitates transfer credit and generally creates sharing efficiencies. 
 
There was a three-stage process of partner selection in Consortium 1.  The ‘early birds’ who 
were organizing the consortium got in first, set the partnership criteria, and selected the 
educational areas of interest for themselves.  Then the alliance was opened up to other 
universities who would take the educational areas that had not yet been covered.  Finally, when 
the partnership needed to grow, it was opened to anyone who wanted to join. 
 
There are significant membership fees to be a partner in Consortium 1.  For this reason, some 
partners have been ‘associate’ partners or ‘provider’ universities.  The universities have been 
allowed to provide their educational offerings without paying full consortium fees.   
 
Depending on theoretical definitions, this consortium may well be considered to be  a joint 
venture since partners purchase shares in Consortium 1.  Five original members paid $10,000 for 
a seat on the Board of Directors: BCOU (SFU, UBC, UVic), Athabasca, Brandon, Manitoba and 
Laurentian.  
 
Some universities deliberately did not join Consortium 1 because of the exorbitant membership 
fees and because of a number of other factors discussed in the Consortium 1 Case Study Narrative 
in Chapter 5.  In particular, the Universities of Alberta, British Columbia, Guelph, Waterloo and 
York chose not to join Consortium 1. 
 
4.5.1.2 Consortium 2 
 
Consortium 2 includes Dalhousie University, Simon Fraser University, York University and the 
Universities of Alberta, Calgary, Saskatchewan, Waterloo, and Guelph.  The focus of Consortium 
2 is more research and development around online teaching rather than just production and 
development of online courses and programs.  Pedagogical and quality issues, for example, are 
important with a long-term view to improved online educational offerings. 
 
Dollars were committed from Waterloo, Guelph and York to get the alliance operational in the 
first place, making them the original partners.  Certain principles and issues were agreed to as the 
partnership was being formed.  This impacted who might be appropriate as a partner.  An 
Agreement in Principle and a Memorandum of Understanding documented the results. 
 
Two partner selection issues in the development of Consortium 2 were that Industry Canada 
required Canada-wide coverage and that the west coast partners were worried that Ontario may be 
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overly controlling the partnership.  Details of the partnership formation are documented in 
Chapter 5. 
 
4.5.2 Development of Interview Materials 
 
The interview materials were developed over a number of months, initially based on the ‘how’ 
and ‘why’ partner selection issues of the research questions and eventually based on the Partner 
Negotiation Model and propositions.  Interview materials include an Interview Protocol Form, 
Data Collection Matrix, Interview Question Guide, and Probe Questions.  These materials are 
attached in Appendix B.   
 
The Interview Protocol Form provided a template for multiple interviewers to get a sense of the 
purpose and format of the interviews.  In this research, only one interviewer was used so this 
information provided structure for the interview.  The Data Collection Matrix established 
organization for data collection and analysis based on propositions.  The final questions used in 
formal interviews on the Interview Question Guide focused on the partner’s current situation, 
motivation, and partner selection issues.  This Guide includes a section which asks the 
interviewees to represent the partners in their consortia with a diagram.  The researcher originally 
considered asking them to arrange circles on paper to represent the partners, but this more open 
model allowed for a much more interesting view.  Probe Questions covered other topics if time 
permitted.  These extra questions were not used formally in any of the interviews. 
 
4.5.3 Research Methodology 
 
Data were gathered through interviews with key decision makers from the universities in 
Consortia 1 and 2.  Interviewees were asked their views about decision making and partner 
selection in the consortia.  This subjective data were supplemented with appropriate objective 
written documentation, including contracts, government documents, e-mail correspondence and 
web pages.  The collection of data was used to develop insight and recommendations on partner 
selection, both on a practical and a theoretical level.   
 
A limitation with this design is that the cases of interest are not finished cases: the consortia are 
still active, so may change further over time.  As partners are added and dropped, the nature of 
the alliance will change and this may well affect additional partner selection decisions. 
 
The research design consisted of four phases: 
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Phase 1: Review of Previous Work 
 
Existing literature was identified concerning alliances, partner selection, and decision-making 
theory, documented in Chapter 2.  This provided a baseline for potential issues of importance 
in choosing particular partners for particular relationships.  
 
To supplement the literature, three colleagues with alliance experience were informally 
interviewed .  These interviews provided empirical data not necessarily in agreement with 
academic theory.  Further information on these interviews was provided in Chapter 3.  
 
Phase 2: Model Development 
 
From an analysis of the literature and a comparison with initial interviews, several Partner 
Selection Models were developed, eventually leading to the final Partner Negotiation Model 
described in Chapter 3.  Propositions were also developed from the model related to a Deal-
making Cycle, Partnership Roles, Organizational Approval, and Partner Choice Criteria. 
 
Phase 3: Data Collection and Recording  
 
Two existing education consortia were identified to study – Consortia 1 and 2.  The 
universities were documented and key contact individuals to interview.  Progressive 
refinements of an Interview Protocol Form, Data Collection Matrix, Interview Question 
Guide, and Probe Questions were developed to match the final Partner Negotiation Model.  
(See Appendix B)  Ten interviews were conducted as noted in Table 4.6, gathering 
information on existing collaborations and partners, reflections of partner selection decision-
making, organizational and partnership characteristics, and selection criteria.  Initial 
interviews in 2002 were less structured as the research developed its focus, followed by more 
formal interviews in 2003.  As well as the interview transcripts, the researcher kept interview 
notes, which provided descriptive data about the interviews.  Archival data were collected 
from the interviewees as possible, including e-mail correspondence, contracts, web pages and 
other paper documents.  Finally, government and web-based information was gathered. 
 
Phase 4: Data Analysis and Reporting 
 
The theoretical expected model and propositions were compared with actual data gathered in 
Phase 3.  Findings were clearly verified with data from multiple sources to support or refute 
theories.  Data were coded, sorted and displayed manually and with the use of NVivo, a 
qualitative research data analysis tool.  The researcher investigated patterns in the interview 
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and other data, tested the final model and propositions against the data, and considered 
explanations for the research findings.  Results were reported in tables and written form. 
 
4.5.4 Data Collection and Recording 
 
Data collection and recording was done for two initial case studies described in Chapter 3 and ten 
formal interviews noted in Table 4.6.  Standardized protocols, interview questions, and a case 
study database were used.  In spite of this built-in structure, the interviews were open-ended and 
interviewees were encouraged to identify any issues of interest about their partner selection 
process and about their partnerships.  This methodology allowed a focus on partner selection, but 
provided opportunity for other interesting factors to emerge.   
 
The interviews conducted in 2002 were done with key players in distance education consortia.  
The interviews were deliberately open-ended and general to encourage discussion of any issues 
that seemed important to the interviewees.  Issues that emerged were partner negotiation, social 
network, reputation and other topics, which have been reflected in the Partner Negotiation Model. 
 




Director, Learning Waterloo Waterloo 2001 to 2004 
Director, Education British Columbia Waterloo April 16, 2002 
VP Academic Athabasca Waterloo August 16, 2002 
Vice President Waterloo Waterloo October 30, 2002 
Director, Computing Dalhousie Halifax June 5, 2003 
Dean, Extension Saskatchewan St. John’s June 8, 2003 
VP Academic Athabasca St. John’s June 8, 2003 
Associate VP Laurentian St. John’s  June 9, 2003 
Director, Technologies Memorial St. John’s  June 10, 2003 
Director, Learning Guelph Guelph September 26, 2003 
 
Table 4.6 Interviewees 
 
Informants were purposefully selected for their knowledge of alliances or consortia in the 
distance education domain.  All interviewees were at a Director level or higher, generally in a 
group related to Education, Teaching, Learning and Technology.  Some subjects were previously 
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known to the researcher, which added a dimension of informality and potentially additional depth 
of understanding for the study.  (Miles and Huberman 1984) proposed four parameters for data 
collection: setting, actors, events, and process.  In this study, the research is taking place at a 
conference or the subject’s workplace (onsite interviews) or in the researcher’s office (telephone 
calls).  The actors are the interviewees chosen specifically as noted above.  The events of interest 
for this study are the motivation behind the distance education partnerships and the process and 
final choice of partners for the alliance.  The process studied was the ongoing or previous alliance 
motivation and partner selection.  The formal Interview Materials in Appendix B document the 
data collection procedures.  
 
Formal interviews were done before and during a 2003 education conference in St. John’s, 
Newfoundland.  The researcher contacted at least one key informant from each partner in 
Consortia 1 and 2 (See Appendix B) before the conference.  The purpose was discussed with 
them so that they had a good idea of the interview focus, partner selection within Consortium 1 or 
2.  For those partners willing to be interviewed, an Interview Schedule was established to verify 
the day and time for an interview.  Some contacts asked for questions ahead of time and these 
were provided only if requested.  Interviews occurred in a variety of settings: university offices, 
hotel lobby, hotel bar, park bench on a busy street, and hotel meeting room.  Researcher 
observation notes on the settings and other descriptive data were also recorded.  Some partners 
who were not attending the conference provided information by telephone or e-mail.  (BCOU, 
UCCB, UNB, Calgary, York) 
 
The researcher contacted 34  people by phone or e-mail – 23 people associated with 
Consortium 1 and 11 associated with Consortium 2.  Of those potential interviewees, 6 set up a 
formal interview, 6 met the researcher informally in person at the 2003 conference, 5 provided e-
mail or telephone information, and the balance suggested other partners to interview.  Some 
information was gathered by e-mail but most came from personal interviews.  Telephone 
interviews were considered for those in Alberta and British Columbia but were not done because 
the work appeared to have sufficient data.  The proposed method and interview questions were 
discussed with three experienced researchers to minimize problems with setting or leading 
questions.  Problems were considered with an interviewee not mentioning something and the 
researcher discussed how to prompt them without leading them.  It was deliberately decided not 
to show the interviewees current research diagrams or models, so as not to bias their responses.  
Similarly, the Probe Questions and additional interview materials were not discussed unless 
necessary. 
 
Interviews were recorded on a computer memory stick and then copied to a laptop computer.  
They were then e-mailed to a stenographer who transcribed them into Microsoft Word.  The 
entire transcript was copied verbatim, omitting coughs, ‘ums’, ‘ahs’ and other extraneous noise.  
Finally interview material was put into NVivo software for data analysis. 
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Key people who were not interviewed were a Director from the University of Calgary and an 
Academic Vice President from York University.  The Calgary contact is very busy and physically 
distant from the researcher.  The York contact declined to be interviewed as he has a very busy 
work schedule in his role as Academic Vice-President of York University.  Overall, only ten 
people were interviewed formally, which is a fairly small sample size.  Since the same partner 
stories were repeated in later interviews, however, the number seems to be large enough to 
provide the data needed for this research.  There does not appear to be a non-response bias. 
 
Data collected were interviews, transcripts, e-mail correspondence, contracts, web pages, other 
paper documents and hand-drawn visual network diagrams.  Unstructured, open-ended interviews 
were held in conference meeting rooms and university offices.  Interviews were tape-recorded 
and written interview notes were also taken.  This was useful to gather personal and historical 
context, but the information may be biased by the interviewee’s experience.  Also, different 
interviewees may be more or less articulate and perceptive, so comparisons of data may be 
difficult. (Merriam 1988) Public documents as available from the informants or from web pages 
or other written material were read, included and analyzed to extend the interview data.  This 
additional documentation may be incomplete, inaccurate or unreliable depending on the source. 
(Bogdan and Biklen 1992)  The combination of various types of data collected from multiple 
sources, however, reduces bias and adds depth to the final study results. 
 
The researcher tape-recorded the interviews and also recorded written notes as they were done, 
loosely following the questions identified in the Interview Question Guide.  Interview focus with 
respect to a history of events was on motivation for the alliance, optimum partner characteristics, 
and final choice of partner perhaps based on necessary compromises.  As well as freehand notes 
from the discussion, sections of the recording form were provided for the following observations.  
Descriptive notes identified the informant, the dialogue, the physical setting and so on.  
Reflective notes recorded the researcher’s personal thoughts such as “speculation, feelings, 
problems, ideas, hunches, impressions, and prejudices”. (Bogdan and Biklen 1992)  Demographic 
information describing the date, time and place of the interview was also recorded.  Documents 
were identified as to name, key categories of interest to this study, and primary or secondary 
source.  Interviews were tape-recorded, recorded by hand and later transcribed to a computerized 
narrative.  The narrative was subsequently re-ordered and categorized into the issues of interest: 
partner selection process, negotiation, alliance motivation, partner selection criteria or rationale, 





To validate these findings, multiple sources of data, multiple consortia, multiple people and 
locations, and multiple data collection types were deliberately sought.  Formal taped interview 
transcripts were gathered, as well as collaboration (network) diagrams, informal researcher 
observations, written documents, and archival e-mail correspondence.  In particular, the following 
information was available for analysis. 
 
1. Interview transcripts: 
(a) Three initial (contacts from Cases 1 and 2) 
(b) Four informal (Interviewees 1 to 4 from Table 4.6) 
(c) Six formal (Interviewees 5 to 10 from Table 4.6) 
2. Collaboration (network) diagrams from formal interviews 
3. Interview field notes from the researcher 
4. E-mail correspondence between the researcher and 14 university contacts at BCOU, UCCB, 
UNB, York, Mount Saint Vincent University, Quebec, Athabasca, MUN, Manitoba, Calgary, 
SFU and Alberta 
5. Archival E-mails 
There are 231 e-mails and 36 correspondents, excluding administrative assistants and other 
unrelated staff.  The e-mails range from February 21, 2000 to April 1, 2003.   
6. Consortium 1 Documents 
(a) Consortium 1 Introductory Letter, January 10, 2000 
(b) Consortium 1 discussion paper 
7. Consortium 2 Documents listed next page 
8. Industry Canada Documents 
(a) Contribution Agreement (Contract) between Information Highway Branch of Industry 
Canada and Consortium 2, May 7, 2001 
(b) Statement of Work (Appendix A of Contract), May 2001 
(c) Statement of Work Costing (Appendix B of Contract), May 2001 
9. Webpages for Consortium 1, Consortium 2, Industry Canada, and partner universities 
10. Anecdotal evidence from conference comments on preliminary model and propositions 
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4.5.5.1 Consortium 2 Documents 
 
Memorandum of Understanding, March 2001 
 
Overview of UW Involvement in National/Regional Initiatives for Learning & Teaching through 
Technology, March 2, 2000 
 
Consortium 2 Draft, April 10, 2000 
 
Letter from the J.W. McConnell Family Foundation, April 27, 2000 
 
Proposal for the Development of Consortium 2, May 25, 2000 
 
Overview of the Consortium 2 Project, June 16, 2000 
 
STELAR (Stimulating Technology-Enhanced Learning with Action Research) Proposal 
Summary, January 5, 2001 
 




4.5.5.2 Data Stored in NVivo 
 
Eleven documents were stored in the NVivo data analysis computer package, as shown in Table 
4.7 below.  The six interviews were stored and analyzed first.  This allowed time to return to the 
field for further information if necessary.  E-mail correspondence and contract documents were 
gathered and analyzed later to supplement the interview data. 
 
CONSORTIUM NAME TYPE SIZE 
1 Interview 7 Interview 120 KB;15,469 words; 51 pages 
1 Interview 8 Interview 60 KB; 4747 words; 15 pages 
1 Interview 9 Interview 91 KB; 6869 words; 24 pages 
2 Interview 5 Interview 54 KB; 5905 words;18 pages 
2 Interview 6 Interview 92 KB; 6350 words; 24 pages 
2 Interview 10 Interview 76 KB; 5655 words; 19 pages 
2 E-mail E-mail 787 KB; 231 e-mails;  36 people 
2 C2 Draft Contract 44 KB; 6670 words; 26 pages 
2 MOU Contract 23 KB; 445 words; 1 page 
2 SOW Contract 124 KB; 1158 words; 6 pages 
2 SOW Cost Contract 121 KB; 1293 words; 6 pages 
 Total  1592 KB 
54,561 words plus 231 e-mails 
190 pages plus 231 e-mails 
 




4.5.5.3 Consortia Network Diagrams 
 
Diagrams were collected from the six formal interviews.  The interviewees were asked to draw a 
picture of their perception of the consortium.  Results were expected to include power issues, 
lines of collaboration, and so on.  In fact, many of the interviewees drew Canadian national 
diagrams, showing the connections from British Columbia to Newfoundland with little discussion 
of power or control.  
 
The Dalhousie contact drew a picture with Dalhousie as a circle off on one side and the Provost 
and the Consortium 2 representative within the circle.  He drew seven additional circles, labelling 
one as Calgary.  This is significant because this was the one partner that Dalhousie needed before 
they decided to join Consortium 2.  As well, the Dalhousie person noted on the bottom of his 
diagram that the teleconferences were personal contacts professor to professor, provost to provost 
and dean to dean. 
 
The Saskatoon contact drew a picture with Saskatoon and Waterloo as circles connected 
directly at the centre.  The Waterloo circle was connected directly to York as well.  Off to the side 
were other circles – Dalhousie, Guelph, SFU, Alberta and Calgary – drawn vaguely cross-
Canada. 
 
The Guelph contact drew her diagram as a hierarchy with the Provosts at the top, Consortium 2 
Directors at the second level and the final level as university Project Directors and other members 
depending on the Project.  She also noted Online, Online Research and Faculty Development on 
her diagram, as examples of specific Consortium 2 projects.  She noted that her Manager of 
Distance Education would be involved in Consortium 2 working groups to make sure that the 
information was up and they were solving issues of cross-registrations and letters of permission 
and so on.  Research projects, depending on the project, might be a Learning Specialist or it might 
be faculty in specific research areas. 
 
The Athabasca contact drew a very detailed network diagram of a large number of circles 
tightly arranged around Athabasca University and the Consortium 1 Executive Director as the 
centre circle.  Immediately around Athabasca University were the University of New Brunswick, 
UCCB, MUN, Laurentian and Manitoba.  Slightly outside of the inner circles were Tele-
Universite, Moncton, Brandon, Royal Roads, MSU, the University of Victoria and the OLA.  
Words written on the side of the diagram were Complementary, Unique Set, All Current 
Programs, and Case by Case, indicating original requirements to join Consortium 1. 
 
The Laurentian contact drew a large circle labelled Consortium 1 in the centre.  Around this 
circle and directly connected to it were all of the universities that were part of Consortium 1, 
including Athabasca, Memorial and Laurentian.  A direct line was also shown between Memorial 
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and Laurentian, marked B.Ed. to indicate a joint Bachelor of Education program between the two 
universities but not part of Consortium 1. 
 
The Memorial contact drew a geographical diagram from BCOU in the west through 
Athabasca University, Manitoba, Laurentian, Teluq, Moncton, UNB, MSVU, UCCB and to 
Memorial in the east.  The Athabasca circle is larger and bolder than the others, indicating its 
importance in the consortium.  Dates were noted on the bottom of the diagram, August 2001, then 
February 2002, meeting, and then August 2002, Quebec City. 
 
4.6 Data Analysis 
4.6.1 Introduction 
 
Data analysis is an ongoing process with open-ended data for broad data collection.  In this study, 
initial data analysis was conducted simultaneously with data collection, interpretation and report 
writing.  This allowed an early sorting into potential categories and the shifting and development 
of these categories as work progressed.  The large volumes of interview data were reduced to 
identifiable patterns or categories and then interpreted according to existing theories identified in 
the Literature Review and the Partner Negotiation Model.  Issues around alliance motivation and 
partner selection were taken out of their specific distance education context, sorted, evaluated, 
and represented as potential theories for a number of new domains.  “While much work in the 
analysis process consists of ‘taking apart’ (for instance, into smaller pieces), the final goal is the 
emergence of a larger, consolidated picture.” (Tesch 1990, p. 97)   
 
The researcher must be comfortable developing categories and making comparisons and 
contrasts.  “Empirical research advances only when it is accompanied by logical thinking.” (Yin 
1989, p. 12)  The analysis must also be open to possibilities and consider contrary or alternative 
explanations for the findings. (Tesch 1990)  The information was sorted and displayed in figures, 
tables and charts as much as possible to ease readability and understanding.  These displays can 
show the relationship among categories of data, display categories by type, show time ordering, 
and provide a number of other possibilities. (Miles and Huberman 1984)  For this study, data 
were organized by alliance motivation, negotiation process, selection criteria, organizational or 
partner characteristics and combinations of this information. 
 
The coding procedure began with the variables and categories identified by previous 
researchers, such as alliance motivation, selection process and criteria.  This initial segmentation 
allowed the information to verify existing theories and categories or alternatively to suggest new 
patterns.  The focus of data analysis was on the meaning and understanding in the interview data 
whether it matched preconceived theories or not.  Categories and codes emerged from clustering 
and organization of one or more interviews. (Tesch 1990)  Recoding and rework was necessary as 
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new categories and patterns developed.  For example, the term ‘geography’ was used in two 
different ways by interviewees so required recoding to ‘Canada-wide’ and ‘isolation’.  Significant 
quotations from subjects and ‘contrary’ data provided particular areas of new interest as 
suggested by Creswell. (1994)  
 
Specific data analysis procedures are appropriate for qualitative research.  For case studies, Yin 
(1989) suggests the search for ‘patterns’ by comparing results with previous literature, 
‘explanation building’ in a search for causal links, and ‘time-series analysis’ tracing changes in 
patterns over time.  In theory development, researchers can saturate coding categories by coding, 
recoding, generating a conditional matrix, and constantly comparing incidents with incidents until 
categories emerge. (Strauss and Corbin 1990)  All of these suggestions are appropriate for this 
study.  
 
The researcher worked with the University of Waterloo Statistics Consulting Director, Dr. 
Jeanette O’Hara-Hines, to enrich the current research design, data collection and analysis 
procedures.  Specific suggestions from Statistics Consulting included: 
• Clearly tie the theory to the research questions and to the data analysis 
• At the start of the alliance, show a clear tie to partner selection 
• Compare successful alliances to failures 
• Code the data, give each category a number, put information in tables 
• Describe the data clearly with two-way tables or charts 
• Graph the number of partnerships with a particular motivation, type, and so on 
 
Overall, the Data Analysis phase tested existing models, propositions and proposed causal 
links, and reported theory inconsistencies.  This supported or refuted particular alliance and 
decision theories.  Findings were clearly verified with data from multiple sources across Canada.   
 
4.6.2 Data Analysis Method 
 
4.6.2.1 Data Organization 
 
Data were analyzed following the procedures suggested by Creswell (2003).  First, the data were 
organized for analysis.  Interviews were transcribed from audio to Word and then text files, hard 
copy contracts were scanned to computer text format, and e-mail correspondence was converted 
to rich text format files.  Hand-written field notes were typed into Word and then converted to 
text files.  All of the text files were copied into NVivo, the data analysis software package.  In 
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NVivo, the files were sorted and arranged into different types or sources of information – E-
Mails, Interviews, Notes, and Contracts.  NVivo also allowed organization by person, consortium, 
institution, and so on. 
 
Original interviews were recorded and saved on the electronic memory stick of a digital voice 
recorder.  The voice recordings were then transferred to the hard drive of a laptop computer.  A 
secretary was hired to transcribe the audio to Word documents.  Once the Word documents were 
ready, they were checked by the researcher against the voice recordings so that errors in names 
and blurred speech could be corrected.  The transcripts were edited by the researcher as necessary 
for spelling and other minor errors.  The final corrected Word documents were converted to rich 
text format files for use with NVivo.  Each interview was entered as a document and given a 
name corresponding to the number of the interviewee.  (interview7.doc, for example)   
 
The hard copy network diagrams that were collected during interviews were analyzed manually 
since they didn’t fit the computerized mould.  Information on the diagrams was documented in 
text and that text was compared later with other written data sources. 
 
4.6.2.2 Initial Data Analysis 
 
The second step was to read all of the information through at a high level to get a general sense of 
the data.  At this point, data from every source were read, organized chronologically, and written 
into the two case study narratives.  As expected, there was a definite sense of community and 
social network contact in order to find appropriate partners.  Reputation was mentioned several 
times as an issue in partner selection.  Unrelated to the specific issue of partner selection, many of 
the interviewees expressed concern that there were two distance education consortia in Canada 
and they would prefer to see only one.  Since the two consortia are separated somewhat by level 
of education and research (or quality of both), the issue actually is relevant to the partners chosen 
or not chosen for each partnership.  Also tied to this issue was the notion of government funding.  
Both sides seemed to feel that funding would be easier to get for one united consortium. 
 
The Consortium 1 partners seemed very close to each other and very specific in terms of the 
good that the Consortium 1 partnership was doing for their organizations.  All of the interviewees 
could name specific things that had been accomplished through Consortium 1.  They could all 
identify collaborative distance education course offerings that had been developed with 
Consortium 1. 
 
Consortium 2 partners were less sure of the need for and benefit of the partnership for their 
organizations.  Since this partnership operates at a higher level, related to collaborative research 
rather than specific distance education offerings, this should not be surprising.  Several 
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collaborative research projects were mentioned that were ongoing or that were at the proposal 
stage.  Because collaborative research had been going on before Consortium 2, however, the 
interviewees were unsure of the positive impact of Consortium 2 on this work. 
 
4.6.2.3 Detailed Analysis with Coding 
 
Step three was a detailed analysis of the data with coding.  The text and diagrams were scanned 
by word, phrase, sentence and paragraph for ideas to be put into categories.  A structured 
approach to coding, as proposed by Rossman and Rallis (1998) and Tesch (1990), formalized this 
work.  A small number of short documents were coded individually first.  Topics were then 
gathered into one list, organized and regrouped as appropriate.  A few additional documents were 
then coded with the new master list and additional codes and topics were added and reworked as 
necessary.  As this base list of codes was being developed, topics were also grouped into larger 
categories to allow a general idea of issues that could be split into further detail with lower-level 
codes.  Lines were also drawn between categories to show interrelationships.  All data were 
coded and recoded as necessary with newer categories.  Fortunately, the NVivo software made 
this job easier than hand-coding.   
 
This coding and re-coding step was done twice on the data – first very open-ended, relying 
strictly on the text and a second time with preconceived codes from the Partner Negotiation 
Model and propositions.  No noticeable differences showed up, probably because the interviews 
and other data collection had been based on issues from the model.  Data were analyzed for codes 
that addressed topics that the researcher would expect to find (reputation), codes that were 
unexpected or surprising (multiple funding issues), and codes that addressed a larger theoretical 
perspective (joining the two consortia).  This method follows the theoretical proposal that a 
qualitative study should generate categories of information (open coding); select one category and 
position it within a theoretical model (axial coding); then explain a story from the interconnection 
of categories (selective coding). (Creswell 2003)  Further detail on this step is provided in 
Chapter 6. 
 
4.6.2.4 Documentation of Results 
 
In step four, the results of the Data Analysis were documented.  A comprehensive narrative 
description of the two case studies had been generated from the raw data to begin the initial data 
analysis.  Further results related to the propositions were generated next from the coding process, 
e-mail correspondence, partnership structure diagrams, detailed interview transcripts and other 
data.  Themes were analyzed for each individual case and across the two cases.  The codes were 
used to generate the themes of the Major Findings, which were Deal-making, Roles, 
Organizational Approval and Partner Choice Criteria.  These categories displayed multiple 
perspectives and were supported by diverse quotations and specific evidence provided in Chapter 
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7.  The information identified here was compared to the original Partner Negotiation Model to 
test its ideas and propositions.  Themes were compared to each other and connected as 
appropriate.  The discussion covers a chronology of events in the two cases, a detailed discussion 
of the themes which emerged and a discussion of interconnecting themes.  Visuals, figures and 
tables are also included to better express some of the data analysis.  For completeness, Other 
Findings were also noted, which were unexpected and unsolicited.  Since these issues were 
identified by a number of interviewees, they were obviously felt to be of some importance to 
them. 
 
4.6.2.5 Data Interpretation and Discussion 
 
The final step in data analysis was the interpretation of the data into something meaningful, 
documented in Chapter 8.  The lessons learned (Lincoln and Guba 1985) included the 
researcher’s interpretation of the data, a comparison of this data and previous literature, and 




The research design and methodology are based on qualitative case study work.  Two case studies 
were chosen and data were gathered from interviews, archival e-mail documentation, contracts, 
diagrams, web pages and so on.  Data were analyzed initially through documentation of detailed 
case study narratives, provided in Chapter 5.  Detailed data analysis followed with coding and re-
coding of written materials in Chapter 6.  Finally, all of the information was compared to the 
Partner Negotiation Model and original propositions.  Results are documented in Chapter 7 and 
discussed in Chapter 8.   
 
This chapter has described qualitative and case study research in general and in terms of the 
work in this research.  Rationale, limitations, reliability and validity also were documented in 
theory and tied to the research design.  Data collection issues, such as choice of cases and 
interview materials, were noted as well as the process of data collection and recording.  Data and 
interviewees were identified.  Data analysis methods were documented at a high level.  Initial 
data analysis is presented in further detail in Chapter 5, Case Study Narratives. 
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Chapter 5 
Case Study Narratives 
5.1 Introduction 
Information about the two case studies, labelled Consortium 1 and Consortium 2 for privacy, was 
organized first by documentation of a simple narrative for each partnership.  The partnerships are 
Canada-wide consortia concerned with education, including online and technology issues.  
Consortium 1 is a partnership of universities across Canada, committed to delivering university-
level programs that can be completed from anywhere in the country or beyond.  As of April 2005, 
it had 11 institutional partners across Canada.  Consortium 2 has 8 partner institutions and its 
focus is more research and development around online teaching rather than just production and 
development of online courses and programs. 
 
Case study information was gathered from a number of sources.  The most significant 
resources for Consortium 1 were Consortium 1 organizational documents, Consortium 1 web 
pages, government RFP and funding documents, e-mails and discussions with four university 
contacts, and formal interviews with three Consortium 1 partners.  For Consortium 2, the majority 
of the information came from historical e-mails, Consortium 2 documents, press releases and web 
pages, informal discussions with two university contacts, and formal interviews with three 
Consortium 2 partners. 
 
The case studies provide a written commentary of what happened during the formation and 
later development of the two consortia as told by this data.  These case studies were documented 
as an integrated chronology from web page data, interview transcripts, e-mail correspondence, 
contracts, diagrams, and other information provided by the interviewees.  The narratives created 
from the case data are focused on the partners selected and when, how and why they were chosen.  
Case study documents were provided to interviewees for their comments and minor changes were 
made accordingly. This member-checking strengthens the validity of the case study results.  
Interviewee quotations were later intertwined with researcher interpretations during the data 
analysis in Chapter 7, as proposed by Creswell (2003, p. 197). 
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5.2 Consortium 1 
5.2.1 Formation 
 
Consortium 1 started with discussions in Edmonton in December, 1999, spurred by initiatives of 
John Daniels from The Open University in the United Kingdom and others.  Daniels had started 
an Open University in the United States and was perceived as having his sights set on Canada 
next.  At that time, there was also the University of Phoenix Online and the Western Governors 
Virtual University trying to recruit Canadian members and students.  The general feeling was that 
“unless we have a consortium of Canadian universities that get together, the likelihood of several 
of us joining either American or European or even Asian consortiums was increasing.” (Interview 
8)  Athabasca already had the rights to the name, Canadian Open University, and Daniels was 
trying to get title.  That interest, as well as world-wide collaborative efforts, inspired the 
Canadians to start their own online distance education collaboration. 
 
The three original discussants were Athabasca University (AU), the Open Learning Agency 
(OLA) of British Columbia, and Tele-Universite (Teluq) from Quebec.  Athabasca University 
was Canada’s leading distance education specialist according to their website, 
www.athabascau.ca.  The Open Learning Agency was a ‘leader in the delivery of life-long 
learning opportunities’.  Tele-Universite was the major online distance education provider in 
Quebec.  Teluq had a collaborative relationship with AU in distance education.  In accordance 
with provincial policy, it could not be seen to be part of a Canadian collaboration, however, so 
eventually declined to be part of the original Consortium 1 organization.  Funding was in place in 
the form of a ‘commitment in principle’ from the Alberta and federal governments before 
Consortium 1 began.  The Drivers (AU and OLA) had prearranged for funding for a potential 
Canada-wide consortium.   
 
The Consortium 1 name had already been registered as a trademark by Athabasca University.  
AU and the OLA ‘collaborated in the development of the Consortium 1 concept’ and were now 
ready to approach other Canadian universities to join them.  The organizing committee 
deliberately chose to only include universities with complete distance education programs rather 
than just individual courses.  This allowed Consortium 1 to establish a list of programs from 
which students could choose.  The program offerings of AU and the OLA, and indirectly Tele-
universite du Quebec and the BC University Consortium made up the nucleus of Consortium 1 at 
its outset. 
 
Other potential Consortium 1 partners needed strong distance education programs, programs 
that could be offered nationally and something unique that everyone else didn’t have.  The 
original direction was that only one university could offer a program.  That is, only Athabasca 
could offer a Psychology program for example.  If another university came along later and 
wanted to join Consortium 1 with their own Psychology program, they could not do that.  The 
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other university could add their distance education program in Sociology, but Psychology was 
already taken.  That single program issue was a concern for many later universities considering a 
collaboration with Consortium 1. 
 
On January 10, 2000, a letter was sent from the President of AU and the President and CEO of 
the OLA to the presidents of 12 Canadian universities known to have distance education (DE) 
programs.  The invited institutions were Open Learning Agency, Royal Roads University, Simon 
Fraser University, University of British Columbia, University of Victoria, Technical University of 
British Columbia, Athabasca University, Brandon University, University of Manitoba, Laurentian 
University, Nipissing University, University of Waterloo, York University, and Memorial 
University.  The letter invited the universities to become a ‘founding member’ of  Consortium 1 
(official name already trademarked!) and to attend a meeting in Vancouver on January 27, 2000.   
 
The letter noted that regional Canadian consortia or portals already existed, such as 
TeleEducation New Brunswick and Campus West, an initiative of the Western Deans of 
Continuing Education, but none were program-based.  The focus of Consortium 1 will be 
‘program-based’ rather than just listing distance education courses as was done with the regional 
consortia.  A ‘structured, pre-arranged curriculum plan’ was proposed in the letter, suggesting 
that perhaps Athabasca University and the Open Learning Agency had already developed such a 
plan.  Indeed, the ‘core’ of Consortium 1 would be the combined programs of AU and OLA.  AU 
also had a strategic partnership with Tele-universite du Quebec, so Teluq course offerings would 
indirectly be part of the Consortium 1 curriculum.  This once again confirmed that at least part of 
the Consortium 1 curriculum was already set.  Although indirectly involved, ‘political concerns 
have not made it possible for Teluq to sign on as an independent founding member’.  Distance 
offerings of the BC University Consortium would also be indirectly involved as a result of OLA’s 
association with that group. 
 
The letter concluded with a ‘practical and inclusive’ Consortium 1 approach that: 
a) advocates a learner-centred model that recognizes and respects the differing needs of learners; 
b) recognizes the value of various delivery systems and pedagogical models that can combine to 
offer complete programs to learners; 
c) assigns significant importance to the provision of a complete set of on-line student services; 
d) anticipates expansion as future entrants make value-added on-line programs available to 
learners. 
According to this letter, the focus of Consortium 1 at this point was very learner-centred and 
practical. 
 
A six-page Consortium 1 document, prepared by the two Presidents, was attached to the letter.  
The Context section of the Consortium 1 document notes increased interest in distance education 
within Canada and outside.  It also notes ‘out-of-country providers’ as a risk to Canadian 
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Distance Education.  (A veiled reference to the UK Open University threat.)  The document goes 
on to discuss the characteristics of a Virtual University as well as Canada’s Strengths, with a 
strong bias to Athabasca, British Columbia and Alberta.  The Consortium 1 Vision very broadly 
identifies ‘the appropriate use of ICT’, ‘quality assured, distance delivered university-level 
programs’, ‘on-going research’ and programs that are ‘current and related to labor force 
requirements.’  Fifteen more specific Outcomes were noted, including an ‘enhanced potential to 
jointly seek public and private funding’.   
 
Consortium 1 Fundamental Principles, included in the six-page document, emphasized the two 
presidents’ very restrictive view of what Consortium 1 could be – only complementary programs 
with openness and flexibility.  The first point of the Consortium 1 Fundamental Principles stated 
that a Consortium 1 member must make its distance delivered program and its courses available 
to any eligible student registered in any Consortium 1 sponsored program.  Open enrolment was a 
key philosophy of the original organizing partners.  Athabasca University, for example, will 
accept any student who applies to any program.  Many of those students (30%) will end up not 
even completing their first course.  Another 30% will not complete their program. (Estimates 
from Interview 7)  Other universities have very high entrance standards and will only accept one 
student in six or one in 10 or only students with averages above a certain threshold, such as 80%.  
This second set of universities was not keen to have to accept any student who came along to 
their distance education courses through Athabasca’s open policy.  This became a major 
stumbling block for several potential Consortium 1 partners.  Others, such as Laurentian and 
Memorial are not open themselves but will accept Athabasca students through their Consortium 1 
connections. 
 
Point five of the Consortium 1 Fundamental Principles said that all Consortium 1 courses 
should qualify as residency requirements.  This meant that a student registered in Consortium 1 at 
the University of Waterloo could potentially take all of his or her courses at Athabasca 
University, have them all count as equivalent-to-Waterloo credits, and obtain a degree from the 
University of Waterloo without taking any Waterloo courses.  Once again, this was not a popular 
idea at the Vancouver meeting. 
 
Point ten noted that Consortium 1 member institutions could control their own individual 
admissions.  This was contradictory to point one, however, which had said that all students from 
all universities needed to be accepted into at least one Consortium 1 program. 
 
5.2.2 Initial Partners  
 
In January 2000, potential Consortium 1 partners met in Vancouver.  Twelve universities had 
been invited - Open Learning Agency, Royal Roads University, Simon Fraser University, 
University of British Columbia, University of Victoria, Technical University of British Columbia, 
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Athabasca University, Brandon University, University of Manitoba, Laurentian University, 
Nipissing University, University of Waterloo, York University, and Memorial University – but 
many did not join the partnership.  The University of British Columbia attended the meeting, but 
declined to join Consortium 1 since it already had a number of distance education collaborations 
of its own world-wide.   
 
The Universities of Alberta and Calgary were not invited, Calgary through an oversight and 
Alberta because it was thought that they did not have complete distance education programs. 
When the Alberta universities heard about the Consortium 1 meeting, they were very concerned 
that they had not been invited.  The University of Alberta later became part of the organizing 
committee for Consortium 2, the second Canadian education collaboration. 
 
At the Vancouver meeting, Consortium 1 organizers made it clear that they were in charge and 
had already made the rules so invitees could either join with their rules or not join.  “We were 
pretty firm about don’t come and join us if you’re not willing to play this game.” “If you don’t 
think you can abide by these principles, then don’t join.” (Interview 7) 
 
Many of the larger, more research-intensive universities chose not to join.  The single program 
approach was a serious concern.  Also, the open enrolment philosophy meant that many 
universities with very high, tight enrolment standards might end up with sub-standard students in 
individual courses if not in entire distance education programs.  The ‘core’ of Consortium 1 was 
to be the combined programs of AU and the OLA.  This left very little for other potential 
members to contribute. 
 
It was going to cost $10,000 to join and $5000 per year to stay in Consortium 1.  For that 
money, the partner universities would have their distance education programs advertised through 
the collaboration.  They would also have access to students entering through Consortium 1.  
Some of the smaller and mainly undergraduate universities found this idea attractive, but the 
larger research-based institutions did not.  External funding was not identified as a major concern 
for partners at the initial meeting.  Each interested university just wanted to promote their 
distance education courses and consolidate into a Canadian consortium.   
 
After the organizational meeting in Vancouver in January 2000, Consortium 1 incorporated 
with Athabasca University, Brandon, the British Columbia Open University, Laurentian, and 
Manitoba as founding members.  These five institutions had a seat on the Board of Directors.  
Since the BCOU included UBC, Simon Fraser and the University of Victoria, these institutions 
indirectly had a voice in Consortium 1. 
 
The University of Waterloo and the University of Alberta told the Consortium 1 organizers that 
they could not sell Consortium 1 principles in their institutions because research universities had 
different pedagogies than open universities.  They thought that the idea of a Canada-wide 
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distance education consortium was a good idea, but needed more focus on research.  This 
smacked of elitism to the Consortium 1 planners and angered them.  Consortium 2’s tone was 
“insulting” – “we (Consortium 1) are a consortium of research universities.” (Interview 9) 
 
5.2.3 New Partners through Campus Canada Connection Funding 
 
Industry Canada started talking to Athabasca University about the Campus Canada Connection, 
now Campus Canada, in 2000.  A Request for Proposal (RFP) went out, looking for universities 
and colleges to work together to provide flexible, seamless, portable learning opportunities for 
federal employee groups and other national employees like Manulife, Hudson’s Bay, and so on.  
The government got three responses to the RFP – one from Consortium 1, one from a fledgling 
group of community colleges (Canadian Virtual College, CVC), and the third one from a group of 
three Atlantic universities (UNB, UCCB (Cape Breton), and Mount St. Vincent).  The Atlantic 
universities then joined Consortium 1 so that it would be easier for them to get the federal 
funding.  Consortium 1 worked with CVC so that all three groups ended up sharing the federal 
funding. 
 
Campus Canada is an active national alliance of universities, colleges and related 
organizations.  It offers online learning, open admissions at some institutions, and a variety of 
courses from a variety of educational partners.  Degrees, diplomas and certificates are available 
with ‘maximum credit for prior learning’.  As of May 2004, educational partners were Athabasca 
University, British Columbia Open University, Humber Institute of Technology and Advanced 
Learning, Marine Institute of Memorial University, Red River College, University College of 
Cape Breton, and the University of New Brunswick.  In April 2005, partners had changed slightly 
to also include Consortium 1, cegep@distance, Fanshawe College, and the Northern Alberta 
Institute of Technology.  The British Columbia Open University was no longer a member. 
 
Slightly different is Canada’s Campus Connection, delivered by Industry Canada and 
established in collaboration with the Association of Universities and Colleges of Canada (AUCC) 
and the Association of Canadian Community Colleges (ACCC).  Canada’s Campus Connection 
promotes the online credit courses of over 75 institutions to learners in Canada and abroad. 
(Campus Canada website, accessed May 6, 2004)  Institutional partners include most of the 
colleges and universities across Canada.  CCC provides student services such as a database of 
online courses, prior learning assessment, credit banking, credit transfer,  and certification. 
 
5.2.4 Later Partners 
 
In June of 2001, there were eight Canadian partners, Athabasca University, Brandon, Laurentian, 
Manitoba, Open Learning Agency, Royal Roads, Tele-Universite du Quebec (which had now 
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joined the consortium), and University College of Cape Breton.  The Consortium 1 Board of 
Directors was made up of the President or his appointee from each of the eight member 
institutions.  There was also one Additional Provider, the University of Victoria.  Victoria 
advertised its Distance Education offerings with Consortium 1, but did not pay Consortium 1 
member dues.  The Goals of Consortium 1 were identified on their web-page at that time as issues 
related to facilitating on-line learning and credit transfers, creating efficiencies and conducting 
research about learning and information communication technologies.  Funding was provided by 
member institutions and by Industry Canada. 
 
Memorial University of Newfoundland came into Consortium 1 in about August, 2001.  They 
paid a shareholder’s fee of $10,000 to join and now pay an annual fee of $5000.  Their Director, 
Technologies believes that is money well spent because of Newfoundland’s isolation.  The 
Director’s educational background is in strategic planning, business development, higher 
education and entrepreneurship in universities, and she sees their Consortium 1 connection as 
very strategic for MUN.  Memorial is strong in distance education (350 courses, 175 online) 
because of the isolation of many of the island’s students.  A relationship with Athabasca, the 
biggest distance education provider in Canada, would add to Memorial’s existing power and 
provide a key national partner.  At first, MUN hesitated in joining Consortium 1 because the 
courses that they were allowed to bring into Consortium 1 were not the ones that they wanted to 
bring in.  The President of the OLA at the time was a former Vice-President Academic at 
Memorial.  He wanted MUN to bring in their education program.  MUN wasn’t really interested 
in that.  By 2001, however, the criteria had changed and universities could bring in what they 
wanted.   
 
UBC is not a partner of either consortium because they already have a large number of 
established international and provincial partnerships.  In early 2000 they were looking for a 
Canadian partnership but at that point perceived no advantage for them.  None of the University 
of Toronto, McGill, McMaster, or Queen’s are partners of either consortium because they don’t 
have strong distance education programs or there is no advantage to them.  The University of 
Toronto and the University of British Columbia, however, were both  members of Universitas 21. 
 
A Vice President of Athabasca University talked to the University of Western Ontario about 
Consortium 1, but they decided not to join because there is no advantage to them.  They offer a 
large distance program in professional education, which is seen to be one of the big areas of 
growth for Consortium 1.  Consortium 1 also approached the University of Ottawa and Ryerson 
University, but again neither saw institutional advantages.   
 
In early 2003, there were 13 Consortium 1 partners.  Of those, 10 were full members and 3 
were associates.  Since then, Brandon University, Mount Saint Vincent University, the University 
of Moncton and the University of Victoria have left.  As of March 2004, there were 250 programs 
and 2000 courses being offered through Consortium 1.  The active institutions within Consortium 
1 in 2003 were Athabasca, Laurentian, Manitoba, Memorial, UNB, and UCCB.  MUN, BCOU, 
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Manitoba and Athabasca were working together in 2003 on a major proposal for learning objects 
with Manitoba as the lead.  
 
5.2.5 Governing Structure 
 
As the consortium grew and formalized, Consortium 1 decided that they needed an Executive 
Director.  They hired one and paid her from the annual Consortium 1 fees and the Alberta 
Learning (Government of Alberta) funding of $75,000 a year.  Athabasca University supplied the 
office.  The chosen person had been hired because she had done some other work for AU. 
“People accepted that.  And it’s worked out very well.” (Interview 7) 
 
Consortium 1 is incorporated and is run as a business with a three-tier governing structure.  The 
Board of Directors at the top is made up of one executive from each of the partner institutions.  In 
2004, that includes nine Presidents, Vice-Presidents, Directors and Deans.  The middle tier is the 
Advisory Committee, which does most of the work for Consortium 1.  It is made up of Distance 
Education directors.  The Advisory Committee has monthly teleconferences with occasional face-
to-face meetings.  Below the Advisory Committee is the implementation level, which may 
include people from the Registrar’s Office, Computer Services or other areas of the partner 
institutions.  These are the people who put the Consortium 1 ideas into practice. 
 
There are different degrees of commitment and participation from the various partner 
institutions, depending on the time, energy and money that they will provide for Consortium 1.    
The degree of participation within Consortium 1 goes to ‘some institutions by virtue of the people 
involved who sit on the Advisory Committee’.  This supports the idea of the real partner as the 
‘person’, not the ‘institution’.  Institutions with only one course or a small number of courses to 
offer within Consortium 1 don’t have to pay full fees.  Such institutions are not shareholders in 
Consortium 1 and don’t attend board meetings.  Universities who have fewer programs to offer 
and those who have joined recently are less active.   
 
Athabasca University is still more-or-less the core of Consortium 1, providing money, people 
and space for the Executive Director.  A Vice President of Athabasca was the Chair of the 
Advisory Committee for 2003 since no other partner would take over after Laurentian in 2002.  
There is concern that Athabasca not be a continuing Chair so that it’s not perceived that 
Athabasca is running Consortium 1.  “If the partners don’t take an active role, Athabasca will 
become the virtual university for Canada and (other institutions) won’t have a role.”  (Interview 
7) 
 
An Associate Vice President from Laurentian is a primary member of the Consortium 1 
Advisory Committee and was the Chair in 2002.  Laurentian has participated in Consortium 1 at 
the board level and at the advisory level.  They have provided input for some discussion papers.  
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The Laurentian bill for Consortium 1 is not paid from continuing education or distance learning; 
it’s paid by the Director of Finance, indicating an institutional commitment.  Memorial’s 
Director, Technologies has also become an active Consortium 1 member recently.   
 
Less active members in 2003 were the OLA (which was being transformed by the British 
Columbia government), Royal Roads, Tele-Universite, Brandon, Moncton, Mount St. Vincent, 
and the University of Victoria.  The latter four institutions have left Consortium 1 in the past year.  
They are fairly small providers, however, so were not expected to impact Consortium 1 
dramatically.  The OLA has been transformed, so is no longer a Consortium 1 member.  Royal 
Roads was invited as an ‘alternative’ university.  They have their own way of doing things and 
don’t allow many Letters of Permission.  Tele-Universite (Teluq) was an independent distance 
education university in Quebec.  It is now a School of the University of Quebec at Montreal.  The 
Vice President Academic is the Consortium 1 contact person.  Brandon was only involved 
because of one unique distance education program – psychology and medicine.  Brandon was at 
the table in Vancouver and was one of the five founding members of Consortium 1 in 2000.  The 
University of Moncton left in 2003.  The Mount St. Vincent University contact identified the 
institution as a “provider” member of Consortium 1, and not a partner member.  Their two-year 
term was up in 2003 and they did not renew.  The University of Victoria didn’t pay the full 
Consortium 1 fee.  It was an associate member and paid $500 per program listed.  The University 
of Victoria wanted wider publicity though, so was using Consortium 1 for publicity for their 
programs outside of British Columbia. 
 
5.2.6 Benefits of Consortium 1 
 
The motivation for Consortium 1 was to “stake a claim to the national thing” and be “part of a 
larger community”.  “It’s a positioning thing.” (Interview 7)  The advantage of Consortium 1 is 
connections with the federal government, the distance education world, the continuing education 
world, and so on.  The downside of Consortium 1 is spending time on long-term Consortium 1 
goals rather than getting immediate short-term benefit working at the institutional level. 
 
Athabasca University sees Consortium 1 as positioning and branding and networking rather 
than as a way to get more registrations.  Memorial finds the Consortium 1 membership 
worthwhile just for the Canadian and world-wide contacts.  Because of the isolation in 
Newfoundland, “you can’t survive without partnerships.” (Interview 9)  “There’s a lot of learning 
in a network like Consortium 1.” (Interview 8)  “You learn from each other at the party or 
reception before or after the board meeting.  So, for our $5000, we get promotion, professional 
development, contacts, and networks Canada-wide.” 
 
The initial motivation for getting together is often to get funding, but the ‘community of 
learning’ created from that collaboration is good.  When you put like minds together, the 
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networking that results from that coming together is ‘valuable in its own self, not just the fact that 
we only have more money’. (Interview 7) 
  
The major goal of interest to Memorial is the mobility of students, providing access to courses 
for them across the country.  A second goal is to pick up market share.  Memorial has been 
marketing to the double cohort in Ontario, for example, to attract students to regular and distance 
education courses.   
 
Unfortunately, it is not easy to measure the benefits of Consortium 1.  It is almost impossible 
for partner universities to keep track of which students or revenues or new registrations they may 
have obtained because of their Consortium 1 collaboration.  That makes it very difficult to judge 
whether their Consortium 1 membership is worthwhile or not.  Most of the benefits are 
intangible.  Memorial is not able to tell whether Consortium 1 is doing them any good or not.  
Procedures are not formalized to track Consortium 1 students.  The Registrar’s Office has not 
been willing to waive visiting student fees, which would help Memorial to be more open and 
inclusive for Consortium 1.  The Distance Education unit wants to be open, but the Registrar’s 
Office structure doesn’t allow it.  Laurentian has done some tracking and have at least $5000 
registration money coming in every year, which covers their Consortium 1 annual fee.  The way 
they track is to phone every new admission and ask them how they heard about Laurentian!  “I do 
it so the decision (to invest in Consortium 1) isn’t questioned.” (Interview 8) 
 
The mission of Consortium 1 is to try to make education more accessible to all Canadians.  
Consortium 1 provides a critical mass, a collective voice to government and one-stop shopping 
for students.  Laurentian’s mission is to bring education to Northern Ontario.  Students from 
Iroquois Falls or Cochrane or Chapleau won’t go to the University of Toronto.  Neither will 
native students or Francophone students.  So Laurentian’s mission fits nicely under the umbrella 
of the Consortium 1 mission. 
 
Laurentian’s former President is a long-time distance educator so it was easy to convince him 
that Consortium 1 was a good idea for Laurentian.  “We wanted to be in an online network so we 
had to pick one.  And I thought it would be better to pick a Canadian one than not.   We see this 
as an opportunity to increase enrolments and give Laurentian more exposure.”  $5000 doesn’t go 
very far in advertising, so Consortium 1 gives us that advertising.  (Interview 8) 
 
Some partners would like to see more collaborative practical research done through 
Consortium 1.  This might study student outcomes, for example, of an online faculty presence.  
Another issue might be why 70% of Athabasca distance students are successful after six months, 
but 30% are not.  (Interview 7) Are there defining characteristics?  Is it lifestyle?  Pedagogy?  
Support systems?  From the answers to these questions, Athabasca and Memorial and other 
distance education universities may be able to help their students to be more successful. 
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5.2.7 Other Consortium 1 Partner Alliances 
 
“The trouble is in Canada, there’s so many of these online learning initiatives dangling around” 
including the  Canlearn database and Schoolnet. “It’s quite a headache!” (Interview 7)  The e-
learning e-volution paper came out (Johnston 2001) and it talked about a pan-Canadian 
coordination of e-learning.  The CANARIE network was to be used to host the learning 
initiatives.  The OLA was very strong in western Canada five years ago, but was very constrained 
by the BC government. 
 
Laurentian and Athabasca have a joint program in Labour Studies.  Laurentian is part of a lot 
of other collaborations outside of Consortium 1.  Prior to Consortium 1, Laurentian had been 
working with Athabasca on a number of projects and course sharing agreements.  Laurentian has 
a fairly big distance education program that is not only course-based, but also complete program-
based. 
 
5.2.7.1 Memorial University of Newfoundland 
 
A new Bachelor of Education by distance program was planned to be offered jointly by 
Memorial and Athabasca as of 2003.  Tying that to Consortium 1, there will be 15 elective 
courses that could perhaps be taken at other Consortium 1 partner universities.  That means 
reduced development costs for Memorial and a new program that all Consortium 1 partners could 
offer to their students.  As of April 2005, this joint offering had not happened yet.  Memorial 
offered a Bachelor of Education by distance, but neither Consortium 1 nor Athabasca were 
involved.   
 
The Director, Technologies has also been making international connections for Memorial 
through the World Education Market.  Nigeria approached the Director at the 2002 conference 
with 48,000 teachers to be trained.  Memorial does not have the resources to handle that but, with 
Consortium 1, the group may be able to handle it.  She is looking for both a larger international 
student base for Memorial and increased consulting for her unit.  If Consortium 1 was to work 
with Memorial to go after work in Uganda and Ireland and Kiev, they could probably jointly 
handle large international projects without severely straining their core Canadian distance 
education work.  Memorial also bid on a development project in Vietnam and sent their staff 
down there to collaborate.  There was a financial gain to Memorial, but the bigger gain was the 
experience and enrichment for staff. 
 
The Director would very strongly like an alliance with Waterloo.  That is harder to do because 
Waterloo is not in Consortium 1.  She would also like an alliance with Simon Fraser University 
because she sees them as a leader in the field.  She is interested less so than Waterloo, however, 
because of physical distance but also because “they have the NCE”.  Simon Fraser had a TL-NCE 
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which was funded for seven years, but was not renewed in 2003.  Memorial believed that SFU 
was too busy with the NCE for Memorial or perhaps that their NCE reputation puts SFU out of 
Memorial’s reach. 
 
Memorial has many international alliances with Europe, Ireland, England and several Marine 
Institute alliances.  The Director couldn’t attend a Consortium 1 meeting in Vancouver in 2002 
because she was in Milan, Italy establishing a collaboration with Sun Microsystems.  She would 
also like to pursue more American and Australian alliances.  American Learning Solutions at 
Vanderbilt University will be recruiting students for the Bachelor of Nursing program, so that 
Memorial will have 70 extra students in fall 2003.  Tennessee will market it to the hospitals down 
there because Memorial believes that they have saturated the Canadian market. 
  
5.2.8 Social Network 
 
Many of the Consortium 1 partners knew each other and worked together before Consortium 1 
was established.  As well as this, many new contacts were made through the partnerships.  A list 
of 86 people known to be involved in either the Consortium 1 or the Consortium 2 partnership or 
both is included in Appendix C.  “The distance education community is fairly small as you see 
here.” (Interview 8)  Many of the Laurentian people already knew the Athabasca and the UBC 
people before Consortium 1.  The Director, Education, at UBC has honourary doctorates from 
Laurentian and Athabasca.  He’s good friends with the Associate Vice President and former 
President and most of the appropriate people at Laurentian.   
 
The President of the OLA was a former Vice-President, Academic at Memorial.  The Director, 
Technologies, who made the decision for Memorial to join Consortium 1, partially based her 
decision on the President’s recommendation.  “I have a lot of trust and faith. … If {the President} 
thought that this was a good thing for Memorial …”  (Interview 9) 
 
The Vice President Education and Provost, BCOU is the former Dean of Education at St. 
Mary’s University, Memorial, and York University.  She is now the VPA, Humber College 
Institute of Technology and Advanced Learning. 
 
The Vice President Academic at Athabasca University knew the Vice President Academic and 
the former President of Royal Roads.  Royal Roads now has a new President and Vice Chancellor 
and a fairly new Vice President, Learning and are waiting to see whether Royal Roads will 
continue with Consortium 1.  The Royal Roads Registrar has tried to work with Consortium 1 but 





Consortium 1 has a number of discussion papers developed through the Advisory Committee 
talking about business planning and how to create revenues to sustain Consortium 1 when the 
Alberta funding dies.  Some ideas are international projects.  Some partner institutions would like 
to see Consortium 1 become self-sufficient financially.  Consortium 1 needs to go after more 
large projects to increase its funding abilities.  That is, they should be able to make money by 
virtue of their size.  International collaborations may provide better opportunities to make more 
money.  “We can charge more … cost-recoverable fees, Asian Development Bank, World Bank, 
CIDA. … you get paid well with those.” (Interview 9)  Then, even if Consortium 1 was the 
project coordinator with a 20% overhead, a financial sustainability model would start to form. 
 
One thing that could be changed is for Consortium 1 to generate self-sustaining revenue.  Many 
partners feel that Consortium 1 is too dependent now on government grants and the small number 
of members.  They are not sure how to generate the revenue, but think that a Consortium 1 
‘brand’ might help.  Right now, Consortium 1 is just an umbrella for the partners and doesn’t give 
degrees or certificates.  Consortium 1 is just selling programs from other institutions rather than 
adding value in its own right. 
 
A second potential change is to reduce the constraint of complementary program offerings.  
Some partners would like to let each institution offer whatever they want and let any institution 
join.  Consortium 1 has proposed a maximum of 15 members, but some partners think they could 
go to 25 members without getting too big.   
 
New members, particularly in Ontario, may be useful for Consortium 1.  A number of Atlantic 
partners came in at once in 2001 and Acadia has recently come in.  Consortium 1 needs more 
Ontario-based members, however, to share the ‘bigger markets’ such as Ontario.  Consortium 1 is 
“predominantly Atlantic-based and Western-based. … We have to get some more footholds in 
Ontario.” (Interview 9) 
 
Consortium 1 has also started adding some non-credit programming as of June 2003.  “We 
keep modifying our scope and way of business because we want to keep our members.” 
(Interview 7)   
 
A final change proposed by many partners but a bit more difficult to implement is to join or 
work with Consortium 2.  Some partners would like to work with Waterloo, SFU and other 
Consortium 2 partners, but are having difficulty doing so because of the Consortium 1 and 
Consortium 2 ‘divide’.  One innovative suggestion was to have various ‘tiers’ within one 
partnership.  That is, have a high-quality research group in the universities that are interested but 
also have a distance education program and course development group at the same universities.  
That would allow both a Consortium 1 and a Consortium 2 flavour within the one consortium. 
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Table 5.1 shows the changes in Consortium 1 partners from 2000 to 2005. 
 
Institution 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Acadia      X 
AU X X X X X X 
Brandon X X X X   
BCOU    X X X 
Laurentian X X X X X X 
Manitoba X X X X X X 
Memorial  X X X X X 
Moncton   X X   
Mount St. Vincent   X X   
OLA X X X    
Royal Military 
College 
     X 
Royal Roads  X X X X X 
Teluq (X) X X X X X 
UCCB  X X X X X 
UNB   X X X X 
Victoria  P  P   
 
Table 5.1 Consortium 1 Partners 2000 – 2005 
 
X = Full Partner 
P = Provider (of courses) only 







5.3 Consortium 2 
5.3.1 Formation 
 
Immediately after the Consortium 1 inaugural meeting in Vancouver in January 2000, two 
Directors and one Vice President of the University of Waterloo began discussing a different type 
of distance education consortium.  See Appendix C for a complete list of the Consortium 1 and 
Consortium 2 players.  Discussion in February 2000 tried to flesh out the motivation behind a 
new consortium.  A number of questions and possible answers were proposed, asking why a new 
consortium was needed, what might come of it and how it might be organized and operate.  A 
third Director also was in on this discussion, proposing a meeting with appropriate parties from 
like-minded schools.  By February 24, less than a month after the initial Consortium 1 meeting, 
the Directors were ready to share the Waterloo ideas with colleagues at the University of Guelph.  
Guelph had not been one of the Consortium 1 invitees.  The document was also shared at this 
time with the University of British Columbia. 
  
The initial Consortium 2 principles were ready by late February 2000.  This consortium had a 
significantly broader and deeper academic mandate than Consortium 1.  The proposal focused on 
technology, quality, depth, breadth, research, and active collaboration.  Major points are noted in 
Table 5.2 on the next page. 
 
The Director, Learning summarized the University of Waterloo’s involvement in national and 
regional initiatives in Learning and Teaching through Technology on March 2, 2000.  As well as 
the Consortium 2 ideas under development, other initiatives were learnware objects, prototypes, 
a repository, collaborative faculty development  and collaborative graduate courses.  
Funding for some of these projects was provided by Industry Canada. 
 
Comments on the proposed Consortium 2 were received back in early March from the 
President and Director, Learning at the University of Guelph.  At the same time, a University of 
Waterloo Vice President shared the proposed list with colleagues at York University.  There was 
also discussion to tie the first draft criteria to other published statements, presumably to add 
credibility. 
 
A planning group meeting was arranged in Guelph for March 23.  Attendees included the 
University of Waterloo (3 people), the University of Guelph (1 person) and York University (3 
people).  The Interactive University working title was to be changed, but a new name had not yet 
emerged.  Industry Canada had suggested the consortium apply for $100,000 seed money for 
startup costs.  This matched the startup money provided earlier for Consortium 1.   
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Criteria for Collaboration through a Consortium 
• Demonstrated experience in distance education with courses that are web based, or are 
significantly enhanced with web/internet technology (or credible evidence for a plan to be 
there within twelve months) 
• Experience in developing high quality web-based teaching material 
• Commitment to convergence (the same material can be used for both on campus and at a 
distance) 
• Experience in offering full degree programs via distance education 
• Faculty depth, breadth and qualifications comparable to a major research university 
• Full range of on campus courses and programs (re choice, intellectual atmosphere) 
• Appropriate and adequate student support services for distance education students 
• Significant interactivity in all courses (students with students and/or students with faculty) 
• Timed courses (known start and end dates) guaranteeing a cohort of students 
• Secured final exams comparable to on campus exams 
• Admission standards appropriate to a university that does selective admissions 
• Programs and courses that have the workload, demands and expectations that are comparable 
to on campus programs and courses 
• Commitment to mutually beneficial collaboration not driven by concerns about competition 
from others partners within the consortium 
• Commitment to work within the home campus to promote meaningful collaboration in 
development of teaching material and development of new programs 
 
Table 5.2 Initial Principles for Consortium 2 
 
By early April 2000, the Consortium 2 name was being used.  On April 3, an education 
consultant put together an internal document, which was forwarded to the three catalyst 
universities.  A Draft (Member Version) document dated April 10, 2000 included adjustments 
provided by one of the Waterloo Directors.  On page 3, members of Consortium 2 were 
recognized as research intensive universities with a strong presence in the delivery of Internet-
enhanced learning.  The Founding Members were identified as the University of Guelph, the 
University of Waterloo and York University.  Additional universities with ‘similar profiles as 
innovative research institutions’ will be invited to join.  A hand-written memo attached to this 
document notes that the name is too ‘cute’ but “we have to have ‘profile’ in order to get money 
(federal and private).  Industry Canada already has made a ‘soft’ promise to match what they 
gave Athabasca!”  So, with only a draft idea for a consortium and only two months after the 




There was also a note that the three presidents needed to get together with the Minister of 
MTCU. (Ministry of Training, Colleges and Universities)  There had been an expression of 
interest from the MTCU in seeing Ontario collaborations for online learning. 
 
External input was received in March 2000 from Bell Canada University Labs about Standards 
for On-line Course Development.  In April, the Director of Distance Learning and Educational 
Alliances, Pearson Canada, wanted to talk about the proposed Canadian University Consortium.  
 
In early 2001, the Waterloo Director, Learning prepared Background Information for the 
{Consortium 2} Project.  This document explained Consortium 2, the Purpose of the 
Memorandum of Understanding, the Goals, and Planned Activities for 2001. 
 
5.3.1.1 Memorandum of Understanding 
 
A final Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) for the Consortium 2 Project was developed 
between January 25 and March 13, 2001.  The Memorandum established the ‘intention’ of 
member institutions to work collaboratively to enhance ‘high-quality Internet-based programs and 
to integrate scholarly values and culture into our learning and teaching’.  Collaborative initiatives 
were available in Online Programs, Faculty Development and Research & Evaluation.  A 
Steering Group was established to oversee the work of Consortium 2.  Membership was open to 
other Canadian research universities ‘who can add value’ and who ‘share our traditions of quality, 
innovation, accessibility and outreach’.  Funding was explicitly mentioned in the MOU.  A lead 
institution will apply for funds for Consortium 2 projects.  An annual membership fee of $5000 
was proposed.  The MOU was to be revised before August 1, 2002 but it has not been revised yet 
as of April 2005. 
 
5.3.2 Initial Partners 
 
A Vice President at the University of Saskatchewan supported both Consortium 2 and changes 
proposed earlier by a Director, Education at the University of Alberta.  All agreed that an 
academic focus of research into teaching and learning through technology was important as was 
an interactive approach.  The Saskatchewan contact was concerned about a clear definition for a 
‘research university’.  He proposed the Maclean’s magazine medical/doctoral category ‘provided 
that doesn’t rule out any universities that we would want to leave in’, which in fact it did.  He also 
expressed interest in new partner selection – “how and at what stage” would you invite others if 
they wished to join?  The University of British Columbia contact had indicated to the 
Saskatchewan Vice President that he had found solid international and provincial consortia, but 
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the University of British Columbia was still looking for a national consortium.  Also, should 
Consortium 2 incorporate as Consortium 1 had done?  The Vice President’s last point was that his 
experience with CampusWest.Ca had verified that the people organizing the consortium needed 
to consult internally with their Vice Presidents, Deans Councils and so on for institutional buy-in.  
There was a meeting at an education conference in 2000 where some of this was discussed by one 
of the Waterloo Directors and the potential western partners. 
 
By May 25, 2000, the University of Alberta had been included in the Proposal for the 
development of Consortium 2.  An Overview of the Consortium 2 Project dated June 16, 2000, 
identified a target ‘to add three more universities by the end of 2000 … providing a truly national, 
coast-to-coast collaboration.’  At this time, two operational thrusts were recognized – 
Consortium2.ca focused on collaborative development of high-quality Internet-enabled programs 
and the Consortium 2 Institute focused on integrating scholarly values and culture with longer-
term impacts.   
 
On August 27 and 28, 2000, a meeting was organized in Edmonton including representatives 
from the Universities of Alberta, Saskatchewan, and Waterloo, York University,  and the Alberta 
Online Consortium.  On August 29, a draft Memorandum of Understanding was prepared by 
York University.  By early September, Waterloo and Alberta partners were organizing budgets, 
lists of courses and their online content.  At the same time, the Waterloo Director, Learning was 
to invite a Quebec partner and Dalhousie University to provide the broad geographical coverage 
necessary for a truly Canadian consortium.  The University of Alberta Director, Education noted 
“our strength will depend to a large extent on the commitment of each institution to do its own 
selling of the concept internally.”   
 
Feedback from the August meeting identified a number of issues of potential concern to 
Consortium 2.   
1. A source of funding for joint research initiatives has not been identified. 
2. Copyright and return on investment need to be clarified. 
3. The definition of ‘online course’ varies among institutions. 
4. The Consortium 2 brand name may be less than that of individual institutions. 
5. Consortium 2 needs buy-in at the vice presidential level. 
6. The value added by Consortium 2 needs to be clear for each institution. 
7. External funding will probably be needed for at least three years. 
 
On September 18, 2000, an Interim Steering Committee Report was prepared by the Waterloo 
Director, Distance Education, on behalf of himself and other Directors at Waterloo and the 
University of Guelph.  Partner issues in the Report: 
1. The Waterloo Director, Learning has had two discussions with Dalhousie. 
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2. Industry Canada cannot suggest a suitable English-speaking university in Quebec, so 
Consortium 2 can proceed without a Quebec partner for the time being. 
3. The University of Waterloo Director, Learning will discuss the issue of UBC with the 
University of Alberta Director, Education. 
The Report also contained course content and administration issues, such as development and 
preparation of lists of courses, graduate programs, educational principles, website development 
and student administrative processes.  A major issue was the need for a Chief Executive Officer 
to drive Consortium 2.  Without such a person, it was felt that the initiative would falter.  Finally, 
the Report noted the need for a Consortium 2 budget and funding, as well as the need for the Vice 
President Academics (VPAs) from each Consortium 2 institution to support the initiative. 
 
The University of Waterloo Director, Learning wanted the Atlantic provinces represented 
because part of the criteria of Canadian government funding was that it be coast-to-coast.  The 
Director saw Dalhousie as the most recognized and/or the most research-intensive Atlantic 
university.  Also the Executive Director, Technology, at Dalhousie at the time was a personal 
contact promoting instructional development and that was wanted by Consortium 2.  The 
Associate Dean in Health Professions and his faculty had had the most involvement in online 
course delivery, so it made sense for the Associate Dean to be the Consortium 2 liaison.  The 
Dean in the Faculty of Health Professions gave them a mandate to grow and they had no physical 
space, so online delivery fit the bill.  A number of people at Dalhousie have had the Consortium 2 
liaison position, due to significant faculty turnover at the university.  The current representative 
from Health Services is helping to collaborate on a research paper with a Director, Development 
from Simon Fraser University.  The two professors were collaborating before Consortium 2 since 
they had both been faculty members at Dalhousie. 
 
On February 7, 2001, the Vice President of York University talked to the President and the 
Chair of Communication, Simon Fraser University, about Consortium 2.  Simon Fraser was 
interested in all three areas of Consortium 2.  Simon Fraser would be the seventh member if they 
signed on.  The Director, Education, University of Alberta, said that research and development 
were most important to him and detail was needed “to convince my VPA that we need to be 
active members”.   
 
The University of Waterloo Director, Learning wanted the Consortium 2 membership 
confirmed by February 2001 to secure government funding.  Waterloo, Guelph, York and Alberta 
had signed the MOU by March, 2001.  Dalhousie, Saskatchewan, and Simon Fraser were ready to 
sign.  By March 19, Simon Fraser had signed.  More external input was received in May 2001 
from NSERC speaking to Consortium 2 about the Advisory Committee on Online Learning 
(ACOL).  The University of Alberta Director, Education accepted a new position as Executive 
Director, Learning at the University of Calgary.  By mid-September 2001, he had persuaded his 
new VPA to sign the Consortium 2 MOU, making the University of Calgary the eighth 
institutional member.  At about the same time, the University of Alberta Director, Extension 
moved  to the University of Saskatchewan.  The University of Alberta remained in Consortium 2 
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with a new contact.  In January 2002, the Acting Director, Technologies, confirmed continued 
support for Consortium 2 from her Associate Vice-President. 
 
5.3.3 External Funding  
5.3.3.1 McConnell Foundation 
 
On April 14, 2000, a Consortium 2 proposal was jointly submitted to the McConnell Foundation 
by the University of Guelph, University of Waterloo and York University, signed by the 
presidents of the three institutions.  On April 27, a letter was received back from the Foundation 
asking for a full proposal by May 23.  The reviewers from the Foundation requested further 
explanation as to how Consortium 2 would be any different from any other collaboration, how 
it is more than just a wider network of online courses, and specifically how Consortium 2 
contributes to teaching and learning at each university. 
 
An Abstract of the proposal from the Consortium 2 Group to the Foundation mentions the 
Consortium 2 Institute, a scholarly centre which was meant to add a strong research component to 
the collaboration.  There was also discussion of joint goals with the Association of Universities 
and Colleges in Canada (AUCC) and the MERLOT project in the United States. 
 
On October 10, the Vice President of York University and the Director, Learning of the 
University of Waterloo visited the President of the McConnell Family Foundation.  A new 
proposal was to be submitted although there was no guarantee that McConnell money would be 
available.  Even if McConnell funding is made available, it would cover only some parts of 
Consortium 2 and only three or four years rather than the five years that are needed for startup 
funding.  A new McConnell proposal was developed by January 2001 suggesting the need for 
funding of 10 faculty members at each university by Fall 2001, then 30 in 2002 and 40 in 2003 
and 2004.  The individual universities would have to pick up the costs of these Faculty Fellows 
about 2002 or 2003. 
 
5.3.3.2 Government  
 
On February 22, 2001, the University of Waterloo Director, Learning met with the Office of 
Learning Technologies (OLT) about their research agenda for potential Consortium 2 funding.  
On May 15, there was discussion about an OLT-NPLT fund application.  The application was to 
evaluate the CLEO resources and, in case Inukshuk Learning Plan funding doesn’t come through, 
evaluation of Consortium 2 learning objects, thereby extending the application from Ontario to a 
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national project. An OLT meeting was being arranged in May to “collaborate on their research 
agenda”.   
 
In late April, the University of Waterloo proposed Collaborative Research and Research 
Alliances and Lifelong Learning as an SSHRC strategic theme.  While the Consortium 2 group 
was in Ottawa in May, they planned to meet with SSHRC about their Initiative for the New 
Economy (INE) program.  The INE initiative was a 5 year, $100 million program of targeted 
research support.  Focus areas, set by Finance and Industry Canada partners, are education, life-
long learning and management.  The STELAR (Stimulating Technology-Enhanced Learning with 
Action Research) initiative is directly related, but was not pursued after attracting minimal 
interest when circulated.   
 
In May 2001, meetings were arranged in Ottawa between several funding organizations - OLT, 
SSHRC, and Industry Canada - and Consortium 2 people.  Directors from the Universities of 
Guelph and Alberta were both originally interested in attending.  The University of Alberta 
couldn’t make the Ottawa meeting at the last minute, so there was some consternation on both 
sides as to what went wrong and why and how.  An Alberta presence was seen to be necessary to 
support the notion that Consortium 2 was national.  In fact, only the Director, Learning from 
Waterloo and a Distance Learning Specialist from Guelph ended up in Ottawa, which defeated 
the large-scale Canada-wide focus that had been expected. 
 
The Consortium 2 group also planned to put a proposal in to SSHRC and NSERC to support 
discipline faculty in Learning Technologies research.  As of October 2001, Industry Canada was 
interested in Consortium 2 and intended to provide funding.  A Statement of Work was being 
reviewed.  A press release was to come later jointly with Industry Canada after the Statement of 
Work was final.  From April 1, 2001 to March 31, 2003, Consortium 2 had funding from Industry 
Canada to prepare a database of courses, get the courses ready for public access, and prepare 
documents such as Letters of Permission for course credit. 
 
5.3.4 Governing Structure 
 
In July 2000, the Academic Vice Presidents of Guelph, Waterloo and York shared e-mail about 
the governing structure, funding and publicity for Consortium 2.  By October 2000, a web portal 
was being developed to showcase the Consortium 2 courses.  A part-time Project Director was 
hired in November.  In January 2001, work continued on the Consortium 2 database and portal.  
The University of Alberta had originally started doing this work, but Waterloo later took it on due 
to poor project management in Alberta.   A contract company called CompCanada Atlas finally 
created Consortium 2’s database and public website.  This outside company was hired because of 
the project management issues and delays at the University of Alberta.  The course database in 
spring of 2001 contained 285 courses, spread broadly by category. 
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On February 27, 2001, a teleconference was arranged with Senior Administrators (Vice 
Presidents) and Directors of all Consortium 2 universities.  The teleconference discussed 
Learning Object definitions, portal specifications, and internal course databases, all with March 
31 deadlines.   
 
On April 30, 2001, a series of monthly teleconferences began with the six confirmed 
universities.  Dalhousie had not yet signed the MOU by this date.  Separate monthly 
teleconferences were held with the Project Directors, Online Programs, and Research & 
Evaluation groups.  A Vice President at the University of Saskatchewan was leading the transfer 
credit process.  The Director, Development was still at Dalhousie at this time, but is moving to 
Simon Fraser University on July 1, 2001 so is now the SFU Online Program Initiative Contact. 
 
A meeting was arranged in Saskatoon August 28 and 29.  On August 28, 2001 there was a 
Research meeting to discuss OLT, Industry Canada, SSHRC INE, and STELAR research 
projects.  On August 29, there was a Project Directors meeting.  Possible additional participants 
were suggested from the University of Calgary and the University of Quebec.  Alberta’s Director, 
Education was moving to the University of Calgary and Dalhousie’s Executive Director, 
Technology, to the University of Quebec.  Roles within Consortium 2 were discussed – the 
Council of Ministers of Education in Canada (CMEC), Vice Presidents, Project Directors and 
other staff – as well as initiatives, funding and research.   
 
On November 10, 2001, a meeting was planned at Simon Fraser University in Vancouver.  A 
well-known administrator was proposed as the new Executive Director, one day a week.  At that 
time, this person was the Executive Director of the TeleLearning Network of Centres of 
Excellence and she was recognized by many of the partners.  By February 2002, the universities 
were trying to get a Consortium 2 organization chart together – a sign of maturity of the 
consortium. 
 
The Consortium 2 Project Directors teleconference in August 2003 discussed possible 
relationships between Consortium 1 and Consortium 2.  This was followed up with e-mails to the 
Executive Director of Consortium 1.  The key joint project at the time seemed to be a national 
gateway to distance education courses.  The Consortium 2 Annual Meeting in October 2003 
discussed Consortium 1 relationships and again the national gateway to distance education.  The 
agenda included a national research consortium for online learning, collaborative development of 
online programs, and faculty development in research-based teaching online. 
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5.3.5 Potential Partners 
5.3.5.1 University of British Columbia 
 
On March 1, 2000, the Director, Education of UBC provided his comments on the Interactive 
University document.  He found the process restrictive, but thought that the proposal matched the 
‘culture’ of UBC.  Transfer arrangements were similar to those that had been in practice among 
UBC, SFU and the University of Victoria for nearly 20 years.  The Director was concerned that 
an online restriction would need to be clearly defined and might limit course offerings.  UBC at 
that time had been asked to participate in nine different consortia, so the Director was making no 
promises for Consortium 2.  He ended his comments by asking whether institutions from outside 
Ontario would be welcome in the ‘club’, implying that he had sensed an ‘exclusive’ ‘Ontario’ 
focus in the document. 
 
The Director’s comments were appended with a University of British Columbia document to 
UBC’s Vice-President, Academic, with copies to others at UBC, summarizing the Director’s 
thinking about the various distance education consortia of the time.  The Director’s 
recommendations to his superiors: 
1. Aggressively support Universitas 21 
2. Possibly support the US-based R1 consortium 
3. Continue with the British Columbia Open University consortium through OLA 
4. Watch Consortium 1 and perhaps let them use UBC distance education courses, but don’t 
pay to join 
5. Low priority to Campus West 
6. No priority to Industry Canada’s Campus Network, but allow UBC courses 
 
The Director concluded his UBC document with “I see UBC courses having high value for 
most other consortia, so we should be cautious about paying to join such a consortia.”  He follows 
up with “These are my recommendations.  However, I would feel a lot more comfortable if this 
was a decision/policy of the senior management at UBC, rather than my own preference.” 
 
In January 2001, the University of British Columbia decided not to join Consortium 2.  UBC 
said “we support the intent of the project” but do not see advantages to the institution or for the 
students.  All Consortium 2 partners can already use UBC courses if they wish.  Students from 
the Open Learning Agency and Athabasca University already register in UBC courses and 
Consortium 2 students could do the same.  UBC is also interested in research, but with individual 
institutions.  There may be potential accreditation problems and residency issues.  They already 
do their own international marketing specific to UBC.  There is a high cost of participating in 
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Consortium 2, including fees, time and travel costs.  Finally, the UBC staff is already “burnt out” 
with existing funded projects.  
 
5.3.5.2 Other Universities 
 
On March 11, 2001, the University of Waterloo’s Director, Learning approached McGill about 
Consortium 2.  On March 13, the reply from McGill said that faculty development and research 
collaborations are already done “bottom up” by individual faculty members at McGill.  McGill 
was also already in Universitas 21 so didn’t need or want to share online courses.  As well, they 
would require vice presidential and legal office approval, both of which are hard to get. 
 
McMaster  enquired about a potential partnership in the spring of 2002.  They ended up signing 
on with CLOE, a learning objects consortium, but not with Consortium 2.  They do not have a 




By mid-September 2001, Consortium 2 members were looking for Status Reports about 
Consortium 2 that they could share with their institutions for continuing administrative support.  
In October 2001, the Consortium 2 project was announced at the AUCC meeting by York 
University.  Industry Canada was interested in Consortium 2 and intended to provide funding.  A 
Statement of Work was being reviewed.  A press release was to come later jointly with Industry 
Canada after the Statement of Work was final.  It took several months of preparation before the 
public announcement because Consortium 2 wanted the public portal to be ready first.   
 
In Fall 2002, Consortium 2 was officially announced as a national collaboration of eight major 
Canadian universities.  Consortium 2 had actually been operating for some time but was just 
beginning its publicity with the hiring of an Executive Director, and new funding from Industry 
Canada.  The Executive Director had been the former Executive Director of the Telelearning 
Network of Centres of Excellence, now disbanding as its federal funding ran out.  Several staff 
members from the University of Waterloo were involved in start-up work for Consortium 2.  The 
University of Waterloo’s Associate Vice-President, Learning and formerly Director, Learning 
was Consortium 2’s Project Director and a member of the Steering Committee.  The other 
universities in Consortium 2 were Dalhousie, Simon Fraser, Alberta, Calgary, Guelph, 
Saskatchewan and York.  The Consortium 2 website described its first research project with an 
on-line learning environment, as well as co-development of courses among universities.  The 
website also promised a ‘culture of research and scholarship’ tied to technology-enhanced 
learning, development of students’ capabilities and ongoing development of faculty, culminating 
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in a “network of expert faculty members”.  Once again, a very different focus and agenda from 
Consortium 1. 
 
5.4 Summary of Case Study Narratives 
 
Documentation of the case study narratives provided preliminary data organization both by 
timeline and by main topics.  The narrative work itself brought together information from a 
number of data sources.  It also ordered the information and allowed key themes to surface.  
Important issues emerged related to formation of the partnerships, external funding, and evolution 
of the partnerships including expansion with new partners. 
 
Consortium 1 membership has changed dramatically over the years, as shown in Table 5.1.  
The consortium began with five members, grew to a high of 13 members in 2003, and is now at 
11 members.  Conversely, Consortium 2 began with eight members and is still at that steady state.  
The interests and motivation of the partners are very different as well.  Consortium 1 partners are 
very interested in online course development and offerings and in generating revenue from the 
partnership.  Consortium 2 partners are more interested in research and scholarship related to 
online teaching and learning, co-development of courses, and faculty development. 
 
Once the case study narrative was completed giving an overview of the data, the detailed 
analysis of documents was started.  A qualitative research data analysis software package was 
used to store materials and enable electronic coding.  Information on the package and results of 




Detailed Analysis with Coding 
 
6.1 Data Analysis Software 
 
Three software packages for data analysis were reviewed – Atlas ti, N6 (Nudist), and NVivo.  
Atlas ti had been suggested as a long-established data analysis tool that could handle text, 
graphics and audio.  A search for the software, however, showed that it did not appear to be 
appropriate for this work and that it would be difficult to obtain a current version.  N6, the latest 
version of the traditional Nudist data analysis software, could handle large data sets and routine 
queries.  NVivo, another recent variation of Nudist, worked on smaller data sets but could handle 
multifaceted data and complex queries.  NVivo was more user-friendly than N6, had simple 
coding and data management, worked with thematic tree structures, and could generate emerging 
grounded theory from the data analysis.  Since this research encompassed a small amount of 
complex data, NVivo seemed to be the best fit overall. 
 
NVivo 2.0 from QSR International Ltd. was the data analysis software chosen for this research.  
It works with rich text records edited, coded and linked with multi-media data such as voice 
recordings, audio tapes, and video clips.  The software allows simple coding of data and ideas, as 
well as a wide variety of methods of data analysis, retrieval and interpretation.  Emerging theories 
can be recorded and changed as the data are coded and analyzed.  One item can be associated 
with several different codes as appropriate.  Multiple levels of codes are available, so that items 
can be grouped into more general categories, such as ‘partner choice criteria’ and then separated 
into detailed specific codes, such as ‘requirements’, ‘reputation’, ‘social network’ and so on.  
Data can be linked qualitatively into views, groups or sets, and ideas can be shaped and modeled 
as the information is entered and analyzed.  The software allows easy integration, interpretation, 
discovery and focused questioning on the data.  As well as coding capabilities, the software also 
allows easy keyword searching and data pattern emergence.  Reporting can be done in text, 
tables, charts and multi-media formats. 
 
Data are coded as Nodes, which are containers for ideas and concepts.  For this data, these 
were specific codes such as funding, geography, reputation and so on.  Tree Nodes can also be 
coded to group individual nodes.  In this research, all of the Process codes or Criteria codes could 
be grouped to represent research questions or propositions.  Cases can document specific 
interviewees, universities, documents and so on.  Each of these cases can also have Attributes 
assigned to it, such as Consortia and Document Type.  Sets of codes allow for grouping of all 
interviews, e-mails, contracts or various types of data.  For reporting, Show identifies which 
documents relate to which other documents or themes.  Models can be created from these 
relationships.  The Assay reporting function provides more detail, such as numbers of documents, 
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tables, percentages of data, who said what, and detailed cross-referenced tables comparing 
interviewees to codes.  Tables can show numbers of responses, percentages, words, passages and 
a variety of characters compared by code or set or attribute.  The Search function allows 
searching by text, word, phrase, passage, or paragraph.  Search can also expand to include 
enclosing text to put specific words in context as needed.  Reports can be produced on data, 
searches, tables, models or other information.  All of the NVivo information can be linked to web 
pages, photographs, diagrams, graphs, charts, and other materials in a variety of online locations. 
 
6.2 Initial Coding 
 
Coding is very flexible and can be done in a variety of ways with the NVivo data analysis 
software.  Initial coding was done by reading the documents in NVivo and coding as they were 
being read.  NVivo permits multiple coding for all data, so the same words could be coded as 
both Funding and Research, for example.  This allowed for a more realistic analysis of the large 
amount of text. 
 
This type of coding in NVivo codes passages rather than words or lines or documents.  A 
passage in NVivo can be text of any length – a word, phrase, sentence, paragraph or any other 
meaningful unit of text.  When passages are coded then, they represent one part of the interview 
or contract or document (of any size or length) that discusses the idea at hand.  To code ‘social 
network’ for example, the researcher can code “Matt came to see us” as one passage or “We 
knew Justin” or a long, detailed paragraph about previously knowing and working with a variety 
of people.  In general, a passage was ended when a new topic was introduced. 
 
A small number of codes from the Initial Data Analysis such as Partner Selection, Reputation, 
Research, Social Network and Funding were set up to start the coding process.  The balance of 
the initial codes noted below were generated by reading the interview transcripts and coding as 
they were read.  This produced a list of 36 Free Codes.  The number of passages that were coded 
with the code word is shown below the word.  There were 278 passages coded, some with 
multiple codes. 
 
The Free Codes shown in Table 6.1 represent the first attempt to code data.  The names in the 
table are initial codes that seemed to make sense of the transcript and other information.  The 
numbers below the names are the number of passages coded for that code word.  For example, 


















































































Table 6.1 Free Codes 
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6.3 Code Consolidation 
 
Since many words had 0, 1 or 2 codes, these codes were either dropped entirely or rolled into 
another word.  The passages for these codes were reread and decisions were made on what to do 
with the words based on this review.  The words and decisions are identified below.   
 
1. Complementary (2) was coded from Interview 9 saying “We bring in different strengths.” 
This seemed to be the opposite of Similarity, so the two nodes were combined.   
2. External (1) was coded from Interview 5 talking about getting external funding from 
contracts.  This same section was coded as Funding, so the External code was removed to 
prevent duplication.   
3. Future (1) was Interview 8 talking about ‘self-sustaining revenue generation’ in the future.  
Since it had already been coded as Funding, the code was deleted. 
4. Join (1) was Interview 9 talking about bringing the two consortia together.  This was left as is 
since other interviewees also noted the notion of one consortium.  Recoding was expected to 
increase the number of instances of this code. 
5. Key Partner (2) was moved to Role since it appeared to be an example of one of the 
important partnership roles. 
6. More Students (2) was Interview 5 talking about more students growing his distance 
education program from Consortium 2.  This code was deleted since it was already coded as 
Motivation. 
7. Negotiation (1) was Interview 5 talking about bringing in whoever happens to be available 
rather than your first choice of partner.  Interview 5 mentioned that there was no UBC, but 
Simon Fraser was in.  Also, there was no U of T, but Waterloo and York were in.  This was 
recoded to Role (Key Partners), Reputation, and a new code, Resource Availability. 
8. Partner Selection (0) was omitted entirely.  This code had been established to start the coding 
process, but the interview material referred to issues around partner selection, but not Partner 
Selection itself. 
9. Peripheral (1) was Interview 5 talking about the Dalhousie people just ‘reviewing’ some work 
that other partners had done.  This ties to Dalhousie’s role in the partnership, so was changed 
to Role. 
10. ROI (1) was moved to Funding. 
11. Self-sufficiency (2) was Interview 9 talking about reasonable funding and income making the 
consortia self-sufficient.  This was recoded to Funding.   
12. Timing (0) was omitted entirely.  This code was originally included because some 
interviewees felt that the timing of certain events was critical to the partnership.  The issue 
did not surface during formal interviews, however, or it was perhaps subsumed in other 
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issues, such as Resource Availability.  That is, particular partners may or may not be 
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Table 6.2 Consolidated Codes 
 
A total of 26 codes and 277 passages were left after consolidation, as shown in Table 6.2.  
Some of these codes appear to be more general than others, such as Motivation and Social 
Network.  This suggested that at least one layer of high-level codes or Sets or Tree Nodes should 
be added.  These changes were done during the code rework described in the next section. 
 
6.4 Rework and Final Coding 
 
After reading and re-reading interview transcripts, it became apparent that some words, such as 
‘Geography’, meant different things to different people.  For Memorial University in 
Newfoundland, it related to the feeling of isolation from the rest of Canada and the rest of the 
world.  The Director, Technologies was using Consortium 1 to help Memorial collaborate to 
reduce their feelings of separation.  In this sense, ‘Geography’ was a motivation for Memorial to 
join the partnership.  The Director, Learning in Waterloo and other Consortium 2 interviewees 
were using the term ‘Geography’ to mean ‘Cross-Canada’.  That is, they had an Industry Canada 
contract that encouraged Canada-wide participation in their consortium.  For this group, 
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‘Geography’ was a constraint or one of the specific requirements of the partnership.  The 
Geography code was changed to Isolation and Canada, and these two codes were identified as 
sub-codes of Motivation and Requirements as noted earlier. 
 
Similarly, the word ‘Funding’ meant different things in different contexts.  In some cases, they 
were referring to Funds from Income to make the consortium self-sufficient.  In other cases, 
interviewees were talking about Government Funding or Research Funding.  Consortium 1 was 
searching for teaching and course-related funding.  Consortium 2’s focus was more on research 
funding.  A third use of the term was for Funds (or Fees) to be paid to belong to the consortia.  In 
the third case, there was also discussion of how that funding was obtained and who approved it, 
which ties to Organizational Approval. The Funding code was split to three codes: External 
Funding, Income, and Fees. 
 
Likewise, ‘Role’ was used to mean both partner selection roles and operational partnership 
roles.  To differentiate the terms, two codes were used – ‘PSRole’ and ‘ORole’. 
 
The researcher also noted that ‘Institution’ and ‘Organization’ appeared to be the same thing.  
Each of these codes had a large number of passages, however, so further investigation was 
necessary to identify potential subtle differences.   
 
All consolidated codes were reworked as follows to ensure correct coding and to add layers of 
high-level codes as necessary. 
 
1. Activity (14) 
This code referred to consortia operations rather than partner selection.  It referred to how active 
people are or should be in the consortia.  There were 14 instances of Activity in the MOU and 
Interviews 5, 7 and 10.  Operations was added as a higher-level Code. 
 
2. Canada (8) 
Canada was referenced eight times by Interviews 8 (2), 5 (3) and 10 (3).  Interview 8 was talking 
about a cross-Canada network, part of Requirements, and the need for one consortium across 
Canada rather than two consortia, which could be better coded as Join.  Interview 5 talked about 
the need for an Atlantic presence twice and the need for a British Columbia presence once, both 
of which are Requirements.  Interview 10 talked about a cross-Canada consortium and the need 
for McGill and a Quebec presence, again Requirements. 
 
3. Cost (5) 
Interview 9 talked about reduced course development costs, which is really a Motivation or 
Benefit of Consortium 1.  Interview 9 also talked about the financial benefit of income from 
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Consortium 1 twice, which is better coded as Income.  Interview 10 talked about whether it was 
worth the money to be involved in Consortium 2, so that could be better coded as Fees.  The Cost 
code was removed. 
 
4. Deal (6) 
Deal was documented once by Interview 5 talking about deal-making among some Vice 
Presidents and Directors of the University of Waterloo, York University and the University of 
Alberta.  Interview 10 also talked about deal-making five times among the Provost and Senior 
Administration of the University of Waterloo, York University and the University of Guelph.  
The Provost and Senior Administration comments were also coded as Organizational Approval. 
 
5. Drawing (3) 
Interviews 5, 8 and 10 talked about the network pictures that they were drawing to show their 
organization’s structure.  This dialogue was used in the drawing Discussion. 
 
6. Exclusion (6) 
Interview 9 talked about Consortium 2 being more of an exclusive group, which is better coded as 
Requirements.  Then the interviewee said that Dalhousie won’t do anything with Memorial 
(Reputation), then that the Consortium 2 partners are too exclusive, Dalhousie will block 
Memorial from getting into Consortium 2 (Key Partner Role), there has always been a “bone of 
contention” between Dalhousie and Memorial (Reputation) and finally that Consortium 2 is 
elitist. (Requirements and Reputation) 
 
7. Funding (30) 
The Funding codes were split to Income, Fees and External Funding as noted earlier.  Interview 9 
spoke about $15,000, money coming out of the budget, and that it was important to find money to 
support Consortium 1, all of which were recoded as Fees.  Interview 9 also talked about 
reasonable funding and income making the consortia self-sufficient.  This was recoded to Income.  
Interview 8 talked about self-sustaining revenue, a return on investment, the consortium being too 
dependent on the government and that Consortium 1 needed its own branding to generate 
revenue, all four of which were coded as Income.  Interview 8 also talked about paying fees, 
recoded as Fees.  The MOU suggests that Consortium 2 needs to ‘seek external funding’, which 
was coded as External Funding.  Interview 5 talked about external money from contracts, coded 
as Income.  Then he spoke about government funding for CA Net and funding for BELLE, both 
of which were coded as External Funding.  Finally he spoke about the provost providing money, 
getting the most influential person you can (also coded as Organizational Approval), the Provost 
has provided continuity, $5000 per institution to join, phone costs and annual and one-time fees, 
all of which were recoded as Fees.  Interview 10 talked about federal government funding, money 
allowing us to do things, waiting for grants, needing funding for an Executive Director (twice) 
and needing and waiting for Industry Canada funding (twice), all of which were recoded as 
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External Funding.  She also spoke about allocating people and resources to Consortium 2, which 
was recoded as Fees. 
 
8. Geography (10) 
The Geography code was split to Requirements and Isolation.  Interview 9 said that Consortium 1 
needs more Ontario members (twice) (Cross-Canada Requirements or Constraints) and that she 
felt isolation in Newfoundland (Isolation).  Interview 8 spoke about rural communities up north 
needing distance education, so his comment was recoded as Isolation.  Interview 5 said that 
Consortium 2 wanted the Atlantic provinces represented, a coast-to-coast consortium and Atlantic 
provinces coverage, all of which were better coded as Cross-Canada Requirements.  A last 
comment about Dalhousie’s profile in the Atlantic was coded as Reputation and Key Partner 
Role. 
 
9. Government (5) 
Interview 9 mentioned a federal-provincial agreement, which was coded as Deal and External 
Funding.  She also mentioned public-private partnerships as one of the Motivations for Memorial 
to join Consortium 1.  Interview 10 mentioned government funding which was recoded as 
External Funding.  She later talked about the government not understanding differences in 
universities, which was coded as Reputation.  The code for Government was removed. 
 
10. Individual (11) 
Interview 5 mentioned individual representatives who made the consortium deals, certain Calgary 
individuals, and individuals coming and going as partners, all of which were recoded as Deal.  
Interview 10 mentioned the Director, Technology at UBC (Reputation and Social Network), need 
for an administrator (Operational Role), a partner as a person, unit or institution (Unit of Partner) 
and the Vice President, York University (Reputation and Social Network). 
 
11. Institution (16) 
Interview 9 talked about the institution versus the unit as a partner (Unit of Partner).  Interview 5 
talked about organizational approval eight times (Organizational Approval).  Interview 10 talked 
about the institution versus the unit twice and organizational approval four times.  Institution was 
removed. 
 
12. Involvement (3) 
Interview 5 said that Simon Fraser and Waterloo were heavily involved, which was the same as 
Activity.  Later, he said that {Simon Fraser}, University of Alberta and Dalhousie people all 
knew each other.  (Social Network)  The Involvement code was removed. 
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13. Join (1) 
Interview 10 said that Consortium 1 and Consortium 2 should be joined into one Consortium. 
 
14. Motivation (25) 
Interview 9 needed some partners to grow. (5 comments) Interview 8 needed partners to grow, 
didn’t want to join the U.S. or some other consortium, and Consortium 1 made Laurentian’s 
distance education offerings better. (3) Interview 5 mentioned more students, expanded programs 
(5 times), participation in research (twice), participation in course development and sharing, 
being the Atlantic partner (twice), wanting a central database of courses, strength in numbers, and 
mutual interests and similar programs (twice).  He also noted that Calgary and Waterloo were 
already in. (Reputation, Key Partners) 
 
15. Objectives (5) 
These comments were changed to General Motivation.  
 
16. Online (6) 
These comments were also changed to General Motivation.   
 
17. Organization (13) 
Interview 9 discussed the institution versus unit-based collaboration, which was recoded as such.  
Interview 8 noted the President of Laurentian University supporting collaboration, the director of 
finance and president supporting it, and presidential approval, all of which were recoded as 
Organizational Approval.  Interview 5 noted four items of organizational approval and two 
instances of the institution versus unit as partner.  Interview 10 noted organizational approval. 
 
18. Power (5) 
Interview 9 spoke about Key Partners four times and then power or strength in numbers as a 
Motivation for a collaboration.  Power was removed. 
 
19. Reputation (24) 
Interview 9 wanted a relationship with Athabasca, Waterloo, Simon Fraser and other universities 
based on their reputations.  Interview 5 felt that Dalhousie is the best university in the Atlantic.  
He noted that Dalhousie looked in Consortium 2 and saw that “U of T isn’t there, but Waterloo 
and York are in” (Key Partners).  He also identified similarity between Dalhousie and other 
partners and cited the Maclean’s reputation survey.  Interview 10 talked about reputation with 
respect to UBC, Guelph, {Waterloo}, Manitoba, Calgary, Alberta, other known people, and 
similarity of reputation. 
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20. Requirements (7) 
Interview 9 noted Consortium 1 requirements of specific program offerings.  Interview 8 
mentioned open enrolment for Distance Education offerings.  The Consortium 2 MOU stated that 
institutions must enhance offerings and do research.  Interview 5 noted the need for Cross-Canada 
coverage and Atlantic provinces representation.  Interview 10 mentioned distance education 
online courses and quality requirements. 
 
21. Research (5) 
Interview 5 noted research done with Consortium 2 and UBC.  Interview 10 spoke about Guelph 
and Consortium 2 research work.   
 
22. Resource Availability (1) 
Interview 5 mentioned that there was no UBC, but Simon Fraser was in.  Also, there was no U of 
T, but Waterloo and York were in.   
 
23. Role (26) 
This code was split to Partner Selection Role and Operational Role.  Within Partner Selection 
Role, Key Partner was mentioned most often. Interview 5 said that he got the “most influential 
person” to be a local sponsor, which was recoded to Organizational Approval.  Consortium 2 was 
formed from individuals with personal unit interests was recoded to Deal and Key Partners.  The 
previous Peripheral code changed to Operational Role.  Interview 9 mentioned operational roles 
and participation or activity.  Interview 8 noted operational roles and ‘all equal partners’.  The 
MOU identified operational roles.  Interview 5’s comments were recoded to 1 operational, 7 key 
partner, 3 institution versus person, and 1 Motivation.  Interview 10 identified four instances of 
Key Partners and one Executive Director (Operational). 
 
24. Similarity/Complementary (11) 
Interview 5 identified 6 similar problems and issues among universities and 3 reputation 
comments.  Complementary was referenced twice by Interview 9.  She talked about 
complementary strengths within the consortia and complementary programs within Consortium 1.  
These items were coded as a sub-category of Motivation.  
 
25. Social Network (28) 
All interviewees noted either a person or a university which they ‘knew’ or ‘trusted’ to get them 
involved in these consortia.  Specific quotations about their social networks, people and 
reputations are included in the Results section. 
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26. Trust (3) 
Interview 9 trusts the judgement of the President of the OLA.  Interview 10 trusts the instincts of 
the University of Waterloo’s Director, Learning and the University of Manitoba.   These 
comments had already been coded as Social Network, so the Trust code was removed.  
 
6.5 Summary and Organization of Final Codes 
6.5.1 Summary 
 
The codes for Cost, Exclusion, Funding, Geography, Government, Individual, Institution, 
Involvement,  Objectives, Online, Organization, Power, Role and Trust were removed since their 
material was recoded as noted previously.  The Drawing code was removed and its material was 
moved to Section 4.5.5.3, Consortia Network Diagrams.  Codes were added for Partner Selection 
Role (Key Partner), Organizational Role, Organizational Approval, Isolation, Income, External 
Funding, Fees, and Unit of Partner. 
 
The final codes then are as noted in Table 6.3 below.  This is a total of 17 codes and 261 
passages.  The number of codes is reduced from 26 codes in the last round because of 
consolidation and rework.  The number of passages is also reduced somewhat, from 277 
previously, because of reduction of multiple codes and because of passage ‘spreading’.  That is, 
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Table 6.3 Final Codes 
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6.5.2 High-Level Organization 
 
The codes documented in previous sections started as ‘free codes’ taken directly from the raw 
data with no intentional regard to the Partner Negotiation Model.  The next step was to organize 
the codes for analysis according to the Model and Propositions.  Codes were identified as follows: 
 
Proposition 1: Deal, External Funding 
 
Proposition 2: Partner Selection Role 
 
Proposition 3: Organizational Approval, Fees 
 
Proposition 4:  (a) Requirements/Constraints 
  (b) Resource Availability 
  (c) Social Network 
  (d) Reputation 
  (e) Organizational politics 
  (f) Ambiguity 
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For better organization, sets of higher-level codes were added for Process (Research Question 
1) shown in Table 6.4 below, Criteria (Research Question 2) shown in Table 6.5 and Other Codes 
shown in Table 6.6.  Process Codes were Deal, External Funding, Partner Selection Role (Key 
Partner), Organizational Approval, and Fees.  Criteria Codes were Requirements, Resource 
Availability, Social Network, Reputation, Politics, and Ambiguity.  Other Codes were Activity, 




















































Table 6.6 Other Codes 
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6.5.3 Detailed Organization 
 
Finally, each of the three sets of codes in the preceding tables has been organized and subdivided 
with further detail.  Process code results for Propositions 1 to 3 are noted in Table 6.7.  Criteria 
code results for Proposition 4 are shown in Table 6.8.  Table 6.9 shows Other Codes organized by 
issue. 
 
A. Process Codes 
 
Proposition Code Number of Passages Percent 
1 Deal-making 14 17% 
 External Funding 11 14% 
2 Key Partner Role 22 27% 
3 Organizational Approval 21 26% 
 Fees 13 16% 
Total  81 100% 
 
Table 6.7 Process Codes by Proposition 
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B. Criteria Codes 
The 24 Requirements code results were the total of Canada 14, Research 7 and Distance 
Education Offerings 3.  E-mail archives mention specifically trying to fit Consortium 2 to a 
government funding program.  This is a measurement of the ambiguity of the government 
program. 
 
Proposition Code Number of Passages Percent 
4 Requirements 20 23% 
 Resource Availability 1 1% 
 Social Network 32 37% 
 Reputation 34 39% 
 Politics 0 0% 
 Ambiguity 0 0% 
Total  87 100% 
Table 6.8 Criteria Codes by Proposition 
 
C. Other Codes 
Other codes were grouped as appropriate and then sorted into Issues.  The 49 Motivation codes 
were made up of General Motivation code 39, Similarity 8 and Isolation 2.  Operations 22 was 
made up of Activity 16 and Organizational Role 6. 
 
Issue Code Number of Passages Percent 
Motivation General Motivation 39 53% 
 Similarity 8  
 Isolation 2  
Operations Activity 16 23% 
 Organizational Role 6  
Unit of Partner  10 11% 
Income  9 10% 
Join  3 3% 
Total  93 100% 




Results and Evaluation 
 
The results of this research include the following: 
• the final revised Partner Negotiation Model in Chapter 3, reproduced below 
• narrative documentation of the two detailed case studies in Chapter 5 
• analysis and discussion of Major Findings and propositions in this chapter  
• a set of Other Findings in this chapter, relevant to the research questions. 
 
The research began with a literature review of existing theory providing an identification of 
gaps in the literature.  The gaps plus initial interviews led to the original model and declarative 
propositions.  Detailed case studies were written for the two distance education consortia being 
studied.  The analysis of interviews and other archival data provided Major Findings related to the 
research questions and propositions.  For example, the original Partner Negotiation Model was 
adjusted to add an Organizational Approval cycle.  Other additional and unexpected results were 






   
 
 









Cycle => Approval 
2. Driver 
3. Key Partners 
4. Partners 
C. Partner Role/Selection 
Cycle => Alliance 
5. Organization 1. Sponsor 
A. Deal-making Cycle => 
Choice Opportunity 
Figure 7.1 Partner Negotiation Model 
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Results are provided in varied formats and organized into a number of areas, following mixed 
research methods.  A typical qualitative study might produce a tentative theory and a set of 
propositions for results or alternatively a detailed written case study.  Conversely, a quantitative 
study may include a literature review leading to a set of comparative or predictive hypotheses 
with high-volume statistical tests.  This work combines these two areas as well as providing a 
revised model and some unexpected results.   
 
Findings were validated in the following ways, as suggested by (Creswell 2003, p. 196). 
• Multiple cases presented several views on the research questions. 
• A rich description of the cases was provided for the two major case studies.   
• Patterns were observed by grouping the interview data in particular into propositions and 
other findings.   
• Different sources of data – interviews, e-mail, web pages and other documents – provided 
triangulation.   
• Member-checking was done with case members reviewing findings and identifying no 
major concerns with them.   
• Researcher bias was investigated in Chapter 4 and assessed as insignificant.   
• The research has taken six years to complete providing a prolonged time in the field. 
• Results have been reviewed with other arms-length researchers at conferences, in 
Management Sciences and in Computer Science providing peer debriefing. 
• External auditors are available in the form of thesis committee members. 
• Negative or discrepant information was identified in Other Findings.   
 
7.1 Major Findings 
 
The research questions, model, propositions and data analysis codes were used to generate the 
themes of the Major Findings, which were in the following areas:  
1. Deal-making 
2. Partnership Roles 
3. Organizational Approval 
4. Partner Choice Criteria 
These Major Findings tied to the original Research Questions and Propositions.  The Research 
Questions concerned the how (process) and the why (criteria) of partner selection.  The Major 
Findings have been coalesced into Propositions 1 to 3 which address Research Question 1, and 
the multiple parts of Proposition 4 which address Research Question 2. 
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Propositions were tested with a variety of data types as noted in Chapter 4.  Interview 
materials, e-mails, contracts, and other data were reviewed for each proposition.  Contrary or 
negative data were also noted for completeness.  
 
Evidence for these propositions is presented in a variety of ways.  First, the quantitative counts 
from coding analysis and text searches in the data are indicated.  Coding analysis is counted in 
passages – a word, phrase, sentence, paragraph or any other meaningful unit of text.  To obtain a 
relative percentage, the number of passages for each proposition is compared to the total number 
of passages related to the process or criteria of partner negotiation and selection.  The second 
point of evidence is a sample of interview quotations and specific documentation to illustrate the 
coded material for each case study.  Third, the evidence is discussed in light of the holistic data 
provided in the case study narratives.  Finally, the research concludes with the extent to which the 
available evidence confirms the proposition as stated. 
 
7.1.1 Deal-making Cycle 
 
The researcher argues in this section that the partner selection process begins with a Deal-making 
Cycle of informal negotiation between Sponsor(s) and Driver(s), leading to formal documentation 
of a Choice Opportunity.  Evidence to support this contention follows, organized first with 
quantitative evidence, then Consortium 1, Consortium 2, and finally a summary and conclusion.   
 
The quantitative evidence has two components – coding analysis from Chapter 6 and a count of 
appropriate words and phrases.  These differ in that a section of a document (interview, contract, 
e-mail, and so on) can be coded with the code ‘Deal-making’ when the section may not actually 
have the word ‘deal’ or any similar word in it.  The coder makes a subjective judgement that this 
dialog concerns deal-making.  Conversely, the word ‘deal’ may be found in a section of text that 
is unrelated to the notion here of a deal-making cycle.  The researcher performed both types of 
quantitative searches to produce the numbers given in the next three paragraphs.  Then the data 
from both searches were used as a frame to examine the narrative evidence from the Consortium 
1 and 2 case studies.  This process included all data types. 
 
From Table 6.7 in the Data Analysis section, coding analysis showed 14 passages that dealt 
with Deal-making in the context of consortium formation.  Another 11 passages noted the need 
for External Funding as a precursor to the partnership.  With a total of 81 process codes, this gave 
the researcher 31% of the interview comments about partner selection process that identified 
issues related to a deal-making process.  A sample of specific comments are provided following. 
 
The second search for quantitative evidence provided 413 instances in 9 documents.  These 
numbers were obtained from a text search for words related to deal-making cycle and informal 
negotiation such as bargaining, back and forth, tried, talk, discuss, confer, negotiate, negotiation, 
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consult, settle, compromise, cooperate, collaborate, cycle, circle, go back, return, sequence, 
round, rotation, complicated, and complex.  The NVivo software had originally returned a count 
of 704 passages in 9 documents.  Since many of the passages were unrelated to deal-making, 
however, the researcher had to manually remove those items.  Again, the specific issues are 
presented below.   
 
For funding related to deal-making, the researcher searched for grant, contract, government, 
deal, fund, and money.  Results showed 426 passages in 10 documents.  Separately, a search was 
done for formal and document and produced 137 passages in 5 documents.   
 
A deal-making cycle was evident in the planning and organization of Consortium 1.  Three 
founding institutions – Athabasca University, the Open Learning Agency (OLA), and Tele-
Universite (Teluq) from Quebec originally discussed the formation of this consortium.  Teluq 
could not participate for political reasons, so AU and the OLA proceeded together to obtain 
government funding, establish a Consortium 1 vision, and invite other universities to join.   
• Athabasca University (AU) and Open Learning Agency (OLA) are the Drivers of 
Consortium 1 according to their January 10, 2000 letter to other university presidents. 
• The two Drivers had already arranged for government funding for Consortium 1.  Both 
Industry Canada and the Alberta government had tentatively approved funding for this new 
consortium. 
• The Consortium 1 name had already been trade-marked before additional partners were 
invited. 
 
The January 10, 2000 letter included a six-page Consortium 1 document, outlining the vision of 
the Consortium 1 Drivers for this consortium.  The Consortium 1 Fundamental Principles (See 
Chapter 5) provided ten specific points put in place by the two Drivers.  As well, the “Process for 
creating the Consortium 1 Consortium” notes the lead of Athabasca University in trade-marking 
the Consortium 1 name.  Since Consortium 1 would provide “added value”, however, Athabasca 
is prepared “to license to it, free of charge, the Consortium 1 trademark.”  This statement, once 
again, puts Athabasca clearly out front as a Driver and the other institutions positioned separately.   
 
Since many issues had already been solidified, there was little left for new partners to 
contribute in the formation of Consortium 1.  For instance, a western focus was clearly evident 
with the example of an Athabasca University Executive MBA program along with other cases 
from British Columbia and the Western Deans of Continuing Education.  Certainly the framing of 
the invitation to new participants suggested that there was little deal-making left to do for other 
partners even at this early stage of Consortium 1 formation. 
 
Some potential partners felt that they had been left out of the deal-making and therefore did not 
join.  The two Drivers may have gone too far along in their planning before engaging other 
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partners.  One of the University of Waterloo’s Vice Presidents, for example, felt that Waterloo 
would not gain by joining Consortium 1.  The concept of a Canada-wide consortium was good, 
but the Consortium 1 model was not.  Similarly, the University of British Columbia, Simon 
Fraser University and York University did not join Consortium 1 but some of them later formed 
Consortium 2 with their own higher-level research ideas. 
 
During the search for deal-making evidence, it became clear that there were different levels of 
deal-making and different power of players in the deal-making.  With Consortium 1, for example, 
one of the reasons that the original deal was not well-received was that it had been developed and 
was being led by Athabasca University.  Some people from other universities invited to join the 
consortium felt that their university was more prestigious than Athabasca.  Therefore, they didn’t 
want to commit to a consortium being driven by a ‘lesser’ university.  If the same arrangement 
had been offered from the University of Toronto or the University of British Columbia, the deal 
might have been better received and they might well have joined Consortium 1.  The status or 
prestige of the Driver in this case made a big difference in terms of how well the deal was 
perceived by other partners.   
 
Another issue is whether this institution is included in the initial deal-making at all.  Only two 
institutions developed the Consortium 1 proposal.  This made the deal as presented appear to be a 
solid final consortium rather than a ‘proposition’.  Since the solid deal had been developed by 
what was perceived to be ‘lesser’ institutions, it was even less well-received. 
 
A third issue is whether potential partners like the deal at all.  Institutional partners must weigh 
costs and benefits of any potential partnership and decide for themselves whether this is a suitable 
Choice Opportunity for them.  For a deal to be positive, partners need to respect the Drivers, feel 
part of the deal-making, and want to be part of the deal to make all of the pieces work together.  
For Consortium 1, the deal-making cycle was too far along before other partners were sought and 
the two Drivers were not universally respected. 
 
Once an agreement with Consortium 1 was seen to be inappropriate, the University of 
Waterloo, the University of Guelph and York University began their own deal-making cycle.  
These three universities became the Drivers of Consortium 2, negotiated informally amongst 
themselves, and started their own plans for a new consortium and their own search for funding.  
At this point, the deal-making was very heavily Ontario-based although both Alberta and British 
Columbia were involved at arms-length. 
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Anything worthwhile needs a Driver, somebody on top of things 
and knows the opportunities and facilitates our expertise to that 
solution. 
The Provost has asked me to drive this for the university and 
quite often asks me, “Is this worth it?” 
 Interview 10 
 
UBC was concerned about the deal-making seen to be happening with the formation of 
Consortium 2.  Specifically, the Director, Technology asked whether institutions from outside 
Ontario would be welcome in the “club’” implying that he had sensed an “exclusive” “Ontario” 
focus in the Consortium 2 documents.  The University of Alberta similarly felt left out although it 
had originally thought of itself as a Driver of this new consortium.  The University of Guelph and 
York University were included as part of the deal-making in early March 2000, with comments 
received back from the Presidents and other high-level administrators at each institution. 
 
The three Ontario founding partners of Consortium 2 and the University of Alberta applied to 
the McConnell Foundation for external funding in April 2000.  Deal-making was evident in 
subsequent e-mails, letters and meetings between these Drivers and the McConnell Funders.  The 
original application was denied with feedback that the proposed partnership was too complex to 
work.  A second application was submitted including only the Ontario partners.  Alberta felt that 
they had not been consulted enough on the first application and they were not happy to have been 
left out entirely on the second application.  This particular effort failed, but it provided experience 
for future funding ventures. 
Well, money allows you to, it’s just the tool to do the great 
things you want to do. 
 Interview 10 
 
Deal-making was evident as well when the three Ontario university presidents (Waterloo, 
Guelph, and York) were encouraged to meet the Minister of Training, Colleges and Universities.  
There had been an expression of interest from the MTCU in seeing Ontario collaborations for 
online learning.  It was hoped that this could lead to external funding.  Again, the funding effort 
failed but it continued the deal-making process as Consortium 2 was formed. 
 
On August 27 and 28, 2000, a meeting was organized in Edmonton including representatives 
from the Universities of Alberta, Saskatchewan, and Waterloo, York University,  and the Alberta 
Online Consortium.  On August 29, a draft Memorandum of Understanding was prepared.  By 
early September, Waterloo and Alberta partners were organizing budgets, lists of courses and 
their online content.  At the same time, the University of Waterloo’s Director, Learning was to 
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invite a Quebec partner and Dalhousie University to provide the broad geographical coverage 
necessary for a truly Canadian consortium.   
 
Feedback from the August 2000 meeting identified two external funding issues of potential 
concern to Consortium 2.  
A source of funding for joint research initiatives has not been 
identified. 
External funding will probably be needed for at least three years. 
Deal-making needed to be continued until a source of funds could be found to solidify the 
consortium. 
 
The Funding section of the Consortium 2 Memorandum of Understanding, March 2001, 
discussed both startup and continuing funding in the context of both a Funder and a Driver. 
applications for funds from foundations or government agencies 
will be submitted by a lead institution 
 
By 2001, a number of deals were being contemplated for external funding.  On April 26, the 
University of Waterloo’s Director, Learning mentioned the SSHRC selection of strategic themes, 
proposing Collaborative Research and Research Alliances for Lifelong Learning.  In May, 
NSERC spoke to Consortium 2 about the Advisory Committee on Online Learning.  There was 
also discussion of an OLT-NPLT fund application and using Ontario funds to leverage national 
funds as needed. 
 
Another potential source of funding included the SSHRC INE initiative, which was a 5 year, 
$100 million program of targeted research support.  Focus areas, set in consultation with Finance 
and Industry Canada partners, were education, life-long learning and management.  The STELAR 
(Stimulating Technology-Enhanced Learning with Action Research) initiative was directly 
related, but did not generate external funding. 
 
A meeting was arranged in the summer of 2001 between several funding organizations and 
Consortium 2.  The University of Alberta didn’t make the Ottawa meeting at the last minute, so 
there was some consternation on both sides as to what went wrong and why and how.  An Alberta 
presence was seen to be necessary to support the notion that Consortium 2 was national.  In fact, 
only the Director, Learning from Waterloo and a Distance Education Specialist from Guelph 
ended up in Ottawa, which defeated the large-scale Canada-wide focus that had been required. 
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If you are expecting funding from federal government, you better 
be representative of your country. 
 Interview 10 
 
Funding for Consortium 2 was finally obtained from Industry Canada, but it took a long time to 
get this agreement.  The initial draft was May 2001 and the contract was finally signed in March 
2002.  The University of Waterloo’s Director, Learning was working with a contact at Industry 
Canada, but he had to get authorization or approval for the money to be allocated to Consortium 
2.  That is, the contact was not in a role authorized to make deals on his own. 
 
Deal-making was evident in a number of contexts in the Industry Canada Contribution 
Agreement, May 2001.  In section 6.1, Industry Canada states explicitly that they want to be 
identified as a contributor to the Consortium 2 partnership.  Sections 12.1 and 12.2 state that 
public announcements must be made through or approved by the government Minister.  After 
these two previous sections which seem to link Industry Canada and Consortium 2, section 14.7 
clearly declares that there is no partnership between the Minister and Consortium 2.  The 
government wants to be identified as a funder and contributor, but not a partner.  The final 
evidence of deal-making is in section 2.5 of the Statement of Work, Schedule A.  Under the title, 
Collaborating with Industry Canada, the government states: 
The {Consortium 2} Project Group/University of Waterloo will 
explore collaboration options with Industry Canada to identify 
and take advantage of opportunities for {Consortium 2} Project 
Group partner universities to offer Industry Canada online 
courses and evaluation tools 
Although this does not appear to be a specific requirement of this government contract nor 
binding on funding for the Consortium 2 project, it does appear to be a potential ‘deal’ as an 
outcome of the funding.  In essence, the government is hoping to obtain some future online 
courses and tools for its own use from the Consortium 2 collaboration. 
 
Evidence of a deal-making cycle from Consortium 1 includes: 
• Athabasca University and OLA as Drivers 
• External funding negotiated with Alberta and federal governments as Sponsors 
• Consortium 1 name trade-marked 
• Consortium 1 document prepared for discussion 
• Consortium 1 Fundamental Principles documented 
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With Consortium 2, the evidence is: 
• Waterloo as primary Driver, negotiating with external Sponsors 
• Alberta, Guelph and York as secondary Drivers 
• University Presidents and Industry Canada as Sponsors 
• Search for funding from the McConnell Foundation, MTCU, SSHRC, NSERC, OLT-
NPLT, and INE 
• Final funding from Industry Canada 
• Documentation of the Consortium 2 Memorandum of Understanding 
 
Since there are 10 different pieces of evidence from two case studies across a number of 
sources – interviews, e-mails, contracts, written documentation – there is significant support for 
this proposition.  Initial literature reviews had indicated that alliance formation and partner 
selection was a simple, rational straight-line process.  In fact, these data show a very complex 
process of deal-making, searches for external funding, and opportunistic activity.  Many 
interview sources also noted the need for a Catalyst or Driver to start the negotiation process or to 
keep it on-track once begun.  
 
This complex proposition required evidence of a number of different aspects.  First, there is the 
notion of a ‘deal-making cycle’ implying back-and-forth cooperation in an attempt to create a 
partnership.  Second, there are two Partner Roles noted – Sponsor(s) and Driver(s).  Sponsor(s) 
may be External Funder(s) or a person in a position of power who has sanctioned or mandated the 
formation of the partnership.  Driver(s) will be the person or people who ensure that the work is 
done to form the partnership.  Finally, there is ‘informal negotiation’ which later produces 
concrete ‘formal documentation’.  The evidence gathered in this study focuses on the deal-
making cycle including external funding.  The Partner Roles are explored again in Proposition 2, 
but are evident in these Proposition 1 results as well.  The informal negotiation and formal 
documentation appear to be outcomes of the deal-making and external funding, so are supported 
with evidence as part of the package as a whole.  Similarly, the deal-making cycle and external 
funding are often linked as a catalyst for the formation of the partnership.  This evidence leads to 
Proposition 1 below. 
 
P1: The partner negotiation process begins with a Deal-Making Cycle of informal negotiation 
between Sponsor(s) and Driver(s), leading to formal documentation of a Choice Opportunity. 
 
7.1.2 Partnership Roles 
 
The researcher argues in this section that partners can be selected to play different partnership 
roles, both partner negotiation and operational roles.  Partnership roles were discussed in the 
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literature in terms of operational roles once the alliance was established.  Significant evidence 
was also found of partner negotiation roles as the partnership was forming.  Individual people or 
organizations acted as Sponsors, Drivers, or Key Partners.  Depending on their success in these 
roles, other partners would join the consortium or not.  Interviewees specifically mentioned the 
notion of key partners and lesser partners.  Within the institutions, some people appeared to be 
more key than others as well.  The Provost for example, or someone who controlled funding, had 
much more power than the people doing the research or course work within the consortia.  The 
Provost’s power in this example is internal organizational power, which ties to organizational 
approval noted with Proposition 3.  The Provost’s role can also be seen as that of a Sponsor, 
however, since external funding and organizational support are key for the partnership. 
“{The Director, Learning} said “Get the most influential person 
you can as sort of the local sponsor of the project.”  So the first 
contact was with {the Provost}.”   
“the Provost’s office is where extra money ... derives from” 
 Interview 5 
 
Partner roles are important when new partners are sought.  It is important to have key partners 
in place to attract new partners.  Also, it may be important to be able to offer a key partner role to 
a high-reputation potential partner. 
 
Coding Analysis identified 22 passages noting a Partnership role, mentioning a key partner in 
particular.  In most cases, the key partners were people or institutions that were used to attract 
future partners.  From a total of 81 process codes, this made 27% of the interview comments 
about partner selection process related to partner negotiation roles.  The text search explored role, 
part, job, title, position, function, responsibility, task, and rank.  Results showed 938 passages in 
11 documents. 
 
According to the January 10, 2000 letter of invitation, Consortium 1 established “as its core, 
the combined programs of Athabasca University and Open Learning Agency.”  This immediately 
sets AU and OLA up as both the Drivers and the Key Partners of Consortium 1.   
 
Following from the early deal-making, different partners joined the group under different deals.  
Some were suggested by the Drivers or Sponsors.  Some checked out the existing partners and 
made their own decision based on who was already in the consortium.  Some were checked out 
by the existing partners and were allowed in by the majority of existing partners.  There seem to 
be different rules for different roles or levels of partner.  Founding partners seem to have more 




What is really important to me was the fact that {Waterloo’s 
Director, Learning} is involved. He’s a visionary. I’ve got great 
respect for him. We’ve worked together for several years. 
 Interview 10 
 
On February 7, 2001, the Vice President of York University talked to the President, and the 
Chair of Communication, Simon Fraser University, about Consortium 2.  As a key partner, 
York’s Vice President could potentially interest Simon Fraser in becoming the seventh member 
of the consortium. 
 
Differences in partner roles are important in the partner selection process.  Part of the partner 
selection process is that some roles need to be filled.  Based on requirements criteria, a cross-
Canada consortium was needed so one criteria for a partner role is to be the Western Partner 
(Simon Fraser) or the Eastern Partner (Dalhousie).  These partners may also fill other roles such 
as Key Partners to attract further partners. 
 
Dalhousie played two key partner roles in Consortium 2.  First, Dalhousie was chosen by the 
existing Consortium 2 partners as the only suitable research university in Atlantic Canada.  This 
provided the high-quality research university necessary from the Maritimes to solidify Industry 
Canada funding.  Second, it was key for Dalhousie that Alberta was already a member of 
Consortium 2.  Dalhousie’s vision of reputation was based on the Maclean’s survey categories 
and Alberta was the only category fit with Dalhousie.  So, overall, Dalhousie needed to be 
attracted as a key partner from the Maritimes and they were attracted both by Industry Canada 
funding and by Alberta as an existing partner. 
 
“That’s right. I mean, I think, and I’ve probably said this, the partners all bring something, you 
know you can contribute something and you know you all have the same vision so that together 
you can make something better. And I think that’s the success of a good partnership. And I think 
that’s the success of {Consortium 2}.” (Interview 10) 
 
Evidence of partner negotiation roles from Consortium 1 was: 
• Athabasca University and the Open Learning Agency as Drivers 
• Some universities (Moncton, Mount Saint Vincent) as Key Partners in terms of the 
required national spread for Federal funding 
• Some universities (Victoria, Moncton, Mount Saint Vincent) as Providers only 
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Evidence from Consortium 2 included: 
• Alberta, Waterloo, Guelph and York as Drivers 
• Simon Fraser University and Dalhousie as Key Partners required for national coverage 
• Dalhousie attracted to Consortium 2 by the University of Alberta 
 
The evidence is mainly from interviews, so support for the proposition is not as strong as for 
Proposition 1.  Both partnerships showed evidence of Drivers and Key Partners, but the evidence 
is not strong.  Lesser partners – providers and project funding partners – were also evident in 
Consortium 1.  Because the evidence only comes from self-reported perceptions recorded in 
interviews, it is possible that it is only hearsay.  Proposition 2 should therefore be tested on a 
broader spectrum of partnerships to see whether additional solid evidence will support it. 
 




7.1.3 Organizational Approval 
 
The researcher argues in this section that organizational approval is a key element in the partner 
negotiation process.  The literature was silent on the need for organizational approval for 
partnerships.  In the context of this research, organizational approval can be defined as 
endorsement from upper management of both the partnership under consideration and the release 
of funds to support the partnership.  This data showed clear indications of organizational approval 
and cycling back to get organizational approval at several points in partnership negotiation.  
Some of the keys to understanding the partner negotiation process are the initial and ongoing 
cycles of organizational approval.  The negotiation process cannot be understood without 
understanding the need for organizational approval. 
 
The original Partner Negotiation Model had identified Organizational Approval as a factor, but 
not one of the key cycles.  The model has now been extended with two approval cycles – one 
during the initial deal-making and the second for partners being added to the established 
partnership.  Initial and ongoing funding were noted in many instances as specific reasons for 
strong upper management support.  Organizational approval cycles appear to be ongoing as 
partners are added and decisions need to be made on partnership renewal or continuation. 
 
The amount of Organizational Approval needed depends to a large extent on the partner doing 
the negotiation.  Partners at a high level of the organization require less formal approval since 
they may already have responsibility for major decisions and for their own funding.  As well, less 
organizational approval may generally be needed for a partnership with a well-known or highly 
reputable institution or consortium.  Such an institution or consortium may have such brand-name 
recognition that approval is almost a given.   
 
From Table 6.7, Coding Analysis identified 21 passages that mention organizational approval.  
A further 13 passages identified Initial and Ongoing Fees as one of the negotiation issues.  These 
Fees often needed negotiation within the organization for approval to proceed with the proposed 
partnership.  Of 81 process codes, this made 42% of the interview comments about partner 
selection process concerned with Proposition 3. 
 
The researcher searched document text for organization, institution, university, department, 
president, provost, dean, manager, senior, administration, formal, official, bureaucratic, 
bureaucracy, approve, approval, endorse, support, agree, grant, consent, sanction, back up, allow, 
and authorize.  Results identified 1606 passages in 11 documents. 
 
The University of Waterloo and the University of Alberta told the Consortium 1 organizers that 
they could not sell Consortium 1 in their institutions because it did not have a strong distance 
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education research emphasis.  Organizational approval in their universities depended on strong 
academics and research as well as strong teaching. 
They couldn’t sell that (non-research) model in their own 
institutions. 
 Interview 7 
 
Consortium 1 is incorporated with a Board of Directors made up of one executive from each of 
the partner institutions.  In 2004, that included nine Presidents, Vice-Presidents, Directors and 
Deans.  Since financial, time and organizational commitments are required to work within the 
consortium, this high-level administrative structure facilitates organizational approvals. 
 
Consortium 1 initially required $10,000 to join and $5000 per year to stay in the consortium.  
High level organizational approval, usually at the Provost’s level, was needed to approve these 
funds. 
 
Laurentian’s organizational approval is evident in the funding of Consortium 1 by their 
Director of Finance, rather than from continuing education or distance learning.  This indicates an 
institutional commitment to the national consortium.  Laurentian’s former President is a long-
time distance educator so it was easy to convince him that Consortium 1 was a good idea for 
Laurentian.   
 
At UBC, the Director, Education needed organizational approval to join Consortium 1 and 
other consortia.  He recommended continuation of the Universitas 21 consortium to his Vice-
President, Academic and other superiors with a lower priority to other groups. 
These are my recommendations.  However, I would feel a lot 
more comfortable if this was a decision/policy of the senior 
management at UBC, rather than my own preference. 
 Interview 2 document, March 2000 
 
For Guelph, interview 10 provided strong evidence of organizational approval cycles with this 
statement.  “I was able to do it myself but I ... always go to the Provost. This was too important 
for me to make that decision on my own. I said, “I think this is important. I know who the players 
are. They bring something to the table. It’s value-added. Their reputations are sterling. And I 
think that Guelph is, we’re number one in Ontario in terms of distance education registrations. 
We’ve got something to offer. And we just want to continue to raise the bar. And these are people 
who ... have that same commitment.” And the questions I would get are, “Well, what’s the 
University of Guelph going to get out of this?”  And I said, “The University of Guelph is going to 
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be working with the best people, the best minds in this area. And are only going to make the 
distance education experience for the learners better. And if that doesn’t happen, my 
recommendation will be, this is not of interest to us anymore.” This quotation shows a clear 
cycling back to the Provost for funding and for approval of partnership continuation decisions. 
 
Organizational commitment or approval was evident in the Project Steering Group Governance 
section of the Consortium 2 Memorandum of Understanding, which called for a “senior 
management representative or his/her delegate from each institution”.  As well, the Funding 
section of the Consortium 2 Memorandum of Understanding discusses “an annual fee for 
members (currently $5,000)” which presumably would require organizational approval. 
We were functioning at a high level in the institution. And if you 
don’t have the ear of your senior administration and you’re 
trying to affect institutional change, you’d best put your effort 
somewhere else.  
 Interview 10 
 
One of the Vice Presidents at the University of Saskatchewan noted that his experience with 
CampusWest.Ca had verified that the people organizing the consortium needed to consult 
internally with their Vice Presidents, Deans Councils and so on for institutional buy-in. 
 
The Director, Education University of Alberta, felt that research and development were most 
important for Consortium 2 and detail is needed “to convince my VPA that we need to be active 
members”.  He also noted “our strength will depend to a large extent on the commitment of each 
institution to do its own selling of the concept internally.”   
 
Feedback from the August 2000 meeting identified a number of issues of potential concern to 
Consortium 2.  The following two concerns clearly indicate the need for organizational approval. 
• Consortium 2 needs buy-in at the vice presidential level. 
• The value added by Consortium 2 needs to be clear for each institution. 
 
McGill was approached to join Consortium 2 but declined based on existing research and 
online course collaborations.  As well, they indicated that vice presidential and legal office 
approval would be required, both of which were hard to get. 
 
In mid-September 2001, Consortium 2 members were looking for Status Reports about 
Consortium 2 that they could share with their institutions for continuing administrative support.  
In January 2002, the Acting Director of Learning, University of Alberta, confirmed continued 
support from her Associate Vice-President.   
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It’s really important when York’s Vice President has these 
teleconferences with the Provosts.  They are critical. 
 Interview 10 
{The Executive Director, Development} considered it and made 
a recommendation that we join and took it back to {the Provost} 
... so Sam agreed and then we signed on as a member. 
 Interview 5 
 
Well, you have to spend time. There are out-of-pocket costs, i.e. 
your long distance teleconference calls.  And we have two face-
to-face meetings. We’re going to Dalhousie next weekend. And 
allocation of people’s time in terms of feeding the university 
online web site and preparing research projects. And there’s 
$5,000 to fund. 
 Interview 10 
 
Evidence from Consortium 1 was: 
• Some universities not joining C1 because of lack of organizational approval 
• Consortium 1 Board of Directors made up of executives 
• $10,000 initial and $5000 annual funding 
• Interview quotations from Laurentian  
• UBC document 
 
Evidence from Consortium 2 included: 
• Interview quotations from Guelph, Saskatchewan, Alberta 
• Memorandum of Understanding noting senior management 
• Annual fee of $5000 
• McGill refusal based on lack of organizational approval 
• Meeting notes documenting vice presidential buy-in 
• Status Reports required for ongoing organizational support 
 
Because there is a wide variety of evidence for both partnerships from a variety of data sources, 
the researcher can conclude that there is strong support for this proposition. 
 
P3: Organizational Approval is a key element in the partner negotiation process. 
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7.1.4 Partner Choice Criteria 
 
The researcher argues in this section that partner selection is not completely rational, nor based 
solely on partnership requirements.  Requirements are established during the Deal-making Cycle 
and used to attract Key Partners.  Requirements are also fluid and changing, however, and evolve 
over time.  According to the interviewees, partners are largely chosen based on requirements, 
social network and reputation.  These partner choices are moderated by resource availability, 
ambiguity and organizational politics.  These data suggest that specific requirements or 
constraints are important early on to establish a strong partnership.  Some requirements, however, 
could be so ambiguous as to allow open membership in the consortium.  Resource availability 
could also temper the chosen partners since second or third choices may need to be taken if the 
first choice partner is not obtainable for whatever reason.  A strong social network and either 
personal or organizational reputation are also very important in terms of finding and attracting 
potential partners.  Finally, the researcher contends that politics, however characterized, may play 
a role in partner negotiation and final selection. 
 
From Table 5.10, coded passages noted 20 coded as Requirements (23%), 1 Resource 
Availability (1%), 32 Social Network (37%), and 34 Reputation (39%) from a total of 87 




Originally, Consortium 1 only allowed complementary programs with openness and flexibility.  
The first point of the Consortium 1 Fundamental Principles stated that a Consortium 1 member 
must make its distance delivered program and its courses available to any eligible student 
registered in any Consortium 1 sponsored program.  Potential partners needed strong Distance 
Education programs, programs that could be offered nationally and something unique that 
everyone else didn’t have. 
We were pretty firm about don’t come and join us if you’re not 
willing to play this game. 
If you don’t think you can abide by these principles, then don’t 
join. 
 Interview 7 
By June 2003, however, Consortium 1 was much more flexible.  “We keep modifying our 
scope and way of business because we want to keep our members.” (Interview 7)  Some partners 
would have liked to let each institution offer whatever they want and let any institution join.  
Consortium 1 proposed a maximum of 15 members, but some partners believed that they could 
go to 25 members without getting too big.  Some partners felt that Consortium 1 was too heavy in 
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western universities and not heavy enough in Ontario and were pushing for an evenly-distributed 
Canadian requirement. 
 
The Consortium 1 case illustrates the interactions amongst partner selection and the evolution 
of requirements.  Originally, Consortium 1 recruited and wanted everyone who would fit into 
their master plan.  Initial requirements mandated a very strict idea of who fit and who didn’t.  
Over a number of years, however, the requirements eased as initial partners left and new partners 
demanded more autonomy.  For example, Consortium 1 initially required all partners to accept all 
consortia students.  They also directed that multiple institutions could not offer the same program.  
That is, only Athabasca could offer Psychology or only Brandon could offer Nursing.  Both of 
these requirements have been altered to allow more partner freedom. 
 
The Consortium 2 Memorandum of Understanding required only “Canadian research 
universities who can add value to our activities and who share our traditions of quality, 
innovation, accessibility and outreach.”  This requirement is broad enough that most Canadian 
universities would perceive that they meet this condition.  In fact, however, the ‘and’ in the 
requirements statement limits acceptable universities to those who have already done a great deal 
of high-quality innovative work in all of these areas.  Interview 10 described the idea of 
Consortium 2 requirements as follows. 
You look at the institution. How research intensive is it? How 
internationally known is it? How entrepreneurial are they and 
who are the people?  
Later, talking about possibly offending some of the smaller universities because of the focus on 
research, she said “so it was really important that those people that were committed at research 
intensive universities come together first.  To be research intensive, you need to be big.” 
 
As well, Interview 10 reported that Consortium 2 was looking for partners with a commitment 
“to distance online learning, ... sound pedagogy, the wise use of technology. What I was also 
looking for is what do I bring and what do they bring and how are those synergies going to make 
it better.”  She further noted that “Guelph is committed to online learning and distance and use of 
technology”, so felt that her university clearly met the partnership requirements. 
 
Requirements are evident in the Industry Canada Statement of Work for Consortium 2.  Section 
2.3 (a) requires  
the commitment of not fewer than seven (7) universities to 
become partners within the {Consortium 2} Project Group by 
March 31, 2002.  This commitment will be demonstrated 
through the signing of a {Consortium 2} Project Memorandum 
of Agreement.   
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Further, Canadian national membership is required in Section 2.3 (b) which calls for “partner 
universities from not fewer than five (5) of Canada’s provinces”.  By September 2000, the 
University of Waterloo’s Director, Learning had two discussions with Dalhousie to try to get an 
appropriate Atlantic connection, Industry Canada agreed that Consortium 2 may proceed without 
a Quebec partner for the time being, and the Director continued to discuss UBC involvement with 
contacts in Alberta.  Once the Industry Canada funding was in place, Dalhousie could commit to 
join Consortium 2 providing the high-quality research university necessary from the Atlantic.  
Consortium 2 is perceived by some partners to be too heavy in Ontario, or at least to have too 
much power in Ontario. 
 
The University of Toronto, McGill, McMaster, and Queen’s are not partners of either 
consortium because, among other things, they don’t meet the requirements of strong distance 
education programs. 
 
4b. Resource Availability 
 
Resource availability was not well supported with the interview data (only one coded passage), 
but could perhaps be studied in future work since several partners were observed that had been 
chosen only because other partners were already busy or not interested in the partnership at hand.  
This indicates to the researcher the notion of a first choice or second choice partner.  The second 
choice only seems to be included when the first choice is not available for whatever reason.  
Some universities, such as the University of British Columbia, were recruited as partners but 
declined to join.  UBC was chosen by both consortia, but had already met its consortium needs 
and was already too busy with existing international and provincial partnerships.  In early 2000, 
UBC was looking for a Canadian partnership but saw no advantage for them in joining either 
Consortium 1 or Consortium 2.   
 
In January 2001, the University of British Columbia decided formally not to join Consortium 2.  
E-mails from the Director, Education at UBC said “we support the intent of the project” but do 
not see advantages to the institution or for the students.  All Consortium 2 partners can already 
use UBC courses if they wish.  Students from the Open Learning Agency and Athabasca 
University already register in UBC courses and Consortium 2 students could do the same.  UBC 
is also interested in research, but with individual institutions.  There may be potential 
accreditation problems and residency issues.  They already do their own international marketing 
specific to UBC.  There is a high cost of participating in Consortium 2, including fees, time and 
travel costs.  Finally, the UBC staff is already “burnt out” with existing funded projects. 
 
Simon Fraser University joined Consortium 2  after UBC declined to be the western partner.  
The University of Manitoba was also considered by Consortium 2 as a potential partner but had 
already signed with Consortium 1 and was not able to make the commitment to both consortia. 
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Industry Canada wanted Consortium 2 to have a Quebec partner but could not suggest a 
suitable English-speaking university in Quebec, so Consortium 2 was allowed to proceed without 
a Quebec partner.  McGill was approached as a reasonable English-speaking research university, 
but did not have a fitting distance education focus for the consortium and expressed 
administrative and resource hurdles.  Other appropriate research universities in Quebec were not 
considered since they were French-speaking, which would limit research collaboration. 
 
Resources were also very limited in terms of a suitable research university for Consortium 2 in 
eastern Canada.  Dalhousie was chosen as the only suitable research university in Atlantic 
Canada.  Their commitment to Consortium 2 was necessary to provide Canada-wide coverage. 
 
4c. Social Network 
 
A social network framework is needed to fully understand how these partnerships formed.  There 
are many issues around social network, discussed in the following paragraphs.  Partners were 
found through social networks.  Canada has a large geographic area to cover but existing social 
networks enabled the consortia to develop.  The alliance process could be construed to be more 
efficient because of a social network, tying to both how and why partners are chosen.  The Case 
Studies showed a large number of people involved – at least 86 people (See Appendix C) between 
the two consortia – indicating a strong social network.  Since the social network in this case is 
work-related, it can be considered a task network.  Either way, the network provides first or 
second-hand knowledge of other people.  This can make the partner selection go faster or more 
efficiently because there is already some knowledge of the potential partners.  There is an 
efficiency of finding suitable people.  Past positive experiences can make this deal-making easier 
and faster.  People feel that they can trust each other.  People moving from one university to 
another can extend the social network further since their second-hand knowledge is moving with 
them. 
 
Partner issues and categories were identified as they appeared in the interviews. Many names 
of people were identified as partners, triggers to partnership, organizational decision-makers, or 
part of a large social network.  These names were coded along with their institution and the part 
they played in the partnership process.  Eventually a network of people and organizations 
emerged from the data.  Key people emerged as leaders and active researchers within the two 
consortia.  This social network was the basis for the case study narratives in Chapter 5 and the 
people listed in Appendix C. 
 
Many of the Consortium 1 partners knew each other and worked together before Consortium 1 
was established.  “The distance education community is fairly small as you see here.” (Interview 
8)  Some of the Laurentian people already knew the Athabasca and the UBC people before 
Consortium 1.  The Director, Education, UBC, has honourary doctorates from Laurentian and 
Athabasca.  He’s good friends with the Associate Vice President and former President and most 
of the appropriate people at Laurentian.   
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The President of the OLA was a former Vice-President, Academic at Memorial.  The Director, 
Technologies, who made the decision for Memorial to join Consortium 1, partially based her 
decision on the recommendation of this former Vice-President.  “I have a lot of trust and faith. … 
If {the former Vice-President} thought that this was a good thing for Memorial …”   
 
The Vice President Education and Provost, BCOU is the former Dean of Education at St. 
Mary’s University, Memorial, and York University.  She is now the VPA, Humber College 
Institute of Technology and Advanced Learning. 
 
The Vice President Academic, Athabasca University, knew the Vice President Academic and 
the former President of Royal Roads.  Royal Roads now has a new President and Vice Chancellor 
and fairly new Vice President, Learning, so Consortium 1 is now waiting to see whether Royal 
Roads will continue with the partnership.   
 
Similarly, many people involved with Consortium 2 had known each other at various 
universities.  The social network expanded because of the partnership.  There was already a social 
network in place, but it was augmented by the consortium.  The Drivers (Guelph, Waterloo and 
York) “were all buds.  They went back and talked to themselves.”  (Interview 7)  Interview 10, 
discussing the partnership formation, said “We (Guelph, Waterloo, and York) had a perspective 
on who should be, whom we would like to see included. The Director, Education was at Alberta 
and he’s now at Calgary. And UBC was one, but Manitoba was already in Consortium 1.  And 
then {the University of Waterloo’s Director, Learning} just got on the phone and did his thing. It 
was primarily {him}.  I think {the Director} appreciated my input in terms of how committed the 
institution was to online learning and distance and hybrid and use of technology, the innovation, 
that sort of thing. Because I know the players.” 
 
Interview 10 provided multiple instances of social network in action on behalf of Consortium 
2. 
 “I would love to have the University of Manitoba join us 
because I know the people there. And I know what they believe 
in and what they do.”   
“I knew the people, I knew what their philosophy was. Certainly 
I didn’t personally select them, we did it as a group. But these 
were the factors that entered my mind.”  
 “I think this is important. I know who the players are. They 
bring something to the table. It’s value-added.” 
“What is really important to me was the fact that {Waterloo’s 
Director, Learning} is involved. He’s a visionary. I’ve got great 
respect for him. We’ve worked together for several years.” 
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Several people now involved with Consortium 2 had been at Dalhousie at some previous time.  
This is probably not unusual, but shows the social network.  The Director, Development was at 
Dalhousie in the Faculty of Medicine, but later moved to Simon Fraser University.  Dalhousie’s 
former Education Co-ordinator is now at the University of Alberta and continues to collaborate 
on research with Dalhousie.  As well, the University of Alberta Director, Education moved to the 
University of Calgary and Dalhousie’s Executive Director, Development to the University of 
Quebec.  At about the same time, the University of Alberta’s Director, Extension moved to the 
University of Saskatchewan.  The University of Alberta remained in Consortium 2 with a new 
contact person.  Many of these people are part of the Canadian higher education community as 




When Waterloo and Alberta would not join Consortium 1 because there was no focus on 
research, Consortium 1 found their tone “insulting”.  “We (Consortium 1) are a consortium of 
research universities.” (Interview 7)  Many of the Consortium 1 universities felt strongly that they 
were ‘research universities’ although perhaps not of the calibre of the Consortium 2 research 
universities.  The mental models of research reputations were often based on Maclean’s rankings, 
which put Consortium 1 universities in general with lower reputations than Consortium 2 
universities.  This meant that for partner selection purposes, Consortium 1 was willing to accept a 
number of universities that were not welcome in Consortium 2. 
 
One of the reasons that Consortium 1 was not universally well-received was that it had been 
developed and was being led by Athabasca University and the OLA.  Consortium 1 was willing 
to accept higher-reputation universities as partners but some people didn’t want to commit to a 
consortium being driven by what was perceived to be a ‘lesser’ university.  Reputation of the 
Drivers made a big difference in terms of how well the deal was accepted by potential partners.  
  
The University of Guelph’s decision to join Consortium 2 was based largely on the reputations 
of the people from the University of Waterloo and York University as well as social network.  “I 
think this is important. I know who the players are. They bring something to the table. It’s value-
added. Their reputations are sterling.”  “I wanted the benefit of {Waterloo}’s vision. So anything 
that {Waterloo}’s involved in for me, because of {its} reputation nationally and internationally is 
90 percent endorsement. So that’s what I mean, it’s about reputation.  I knew {the person at 
York}. I know how the government looks to him for leadership in these areas, that was another 
key.”  (Interview 10) 
 
From Waterloo and York’s viewpoint, Guelph had an excellent reputation in distance education 
and technology to strengthen Consortium 2 in that dimension.  From the Guelph contact’s point 
of view, Guelph had a strong enough reputation to belong in Consortium 2.  “I think Guelph’s 
darn good. And I mean, we’re the number one comprehensive in Canada.  And number one in 
distance education registration in Ontario last year {2002}. And we’re one of the few that have a 
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central unit where the faculty has to work with us. And they like working with us. And we are not 
a separate silo operating where we’ve got our distance students in our own faculty.  We’re 
outreach focused and … I think Guelph brings an awful lot to the table which I’m really pleased 
about that.” (Interview 10) 
 
One of the Vice Presidents at the University of Saskatchewan supported both Consortium 2 and 
changes proposed earlier by the Director, Education at the University of Alberta.  All agreed that 
an academic focus of research into teaching and learning through technology was important as 
was an interactive approach.  The Vice President was concerned about a clear definition for a 
‘research university’.  He proposed the Maclean’s magazine medical/doctoral category ‘provided 
that doesn’t rule out any universities that we would want to leave in’, which in fact it did.  The 
Vice President also expressed interest in new partner selection – “how and at what stage” would 
you invite others if they wished to join?   
 
It was key for Dalhousie that Alberta was already a member of Consortium 2.  Reputation was 
based on the Maclean’s survey categories and Alberta was the only fit with Dalhousie. 
We saw the list of who he was inviting ... Dal’s decision was 
made at every institution independently prior to the whole thing 
coming together.  We looked at it and said “Well ... Calgary’s in 
and Waterloo’s in.” 
 Interview 5 
 
With Consortium 2, another issue of concern was the reputation of the partnership compared to 
the reputation of individual partners.  Feedback from the August 2000 meeting noted: 
The {Consortium 2} brand name may be less than that of 
individual institutions. 
 
Reputation could have also been a factor for a number of Canadian universities that did not join 
either consortium.  The University of British Columbia was already busy with other partnerships, 
but still saw no advantage in joining either Consortium 1 or Consortium 2.  Similarly, the 
Universities of Toronto, Western Ontario, Ottawa and Ryerson University were not motivated to 
join.  This could have been due to a lack of focus on distance education or it could have been a 
sense of reputation.  According to one of the interviewees, the University of Toronto does not 
accept Athabasca graduates into its graduate programs, so Toronto and Western Ontario in 
particular may have felt that they didn’t belong in a consortium with Athabasca University. 
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4e. Organizational Politics 
 
Organizational politics was not well supported with the interview data, as no coded data was 
recorded for this issue.  Politics was mentioned in terms of needing a Quebec partner and in terms 
of Quebec universities not wanting to join Canadian consortia, but the evidence was not strong 
enough to support this proposition.  These somewhat political issues were coded as 
Requirements.  These results are not surprising since politics often relate to underlying issues that 
are not openly expressed, so need to be deduced.  Political issues may also be disguised to hide 
bias. 
 
The only strongly political comment was that Tele-Universite became part of the University of 
Quebec and “that changed the dynamics”, implying that Teluq was now somewhat restricted 
politically by UQ.  In accordance with provincial policy, Tele-Universite could not be seen to be 
part of a Canadian collaboration.  It was acceptable to partner with Athabasca University, but not 
Consortium 1.   
Political concerns have not made it possible for Teluq to sign on 
as an independent founding member 
 Consortium 1 Letter of Invitation 
Interestingly, Tele-Universite became part of Consortium 1 a year after its formation.   
 
A second somewhat political issue was that the other Alberta universities – the Universities of 
Alberta and Calgary – had not been invited to the initial Consortium 1 formation meeting hosted 
by Athabasca University.  There was initial discussion that they had just been ‘missed’ or that 
they did not have complete distance education ‘programs’.  Later, however, some interviewees 
suggested that Athabasca University considered themselves to be ‘the place’ in Alberta for 
distance education and therefore there was no need to include the Universities of Alberta and 
Calgary.  This smacks of exactly the same charge of ‘elitism’ that had been leveled by 




Ambiguity was not supported with the interview data, as no coded data was recorded for this 
issue.  Ambiguous document wording, however, was evident in archival e-mails, the Consortium 
2 Memorandum of Understanding, and the Industry Canada Contribution Agreement.  Archival e-
mails noted the formation of a partnership to meet certain government criteria, implying that the 
criteria were broad enough (and therefore ambiguous enough) that partnerships could be twisted 
to fit the criteria.  Ambiguity is part of the normal communication structure of formal documents, 
contracts, reports to government, and Requests for Proposal from government, so is perhaps not 
identified as an unusual issue.   
144 
Ambiguity was evident in the following Purpose of the Consortium 2 Memorandum of 
Understanding. 
work collaboratively to enhance offerings of high-quality 
Internet-based programs and to integrate scholarly values and 
culture into our learning and teaching 
‘Collaboratively’ can mean any number of ways of working together from a single short 
telephone call to six months of  full-time joint course development.  Similarly, ‘enhance’ can 
mean anything from updating a web page to completely rewriting course offerings.  Likewise, 
‘integrate scholarly values and culture’ can be very broadly interpreted according to individual 
disposition. 
 
Ambiguous characteristics of potential partners are also apparent in the following requirements 
for new members of Consortium 2. 
other Canadian research universities who can add value to our 
activities and who share our traditions of quality, innovation, 
accessibility and outreach 
Since there are many ways to measure ‘added value’, ‘quality’, ‘innovation’ and so on, any 
Canadian research university may believe that they are able to meet the criteria to become a new 
member of Consortium 2. 
 
The Background of the Industry Canada Contribution Agreement, May 2001 indicated 
sweeping ambiguity with the following phrase.   
a commitment to use the Information Highway to provide value-
added learning content to Canadians 
A ‘commitment’ doesn’t have to imply actual future use, but rather just a promise.  The 
‘Information Highway’ could mean any of a large number of technical items, such as any 
network, e-mail system, web page or so on.  Finally, ‘value-added learning content’ leaves the 
end result wide open, depending on various definitions of all three of these words.  Access to a 
remote library or access to one specific community college course or access to an entire 
university program are all very different but could all meet this requirement.  
 
The Objectives of the Statement of Work, Schedule A, also showed evidence of ambiguity with 
the following phrase. 
to establish a pilot consortium of Canadian research universities 
for collaborative design, development, and evaluation of online 
courses and programs and their delivery to students in rural and 
urban communities in a manner that will be administratively 
seamless and educationally coherent. 
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This phrase starts off well with the specific requirement for a ‘consortium’ and ‘Canadian 
research universities’.  The middle of the phrase, however, leaves the organization, the effort, the 
student audience, and the end result wide open so that any outcome will meet the criteria.  
Finally, the conclusion of the phrase – ‘administratively seamless and educationally coherent’ – is 
so ambiguous as to be almost meaningless.  Presumably, the Objectives are trying to say that 
there should be one united effort from the consortium, but no explicit parameters have been 
specified for this unity. 
 
P4: Partner choice cannot be understood completely as a simple rational decision based on 
specific partner requirements; there is a network of important interacting factors, including 
resource availability, social network, and  reputation. 
146 
7.1.5 Summary of Data Source Support for Major Findings 
 
Evidence to support the propositions came from a variety of sources, including interviews, e-
mail correspondence and formal documents, as summarized in Table 7.1.   
 
Proposition Interviews E-mail Formal Documents 
1 X X X 
2 X X  
3 X X X 
4a X  X 
4b X X  
4c X X  
4d X X  
4e X  X 
4f  X X 
 
 
Table 7.1 Instances of Evidence 
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7.2 Other Findings 
 
Some information was obtained that was not related to either of the research questions nor to the 
propositions.  The issues are interesting, but peripheral to the current research.  The data 
presumably were offered as of particular importance to the interviewees, so have been included 
for completeness.  The information may be of use to future researchers in other partnership 
studies. 
 
From Table 6.9 in the Data Analysis, five issues were mentioned as indicated below.  
Motivation was identified as a reason that an individual partner joined the partnership rather than 
why the partnership might select the partner.  Operations were issues around partnership business 
rather than partner negotiation or selection.  Unit of Partner refers to the ambiguity of whether the 
partner was an individual person, department within an institution, or the institution itself.  
Income is an operational issue around the consortium becoming self-sufficient by generating 
ongoing revenue sources.  Integration was the recurring theme that perhaps Canada should only 
have one distance education partnership rather than the two cases noted here and the multitudes 
of other smaller consortia. 
 
7.2.1 Motivation  
 
Answers from the interviews were not always as expected.  Many answers were more about why 
this institution joined the consortium rather than why the consortium wanted them to join.  The 
two points of view – from the partnership and from the partner – did not always match.  From the 
point of view of the partnership, a particular partner may have been desirable.  From the point of 
view of the partner, however, the partnership may not have seemed attractive.  The cycling and 
negotiation processes discussed earlier allowed the partners and the partnership to learn about 
each other and to decide which partners might be appropriate for which partnerships. 
 
There was considerable discussion in the interviews of motivation to join the consortia.  
Motivation was referenced 49 times during the coding analysis.  This was 53% of the 93 Other 
Codes documented in Table 6.9.  Some of the motivators for joining the consortia: 
• Previous personal contact (Social Network) 
• Already doing research with other partners 
• Ease of course transfers 
• Co-development of programs 
• Online portal to advertise programs  
• Increase market share for courses 
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The general feeling was that “unless we have a consortium of Canadian universities that get 
together, the likelihood of several of us joining either American or European or even Asian 
consortiums was increasing.” (Interview 8) 
 
Athabasca University sees Consortium 1 as positioning and branding and networking rather 
than as a way to get more registrations.  Memorial finds the Consortium 1 membership 
worthwhile just for the Canadian and world-wide contacts.  Because of the isolation in 
Newfoundland, “you can’t survive without partnerships.” (Interview 9)  
 
“There’s a lot of learning in a network like Consortium 1.” (Interview 8)  “You learn from each 
other at the party or reception before or after the board meeting.  So, for our $5000, we get 
promotion, professional development, contacts, and networks Canada-wide.  We wanted to be in 
an online network so we had to pick one.  And I thought it would be better to pick a Canadian one 
than not.   We see this as an opportunity to increase enrolments and give Laurentian more 
exposure.”   
$5000 doesn’t go very far in advertising, so {Consortium 1} 
gives us that advertising.  
 Interview 8 
 
The initial motivation for getting together is often to get external funding, but the ‘community 
of learning’ created from that collaboration is good.  When you put like minds together, the 
networking that results from that coming together is ‘valuable in its own self, not just the fact that 
we only have more money’. (Interview 7) 
  
The major goal of interest to Memorial is the mobility of students, providing access to courses 
for them across the country.  A second goal is to pick up market share.  Memorial has been 
marketing to the double cohort in Ontario, for example, to attract students to regular and distance 
education courses.   
 
Dalhousie was motivated to increase their online offerings and to join a consortium of 
universities with similar ideas. 
Distance education is now becoming more online.  Everybody’s 
facing the same issues whether it’s policy on their campus or the 
mechanics of doing certain things. 
 Interview 5 
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Motivation was missing for a number of Canadian universities that did not join either 
consortium.  The University of British Columbia was already busy with other partnerships, but 
still saw no advantage in joining either Consortium 1 or Consortium 2.  Similarly, the 
Universities of Toronto, Western Ontario, Ottawa and Ryerson University were not motivated to 
join.  This could have been due to a lack of focus on distance education or it could have been a 
sense of reputation.  Toronto and Western Ontario in particular may have felt that they didn’t 




Many interviewees noted that consortium activity was directly tied to the activity level of the 
point person or Driver.  That is, a person who is more active in the partnership makes their 
organization more active.  This person could also or instead make the partnership more active.  
Consortium activity was coded 16 times as an issue of importance and organizational roles were 
coded 6 times for a total of 23% of the 93 Other Codes documented in Table 6.9. 
 
The degree of participation within Consortium 1 goes to “some institutions by virtue of the 
people involved who sit on the Advisory Committee”. (Interview 7)  In Consortium 2, “There are 
some (partners) who contribute more than others in terms of consistent participation.  ...  I know 
that they really want to be supportive but that’s not always evident. ‘I can’t get to this meeting or 
I can’t do that.’  But I recognize that everybody’s plate is very, very full.  Also the players change 
an awful lot.” (Interview 10)  Since both Consortium 1 and Consortium 2 seem to be an extra on 
the side of most people’s major jobs, it is not surprising that activity and commitment may be 
hard to come by.   
 
A variety of organizational roles were also mentioned six times during interviews.  These 
comments related to the need for an Executive Director, a Project Manager, and the different 
roles within the consortium at different organizational levels of the university.  Consortium 1 
hired an Executive Director, paid from operational funds.  Athabasca University is still more-or-
less the operational core of Consortium 1, providing money, people and space for the Executive 
Director.  The Vice President, Academic of Athabasca was the Chair of the Advisory Committee 
for 2003 since no other partner would take over after Laurentian in 2002.  There is concern that 
Athabasca not be a continuing Chair so that it’s not perceived that Athabasca is running 
Consortium 1.  “If the partners don’t take an active role, Athabasca will become the virtual 
university for Canada and (other institutions) won’t have a role.”  (Interview 8)  Athabasca has 
also taken the lead in terms of coordinating ongoing funding.  Large-scale government contracts 
are assigned by project and money assigned accordingly.  The OLA developed course credit 
banks and a website for Campus Canada while UNB compiled a set of student services. 
 
The need for ongoing funding to pay for administrative staff was also a concern for Consortium 
2.  The Guelph contact noted that she would like to see “the infrastructure to carry on. And by 
150 
that I mean the funding for an Executive Director who can commit the time and the energy to 
constantly be aware of what’s going on federally, provincially. ... We need to be able to have the 
resources to attract the right person who sees a value in the job and commitment to work with all 
of us and make it happen. That would be the one thing.  Anything worthwhile needs a driver, 
somebody’s on top of things and knows where the opportunities are and facilitates our expertise 
to that solution.”  “And it’s really important. We need somebody keeping us on track because 
after these face-to-face meetings we’re all very enthused and eager and everything else. Two days 
you’re back working, you’re swamped with what you have to do. And so we need an 
administrator, gate keeper person.”   
 
7.2.3 Unit of Partner 
 
Ten people (11% of the 93 Other Codes identified in Table 6.9) noted some confusion between 
the people as the partners or the institutions as the partners.  Even when the institution was seen 
to be the partner, there was concern that only one unit of the institution was involved.  
Interviewees also noted that institutions stayed as Consortium 1 or Consortium 2 partners even 
when the people moved on to other universities.  The people who moved often added their new 
institution to the consortium as well so that they could maintain their personal partnership. 
 
The degree of participation within Consortium 1 goes to “some institutions by virtue of the 
people involved who sit on the Advisory Committee”.  This supports the idea of the real partner 
as the ‘person’, not the ‘institution’. 
 
In August 2001, possible additional Consortium 2 participants were suggested as the University 
of Calgary and the University of Quebec.  The University of Alberta’s Director, Education was 
moving to the University of Calgary and Dalhousie’s Executive Director, Development to the 
University of Quebec.  By mid-September, the University of Calgary had become the eighth 
institutional member.  The University of Alberta remained in Consortium 1 with a new contact.  
At about the same time, the University of Alberta’s Director, Extension moved to the University 
of Saskatchewan. 
 
Dalhousie was concerned that the individual Consortium 2 partners were a problem. 
{Consortium 2 is a} collaboration out of the interest of the 
individual representatives. 
The influence those people need didn’t run deep enough. 
They were speaking just as a professor ... not deep enough down 
to an academic faculty. 
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Guelph, on the other hand, thought that individual commitment was good.  “(The people are) the 
ones that make it happen.”  She did have some misgivings as well however.  “Also, I’m not sure 
with some of the partners whether I’m talking to the institution or their unit. ... And here’s an 
example. It’s no reflection at all, but it’s just one that comes to mind. The university online where 
we all put our courses up.  I looked at York University and thought “I know they offer a lot 
more”. Well, these were just the courses that that unit is responsible for. We aren’t seeing (the 
university as a whole).  And I begin to wonder then ... how is this?  How are the benefits of what 
we’ve learned getting disseminated within the institution and why aren’t these other people on 
board in terms of their courses being listed or whatever? Now our (Guelph) model is very 
different. Every distance course comes through here. And we co-develop it and we deliver it. And 
we link with all the academic departments. But they have different faculties who are different 
silos. No one’s ever going to solve that problem. But if university online is there and the whole 




As already noted, funding was referenced in three contexts.  First, funding was mentioned in the 
context of dollars already obtained or to be obtained from the government or other funding 
sources to support the work of Consortia 1 and 2.  Consortium 1 was searching for teaching and 
course-related funding.  The focus of Consortium 2 shifted to more emphasis on research funding.  
This external funding was identified as part of the Deal-making Cycle.   
 
Second, funding was needed to join the consortia and for annual fees so there was discussion of 
how that funding was obtained and who approved it.  That funding was noted earlier with 
Organizational Approval.   
 
Third, in an operational context, there was concern about generating income from the 
consortium for ongoing expenses and to make the consortium self-sufficient.  This Income issue 
was noted nine times in this research, making up 10% of the 93 Other Codes. 
 
There was no mention of generating income initially with Consortium 1.  Each university just 
wanted to promote their distance education courses and consolidate into a Canadian consortium.  
Consortium 1 now has a number of discussion papers developed through the Advisory 
Committee, however, talking about business planning and how to create revenues to sustain 
Consortium 1 when the Alberta funding concludes.  Some ideas are international projects with 
international revenue streams.   
 
Some partner institutions would like to see Consortium 1 become self-sufficient financially.  
To do this,  Consortium 1 needs to go after more large projects to increase its funding abilities.  
That is, they should be able to make money by virtue of their size.  International collaborations 
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may provide better opportunities to make more money.  “We can charge more … cost-
recoverable fees, Asian Development Bank, World Bank, CIDA. … you get paid well with 
those.” (Interview 9)  Then, even if Consortium 1 was the project coordinator with a 20% 
overhead, a financial sustainability model would start to form. 
 
Many partners feel that Consortium 1 is too dependent on government grants and its small 
number of members.  They believe that a Consortium 1 ‘brand’ might help.  Right now, 
Consortium 1 is just an umbrella for the partners and doesn’t give degrees or certificates.  
Consortium 1 is just selling programs from other institutions rather than adding value in its own 
right.  With some added value, the Consortium 1 name might be able to generate self-sustaining 
revenue. 
 
Guelph noted for Consortium 2 “Well, the disadvantage is the constant chasing of dollars for us 
to exist.  I understand the reality of it, but how we live and die on whether we’re going to get 
some more Industry Canada funding. How pressure is brought to bear to change what our 
original philosophy and mission is. And {the Waterloo Director} has heard me say this several 
times, at what price here.” “{Consortium 2} creates the research proposal. The call goes out to all 
of {Consortium 2} institutions. And we say, “Well, we would like to be involved for these 
reasons.” ... But it’s the developing the proposal, wait, wait, wait.”  “And so my big worry is, and 
I’ve discussed this with {the Waterloo Director}, is that we have a wonderfully cohesive group. If 
we do not get funding, what’s going to happen. And it’s like so many great ideas and people with 
vision who create something who really want to do it. But you’re doing this voluntarily in 
essence. And so if there is no funding support because we do need an executive director to drive 
us, keep us on track.” 
 
Feedback from the August 2000 meeting identified a number of issues of potential concern to 
Consortium 2.  “Copyright and return on investment need to be clarified.” suggests that the group 




Three interviewees specifically wanted Consortia 1 and 2 to join so that there would be only one 
education consortium.  Consortia 1 and 2 were both known to and discussed by all interviewees.  
All participants had their own idea of why there were two consortia, the differences between 
them, and the need for two seemingly similar consortia.  Those who wanted a united front felt 
that it would be easier to get funding for a single group and that it made sense to have one 
consolidated consortium in Canada.  In an informal discussion with a funder from Industry 
Canada, he clearly indicated that he would prefer one consortium.  This would clarify funding 
issues for the government and ease the flow of dollars from Ottawa. 
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Industry Canada and many {Consortium 1} partners have 
suggested that {Consortia 1 and 2} need to get together.   
 University of Manitoba Contact 
We should have tried to make it one consortium.   
Interview 7 
 
Some Consortium 1 partners perceive Consortium 2 as ‘elitist’.  “They see themselves as tier 
one universities and Laurentians, Athabascas, because of the size, because of our openness are 
tier two universities with maybe weaker standings which is a false perception.” “This elitism 
thing” with Consortium 2 is just not helpful. (Interview 8)  
  
Memorial would like to work with some of the Consortium 2 members, such as Waterloo and 
Simon Fraser.  They don’t see many Consortium 1 and Consortium 2 institutions mixing 
generally though. “Dalhousie won’t do anything with Memorial.  I’d be shocked.  There’s 
institutional things.” (Interview 9)  “I don’t view Guelph as a leader in this area.”  “Waterloo and 
Simon Fraser are what I would view to be counterparts to Memorial.” (Interview 9) “historical 
rivalry between Dalhousie and Memorial”  “Dalhousie will likely block us in to Consortium 2.” 
 
Some Consortium 1 partners would like to work with Waterloo, Simon Fraser and other 
Consortium 2 partners, but are having difficulty doing so because of the Consortium 1 and 
Consortium 2 ‘divide’.  One innovative suggestion was to have various ‘tiers’ within one 
partnership.  That is, have a high-quality research group in the universities that are interested but 
also have a distance education program and course development group at the same universities.  
That would allow both a Consortium 1 and a Consortium 2 flavour within the one consortium. 
 
In August 2003, the Consortium 2 Project Directors teleconference discussed possible 
relationships between Consortium 1 and Consortium 2.  This was followed up with e-mails to the 
Executive Director of Consortium 1.  The key joint project at the time seemed to be a national 
gateway to Education courses.  Previous gateways had developed with very different views:  
• Campus Canada brought together institutions committed to high levels of prior learning 
assessment.   
• Consortium 1 was committed to credit transfer.   
• Consortium 2  offered online learning and was committed to a coherent educational 
philosophy and values.   
• Several provincial gateways (at least British Columbia, Manitoba and Ontario) brought 
together provincial offerings. 
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“Oh yes. And I think that in all fairness ... Industry Canada ... (is) interested in having a nice neat 
product that you can export. And that’s not our business. We are not in the widget business. We 
both have separate uniquenesses.”  “And I’m not against {Consortia 1 and 2} being together. My 
recommendation is that we each dissolve and create something new.  It saves face. But we do this 
for the right reasons, not because we want some dollars from Industry Canada. That I have a 
problem with.”  “I would love to have the University of Manitoba join us because I know the 
people there. And I know what they believe in and what they do.”  “We (Guelph, Waterloo, and 
York) had a perspective on who should be, whom we would like to see included. ... Alberta ... 








7.3 Interpretation and Discussion 
7.3.1 Interpretation of the Data 
 
The data showed clear cycles of negotiation for founding and subsequent partners.  Documents 
were prepared with clear partner requirements, but the requirements evolved as the partner 
negotiation proceeded.  Formation of the partnership in these cases depended on external funding 
from a sponsor.  There was a long process of deal-making between partnership drivers and 
sponsors until funding was obtained.  Once obtained, drivers could move to attract new partners 
and to sign on those who had been identified early as potential partners.  Throughout the deal-
making and the partner sign-on cycles, there were also organizational approval cycles.  The 
approval cycles were on both sides.  The existing partnership and its partners needed to approve 
the new partners and the new partners and their organizations needed to approve the partnership. 
 
This information verifies the researcher’s assertion that the process is partner negotiation rather 
than selection.  Drivers approached a number of sponsors trying to obtain funding for the 
partnership formation.  Once the partnership was underway, they selected first-choice partners but 
accepted second-choice partners when necessary.  Key partners helped to sanction the partnership 
as a reputable entity worthy of consideration.  They also helped with subsequent partner selection, 
either in suggesting their own potential partners or being chosen by outside potential partners.   
 
A number of the elements of the final Partner Negotiation Model and Partner Choice Criteria 
appear to be related.  The researcher deliberately kept these components separate in this work, but 
they could perhaps be considered jointly in future work.  For example in Deal-making, Drivers 
and Key Partners were often tied to the notion of Reputation.  New partners signed on to the 
partnerships because of the reputation of the person or institution promoting the partnership.  
Similarly, Social Network tied to Reputation as people told other people good things about the 
partnership or the partners. 
 
The Final Codes in Table 6.3 of Chapter 6 identified a number of issues that were subsumed 
into the pre-defined Model and Propositions.  Some of these issues could be considered as 
subjects or relationships in their own right in future work.  For example, the Sponsor from the 
Partner Negotiation Model and the External Funding code appear to be closely related.  The 
Sponsor often is an External Funder and appears to be a necessary person or organization in 
partnership formation.  The entire process of a search for funding, negotiation of a funding deal 
and ongoing funding is a serious problem for partnerships. 
 
A secondary observation of the two case studies suggested that Founding Partners may have 
more say in who the subsequent partners are or in the future requirements of the partnership.  
Higher reputation partners also appear to have more say in the partnership and its future partners.  
156 
The high reputation partners also, by nature of their standing, are more likely to be Key Partners.  
These two issues were not explored in this work, but could be considered in a study of power and 
control in partnerships or in partner selection. 
7.3.2 Discussion 
 
The second research question,  “Why do organizations choose a particular partner?”, views the 
partner choice from the partnership’s point of view.  Several of the interviewees were eager to 
offer their motivation for joining the partnership from their own partner point of view instead.  
This would answer the question  “Why does a partner want to join?” rather than why they or 
others were chosen to join.  These are two viewpoints on the same issue and needed to be 
separated in this study.  The researcher tried to keep the focus on the choice of partner rather than 
the partner choosing the partnership.  Again, the two issues are related and could perhaps be 
explored together in future work. 
 
Tied to the above observations, the researcher noted that partnership offers don’t necessarily 
lead to new partners.  Some offers are accepted and some are declined.  There are various criteria 
around the decision to make an offer and an entirely different set of criteria around the decision to 
accept or not.  In some circumstances, organizations may not want an offer at all.  This issue 
relates the Partner Choice Criteria to Partner Motivation.  There must be a reciprocal gain for the 
partner and the partnership. 
 
PROPOSITION ISSUE SUPPORT 
1 Deal-making Cycle Strong 
2 Partner Negotiation Roles Some 
3 Organizational Approval Strong 
4 Partner Choice Criteria  
 Requirements Strong 
 Resource Availability Some 
 Social Network Strong 
 Reputation Strong 
 Ambiguity Weak 
 Organizational Politics Weak 
 
Table 7.2 Support for Propositions 
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The data analysis shows support for propositions as shown in Table 7.2. 
 
The items below were noted earlier in this chapter with the evidence for individual 
propositions.  It is nonetheless interesting to observe that the package as a whole identifies many 
of the issues documented in the overall results.  These issues were identified as feedback from the 
August 2000 meeting as issues of potential concern to Consortium 2 during its formation. 
 
1. A source of funding for joint research initiatives has not been identified. 
External funding 
2. Copyright and return on investment need to be clarified. 
Income 
3. The definition of ‘online course’ varies among institutions. 
Deal-making 
4. The Consortium 2 brand name may be less than that of individual institutions. 
Reputation 
5. Consortium 2 needs buy-in at the vice presidential level. 
Organizational Approval 
6. The value added by Consortium 2 needs to be clear for each institution. 
Organizational Approval 
7. External funding will probably be needed for at least three years. 
External funding 
 
Although the initial Consortium 1 document was meant to be a ‘proposal’, it read more like a 
final version of the Athabasca and OLA vision of Consortium 1.  This pre-planning and decision-
making turned off a number of participants at the Vancouver meeting.  Ideas had already been 
solidified and Athabasca and the OLA were perceived as leading all Consortium 1 developments.  
This limited the partners who were interested in the Consortium 1 partnership.  Too much deal-
making and organization had been done before other potential partners were approached.  The 
timing of the invitation to join Consortium 1, therefore, impacted who was interested.  Also the 
idea that higher-reputation partners would be add-on partners was not appealing to many 
universities.  If the invitees had been included from the beginning and felt that they truly were 
Founding Partners, then Consortium 1 may have been able to handle all partners in one 
consortium.  This more open and early approach could well have saved the hassle of two 
partnerships forming and competing for limited funding opportunities. 
 
The cycles of negotiation and approval in the final Partner Negotiation Model are not evident 
in previous literature.  In fact, much of the current literature on partner selection documents 
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rational straight-line decision-making leading to partner selection. (Das and Teng 2000; Reid, 
Bussiere et al. 2001)  Similarly, practitioner literature is rife with checklists of appropriate 
characteristics for partners in particular situations, as if partner selection was simple and 
straightforward. (Hitt, Dacin et al. 2000; Saffu and Mamman 2000)  Business negotiation 
literature documents generic deal-making, but there is no specific literature on partner 
negotiation. 
 
The idea of cycles of negotiation is important to an understanding of partnerships.  Many 
practitioners want to form a partnership quickly or join an existing one because it is the thing to 
do these days or because they think that it makes sense for them in today’s market. (Dussauge, 
Garrette et al. 2000; Economist 2000; Kanter 2001)  With an understanding of this cyclic process, 
they can better plan the formation of their partnership and the time that will be needed for 
negotiations.  They can also prepare business cases for approval. 
 
The results show that existing partner selection theory may be too simplistic in many cases.  
Existing approaches assume that partners can easily be found from a checklist of possible criteria 
and that partners that are selected will choose to join the partnership.  A better approach might be  
to begin with general business negotiation theory and add the instance of partner selection as a 
specific example of a business negotiation.   
 
Extensive evidence was not available to support the resource availability proposition.  In spite 
of the shortage of interview and documentation data, however, anecdotal evidence of this 
resource availability issue is presented.  In particular, UBC was a desirable partner for Computer 
Education (CE) in one of the preliminary studies.  It was also approached to be a partner for both 
Consortium 1 and Consortium 2.  Once UBC declined, all three of these partnerships signed on 
with other British Columbia universities.  That is, the other universities were second choices, 
which were only made after UBC, the primary target partner, indicated that it was not available. 
 
The Partner Negotiation Model was presented to a Supply Chain Management Symposium and 
was validated with respect to other domains by a range of people there.  One person said it was 
exactly how his Sales and Marketing work was done.  Two others said that, if anything, their 
partnerships were more complex than this Model.  This verified that, for at least some 
partnerships, the straight-line rational model was nowhere near true. 
 
A final observation is that over the five years of this study the two consortia appear to be 
declining (Consortium 1) or stabilizing (Consortium 2) in terms of numbers of members.  This 
may be due to reduced government funding or reduced partner interest and may be advancing the 





The Partner Negotiation Model developed in Chapter 3 suggested a number of propositions which 
were explored with the data.  Strong support was found for both a deal-making cycle and 
organizational approval cycles.  Some support was noted for the idea of partner negotiation roles 
– in particular the roles of Driver, Sponsor and Key Partner.  The Partner Choice Criteria had 
suggested that requirements were important, but that they were moderated by five other factors.  
Results showed strong support for social network and reputation as key criteria in specific partner 
selection.  There was some evidence of resource availability as an issue in that second-choice 
partners were sometimes chosen when first-choice institutions were not obtainable.  Weak 
support suggested that ambiguity and organizational politics may have played minor roles in 
partner selection.  Other findings from interviews were also noted in this chapter.  Interviewees 
identified motivation, operations, unit of partner, income, and one joint consortium as issues of 






Summary and Conclusions 
 
8.1 Summary of the Results 
 
In contrast to previous work, these results show the complex and multifaceted nature of partner 
selection with multiple negotiation cycles and irrational selection criteria.  These findings showed 
two patterns – one related to process and the second related to selection criteria.  The process 
showed multiple cycles of deal-making, partner negotiation, and organizational approval rather 
than the simple straight-line decision-making process shown in much partner selection literature.  
The selection criteria findings showed a number of decisive factors that influenced the final 
choice of partner.  As well as the need to meet the condition of documented requirements, partner 
selection was also influenced by resource availability, social network and reputation.  Additional 
issues of interest to the interviewees in this study were motivation, operations, unit of partner, 
self-sustaining income, and joining to one consortium.  These issues were documented for 
completion but an extensive investigation is beyond the scope of this research.   
 
The deal-making cycles in these results showed multiple Sponsors and Drivers.  External 
funding was needed for both consortia as well as high-level organizational approval for the 
partnership itself.  Cycles of organizational approval appeared both in this early partnership 
formation and later as new partners were added and the partnership changed.  Key Partners were 
needed to fulfill specific partnership roles or to attract new partners.  Partners were identified first 
based on their match to explicit requirements.  As part of the selection process, however, 
additional criteria influenced the specific partners that were chosen.  Some partners were selected 
only after the potential first-choice partners had declined their offers.  Many partners were chosen 
because they were already known by others in the partnership.  Partners were distinguished and 
proposed because of their reputation.  And finally, there was some evidence that ambiguity in 
requirements and politics beyond the control of the partnership could both influence final partner 
selection. 
 
Overall, results have identified the following issues. 
1. Partner selection is more complex than past research has described. 
2. There are gaps in the research on partner selection. 
3. Existing partner selection models do not adequately describe what was happening here. 
4. Partner selection criteria are not based solely on rational analysis of goals and 
requirements. 
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5. One challenge of partner selection is the large number of people involved in partner 
selection and partnerships in general.  This social network and communication are 
important in identifying and selecting partners. 




Case study research by its nature is limited with small sample sizes.  The case study approach 
used in this study was appropriate to provide preliminary data, but additional research will be 
needed to provide a broader base for an expanded theory.  This research included two consortia as 
partnership case studies, 22 university partners and 20 interviewees.  The two consortia were also 
in a limited type of partnership – university distance education in Canada from 1999 to 2005 – 
which may further limit the applicability and generalizability of the results, although some 
attendees at a Supply Chain Management Symposium validated the Partner Negotiation Model 
for their business domains as well.  The small number of interviewees was countered by a rich set 
of interview data.  This did allow deep, narrow research but limited the applicability of these 
research results to a larger set without more empirical study. 
 
The interviewees who agreed to provide information were active in their consortia and were 
generally positive about their partnership experience.  Limited data were therefore available about 
the less active partners and about occurrences of negative partnerships.  Some partners dropped 
out of Consortium 1 during the time period of this study.  Data from these ex-partners may have 
provided deeper insight into their partner selection process leading to further understanding of 
instances where partner selection was not successful. 
 
Response bias may have been affected by some interviewees because of their personal 
knowledge of one of the researchers.  The researcher in the field did not know interviewees, but 
the interviewees may have agreed to participate in this work based on prior relationships.  The 
data should not have been impacted by this personal relationship, but the final selection of people 
who agreed to be interviewed may well have been.  That is, some people may have agreed to be 
interviewed because they knew one of the researchers.  Conversely, some people may have 
declined to be interviewed for the same reason.  Again, because a wide variety of data were 
obtained from a multitude of sources, this bias should not have severe impacts on the final results. 
 
Although the researcher used a standard Interview Question Guide, open-ended answers to 
interview questions were deliberately allowed.  This may have provided extraneous data, which 
are not relevant to this study.  More structure and standardization could have been imposed for 
more precise results, but the researcher felt that the tradeoff was worthwhile to allow the Other 
Findings to emerge. 
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The researcher has chosen to not focus on the notions of power, politics, time and trust in 
decision-making and in partner selection, other than as they were raised by interviewees and 
affected the specific decision instances of the research.  A detailed discussion of these issues is 
outside the scope of this work.  Power is difficult to identify, measure and put into practice. 
(Pfeffer 1992)  Time to make a decision and length of time that the alliance will last are both 
beyond the scope of this work.  Trust is a large enough issue that it has been explored in many 
other articles, and again is outside the scope of this work.   
 
8.3 Future Research 
 
An interesting and large-scale issue for future research could be a study of the relationships 
amongst the elements of the Partner Negotiation Model and the Partner Choice Criteria.  That is, 
review the two research questions pulling the ‘how’ and ‘why’ of partner selection together to see 
which criteria may fit into which process cycle.  As an example, requirements may belong to the 
deal-making cycle.   
 
Future research could also extend the Partner Negotiation Model.  This model implies 
sequential cycles of deal-making, partner negotiation and organizational approval.  In fact, these 
cycles may be happening concurrently. 
 
Each of the issues in this work could be studied separately or various relationships amongst 
them could be explored.  That is, deal-making, partnership roles and organizational approval may 
be appropriate to investigate on their own.  Similarly, requirements, resource availability, social 
network, reputation, ambiguity and politics could produce interesting topics on their own.  An 
advance on the six individual choice criteria could be that these partner characteristics are in 
order of the above items.  That is, future research could investigate factors influencing the 
ordering of these issues in terms of importance in the decision cycles. 
 
Resource availability could be studied on its own since several partners were observed that had 
been chosen only because other partners were already busy or not interested in the partnership at 
hand.  This indicates the potential of a first choice or second choice partner.  The second choice 
only seems to be included when the first choice is not available for whatever reason.  Similarly, 
ambiguity and politics could be studied in their own right as potential selection criteria.  Evidence 
for their inclusion was weak in this research, but additional data may show more influence. 
 
A number of levels of partner and partnership emerged from this work, but were too complex 
to include at this time.  For example, partnerships can be based on verbal agreements among 
high-level executives.  The actual partnership formation and operation are then delegated to lesser 
executives, middle managers, and finally line personnel.  Each of these levels of responsibility 
has a different focus on the partnership.  Each level has work to do to make sure that the 
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partnership develops appropriately and evolves to the advantage of each organization and to the 
advantage of the partnership itself. 
 
Network structures are a very interesting field of study in computer science, management, 
psychology and a number of other academic areas.  Some work has been done on network 
structures in alliances, but more could be done.  In particular, by tying such work to partner 
selection and levels of partners, interesting networks may appear. 
  
All work to be done, with or without partnerships, is constrained at different institutions, 
depending on resources of time, money and expertise.  Government constraints are tied to funding 
priorities such as distance education, mobile technologies, Canada-wide networks and coast-to-
coast coverage.  There was some evidence in this research of institutions trying to fit their needs 
to government constraints and vice versa.  A study of a number of funding opportunities, 
including constraints and funding fit on both sides, might provide some interesting results which 
could help both sides better negotiate their future requirements. 
 
Many of the issues which surfaced from the interviews related to partnership operation rather 
than the focus of this work, formation.  In fact, each of the items noted as Other Findings in 
Chapter 7 could provide the basis for future research as follows.   
 
1. Motivation 
Partner selection could be explored from various points of view.  This research investigated 
partner choice from the point of view of the partnership.  There was confusion among some 
interviewees who wanted to express their motivation for joining the partnership, which would 
provide data from the partner point of view. 
 
2. Operations 
The research suggests that the more Active a person is, the more active their institution.  As well, 
the researcher speculates that more partners make the partnership more rigid.  That is, the alliance 
and its people are more set in their ways and stronger network structures are in place.  
 
3. Unit of Partner 
It is difficult to separate the partner as a person, an organization and an organizational unit.  The 
partner can be seen to be a person (executive or worker) or an organization or an organizational 




Many partners believe that their partnerships need self-sustaining income to survive.  A study of 
income sources could provide ideas for future partnerships.  A study of partnerships with and 
without external income could explore specific characteristics that will allow partnerships to 
survive without income. 
 
5. Integration 
The two consortia used for case studies were disparate in a number of ways.  Future research 
could uncover similarities which could enable a move to a single consortium.  The new 
partnership structure would need to reflect differing ideas and viewpoints, but may be possible. 
 
Potential future research topics are summarized in Table 8.1. 
 
1. Relationships amongst all elements 
2. Extend Partner Negotiation Model 
3. Separate individual issues 
4. Relationships amongst individual issues 
5. Order Partner Choice Criteria 
6. Levels of partner 
7. Levels of partnership 
8. Network structures 
9. Match funding opportunities 
10. Partner motivation 
11. Partnership operations 
12. Unit of partner 
13. Self-sustaining income 
14. Integration 
 





The research questions that were answered in this work focused on how and why partners are 
chosen.  These questions turned out to be non-trivial as the researcher found that the formation of 
partnerships and the process of partner selection are both very complex.  New insights have been 
provided linking business negotiation concepts with partner selection.  Two initial interviews and 
two detailed case study narratives were described, all of which offered insight into specific 
partnerships.  A framework for viewing partner selection as negotiation has been provided.  Three 
negotiation cycles of deal-making, partner negotiation roles and organizational approval have 
been proposed.  Four criteria have been identified that influence why specific partners are chosen 
– requirements, resource availability, social network, and reputation.  The five other findings of 
motivation, operations, unit of partner, income and integration have been noted, which were 
considered to be significant by the interviewees.  Finally, based on the complexities and issues 
from this work, a number of ideas have been summarized for future research. 
 
The literature review provides a synopsis of previous work on interorganizational relationships, 
alliance motivation, decision-making, partner selection, and organizational and partner 
characteristics.  Researchers interested in these areas may find this work to be a good starting 
point.  The work provides an overview of a variety of written materials about alliances and a 
number of associated issues.  The focus on partner selection and characteristics also provide 
deeper, narrower research in these areas. 
 
The initial interviews described during the model development phase provide additional insight 
into real-world partnerships and their concerns.  As well, the models contribute a variety of 
approaches and a number of viewpoints from which to consider partner selection.  Propositions 
developed from the initial interviews and model offer a different and interesting framework for 
partner negotiation and selection. 
 
The Canadian distance education partnerships described in the case study narratives provide 
both positive and negative lessons learned.  Partnership formation and initial partner selection 
information can help other institutions with similar issues.  Information on later partners who 
were added or who dropped out can provide insight as to what worked and did not work in these 
cases.  External funding, governing structure and social network emerged as extremely important 
issues for these partnerships, so could again provide a solid background for new partnerships just 
starting out. 
 
Propositions were tested with case study data to provide a sense of whether the issues might be 
worth pursuing in larger-scale quantitative research studies.  The cycles of deal-making, partner 
negotiation roles and organizational approval were very evident in this research, which 
contributes at least three ideas for future work.  The six proposed partner choice criteria of 
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requirements, resource availability, reputation, social network, ambiguity and politics were not all 
well-supported by the data but again may be good resource materials for future work in these 
areas.  Similarly, the five other findings related to motivation, operations, unit of partner, income 
and integration contribute ideas identified as important to interviewees. 
 
8.4.1 Implications for Theory 
 
Partner selection is much more complex than academic and practitioner literature suggest.  The 
most important contribution of this research to theory is an increased understanding of partner 
negotiation and selection from a firm perspective.   An understanding of this area is, as yet, 
extremely limited (van der Heijden, 2000).   This study provides a model and highlights issues 
that can lead to more successful partner selection.  The conceptual Partner Negotiation Model is 
distinctive in the literature.  The research is unique with the focus on partner selection, processes, 
and multiple alliance types.   Key people and institutions are major factors in partnership 
formation.  Social networks and reputation are key elements in partner choice. 
 
The Canadian distance education field cases used as the domain also provide a distinctive 
perspective for this research.  These cases provide deep, narrow research that may later be 
extended and generalized into a partner selection theory in combination with the existing 
literature and many models noted previously. 
 
This research will also be of interest to universities that want to know how certain partnerships 
formed by providing examples of educational consortia in Appendix A.  The study will be of 
interest to governments and other organizations involved in establishing standards and limitations 
for collaborations, so that they can better delineate partner selection processes and choice criteria. 
 
8.4.2 Implications for Management  
 
One contribution of this study to the practice of management will be to provide managers with an 
aid in partner selection decisions.   The list of partnership issues and organizational and alliance 
characteristics resulting from this study can assist managers in implementing, or considering, 
interorganizational relationships.  The study can provide both a rich description of partner 
selection issues and an analysis of the relationship between these issues and real-world consortia.   
 
At an individual organization level, the results of this work can save time and aid the decision-
making process in terms of partner selection.  This work may allow organizations to choose 
among potential collaborators more easily, more fairly and in a more structured manner than an 
ad hoc approach by providing information about the process and factors to consider as important 
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for partnerships.  Organizations may even decide not to join a particular consortium if the 
available partners are not suitable. 
 
This study provides a base for further investigations that will be of interest to organizations that 
need to establish partnerships in order to thrive in today’s markets.  It will be of interest to 
specific industry groups that need to collaborate for reuse and people shortage issues, such as the 
software development and component industries.   
 
From the Case Study Narratives, managers can learn about deal-making and searching for 
funds.  These cases show that it took a great deal of time and deal-making to form partnerships in 
the first place.  Part of that early process was the achievement of external funding, which added 
value to the partnership.  The partnership then appears more legitimate in its own right with solid 
funding and it appears more desirable to potential new partners.  
 
8.4.3 Summary of Contributions 
 
This work makes a number of contributions to an understanding of partnerships and partner 
selection.  The Literature Review provides a summary and overview of current alliance and 
partner selection literature and shows deficiencies and gaps in that literature.  The Partner 
Negotiation Model provides an improved understanding of the partner selection process.  Case 
Study Narratives offer deep, interesting insight into two specific cases of Canadian consortia.  
The results of the case study data applied to propositions from the final model give further 
understanding of partnerships.  Finally, the large number of issues identified for future work 
verify the complexity of this research and give other researchers a better understanding of what 






Examples of Educational Consortia                                    
The educational consortia listed here provide a sample of partnerships that have been around 
for the past several years.  Some consortia have since disbanded and others have changed 
significantly over the years. 
 
BC4, British Columbia Computer Curriculum Consortium, 1985 or 86, 60 school districts (K-12) 
in B.C., 150 educators, originally developed courseware together, now just have a collaborative 
database of what courses are available where, www.bc4.bc.ca 
 
British Columbia Open University (BCOU), is a wholly distance learning institution offering 
courses from a variety of British Columbia sources including the University of British Columbia, 
Simon Fraser University, and the University of Victoria.  In early 2005, UBC courses were not 
available through BCOU but were still available directly from UBC.  As of April 2005, BCOU 
will become part of Thompson Rivers University through the University College of the Cariboo 
in Kamloops, B.C. 
 
Campus Manitoba, www.campusmanitoba.com, is an organization to manage a collection of 
courses available to students studying at the university level anywhere in Manitoba.  One of the 
main ideas of Campus Manitoba is that it can provide a central repository for courses from small 
disciplines.  That is to say, one university may only have one or two courses in a particular 
subject area but the collection of courses from a number of universities will be enough to give a 
broad cross-section of courses in that field.  The big concern for participating departments is that 
they will become redundant and the department will be closed, so the consortium is being treated 
with suspicion. 
 
Consortium 1 is a partnership of universities across Canada, committed to distance delivery 
anytime anywhere.  Partner universities are Athabasca, Brandon, Royal Roads, Tele-Universite 
du Quebec, The University of Manitoba, the University College of Cape Breton, Open Learning 
Agency, and Laurentian University.  The University of Victoria is not a partner, but provides 
complementary distance education programs.  Consortium 1 is funded by its partners and by 
Industry Canada.  Consortium 1 identifies accredited courses, provides access to courses 
developed by partner universities, provides a clearing house for students wanting to mix and 
match courses from various universities, facilitates transfer credit and generally creates sharing 
efficiencies. 
 
Consortium 2 includes Simon Fraser University, and the Universities of Alberta, Saskatchewan, 
Waterloo, Guelph, York, and Dalhousie.  Two issues in the development of Consortium 2 are that 
Industry Canada required an east coast partner and the west coast partners were worried that 
Ontario was controlling things.  This alliance has ‘project staff’ to keep it running smoothly. 
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Congese, Consortium for Graduate Education in Software Engineering, URL off the U of T 
website, www.utoronto.ca, includes the University of Waterloo, University of Toronto, Queen’s 
University in Kingston, Ontario, York University in Toronto, and Carleton University in Ottawa 
 
The e-University is a British government project supported by $100 million US in government 
financing as an effort to offer distance education around the world. 
 
GUA, Global University Alliance, www.gua.com, is an alliance of ten international universities.  
It offers graduate and postgraduate education to adult learners via the Internet.  Universities come 
from Australia, Canada, Europe, and the USA.  Athabasca University in Canada is one of the 
partners. 
 
Griffith Flexible Learning Services at Griffith University, Australia is negotiating learning 
alliances with non-traditional industries to expand its flexible education programs to meet global 
education markets. 
 
IMS Global Learning Consortium, Inc., www.imsproject.org, is a closed consortium that 
produces open standards in education.  This organization is developing and promoting open 
specifications for facilitating online distributed learning activities.  IMS is a global consortium 
with members from education, business and government. 
 
MERLOT, www.merlot.org, offers online learning and sharing of resources, but is not focused on 
Distance Education.  The Multimedia Educational Resource for Learning and Teaching Online 
(MERLOT) is an organization that collects and disseminates online learning materials, 
assignments and reviews.  It is also a community of people who strive to enrich teaching and 
learning experiences.  This organization started as a best practice study at California State 
University and then moved into an alliance organization. 
 
Michigan Virtual University, with U of Michigan from the Universitas 21 consortium 
 
NextEd Ltd., www.nexted.com, is an education and training infrastructure company with 
headquarters in Hong Kong.  NextEd offers corporate and higher education as an accredited 
online learning provider.  The company partners with universities and private education providers 
to deliver their courses over the Internet to students in Asia.  IMS and GUA are technology 
partners.  Athabasca University is an educational partner and part of GUA. 
 
Open Knowledge Initiative (OKI), http://web.mit.edu/oki, is a joint initiative between MIT and 
Stanford University that identifies, designs, and packages a set of web-enabled learning 
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components.  Its focus is on sustainable, open source, web-based tools to support teaching and 
learning. 
 
Open Learning Agency (OLA) is a “leader in the delivery of lifelong learning opportunities” 
through the “provision of high-quality, flexible learning products, services and systems.”  The 
OLA includes distance learning and recognition for non-traditional learning.  It was a partner in 
the Western (Canadian) Universities Telecourse Consortium in British Columbia.  The British 
Columbia Open University was part of the OLA, but is now moving to Thompson Rivers 
University.  The mandate and structure of the OLA has changed significantly from 2001 to 2005. 
 
The University of the Arctic, www.uarctic.org, is ‘a network of academic institutions and 
programs in the circumpolar North’.  The network includes universities from Canada (the Yukon 
and UNBC), Finland, Greenland, Iceland, Russia, and the USA (Alaska and Vermont). 
 
Universitas 21, www.universitas.edu.au, (old www.universitas21.org), is a network for 
international higher education.  It is a company incorporated in the United Kingdom with 18 
universities in 10 countries.  The core business is ‘provision of a pre-eminent brand for 
educational services’.  The two Canadian universities are McGill University in Montreal, 
www.mcgill.ca, represented by Dawn Conway, Director of the Office of International Research, 
dconway@FGSR.Lan.McGill.ca, and the University of British Columbia, www.ubc.ca, 
chase@oldadm.ubc.ca.  The University of Toronto pulled out of the consortium in April 2001 
over concerns about how the online university would run.  U21 Equity is the company set up to 
manage the consortium’s financial arrangements for the online university and many of the partner 
universities are expressing concern over the commitment of large sums of money and the 
licensing of names and logos to an outside organization. (Maslen 2001) 
 
UNIGIS International is a worldwide network of educational institutions that offer distance 
learning courses in Geographical Information Systems.  Three British universities started UNIGIS 
in 1990.  Now there are 13 universities in 12 countries, including Simon Fraser University in 
Canada, with about 900 students total. 
 
Western (Canadian) Universities Telecourse Consortium in British Columbia includes nine 
universities and broadcasting organizations sharing the responsibilities of first and second year 
telecourses. 
 
Westmost – Masters of Software Technology – www.cs.ualberta.ca/~westmost Kal Toth, 
toth@techbc.ca, www.westmost.ca  
 
Worldwide Universities Network is an alliance among autonomous universities in the United 
States and Great Britain, formed in early 2001.  Initially, the universities will be collaborating on 
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graduate research but they soon hope to add online courses. Financing so far has come from the 
universities, but the group is bidding for e-University money from the British government. The 
collaboration includes Penn State, UC at San Diego, U Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, U 
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Interview Protocol Form 
Instructions  
The purpose of the interview is to gather data on partner selection in interorganizational 
relationships.  How and why are specific partners chosen?  We would also like to gather further 
information about the organization, its partner(s), and their alliances.  Some factors that we 
believe may be of interest are alliance motivation, organizational and partner characteristics, 
reputation, decision maker turnover and resource availability. 
NOTE: When we interview the partners we may get different answers to our questions.   
Key Research Questions 
This study seeks to answer two main research questions.  They are: 
1. How do organizations choose collaborative partners? 
2. Why do organizations choose a particular partner?   
Descriptive Notes and Demographic Information 
Document the following descriptive information: 
Date, time and place of the interview  
Interviewee name and job title 
Dialogue 
Physical Setting 
Data Collection Matrix 
Complete the key data identified in the Data Collection Matrix on the next page. 
Probes 
If necessary, ask additional questions found following in Interview Questions. 
Interviewer’s Reflective Notes 
Document your (the researcher’s) personal thoughts such as “speculation, feelings, problems, 
ideas, hunches, impressions, and prejudices” about the data. 
Documents Obtained  
Identify and catalog all documents obtained during the interview.  At a minimum, note a name, 
type of document, key categories of interest to this study, and primary or secondary source 
material. 
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Data Collection Matrix 
 
Organization Name: _______________________________________________________ 
 
 
Partner Name: ___________________________________________________________ 
 
 
How was this partner found? (personal contact, advertisement, previous experience, etc.) 
 
Why was this particular partner chosen? (size, sector, finances, location, etc.)  
 
How does this partner compare to an ‘ideal’ partner for this alliance? 
 
Is there evidence of Deal-making, Key Partners, Negotiation? 
 
What was the rationale for selection of this partner? (hard constraints, resource availability, 





Interview Question Guide 
 
Introduction 
I appreciate your time and will try to limit the interview to one hour.  All information is 
confidential.  The purpose of the interview is to gather data on partner selection in distance 
education collaborations, specifically Consortia 1 and 2.  We are exploring how these 
collaborations are formed and will attempt to interview all partners.   
{Your University} is part of {Consortium 1, Consortium 2}.  I will be asking about your current 
role in the alliance and how and why your organization got involved. 
 
Current Situation 
1. What is your official title within {C}? 
2. What is {U}’s role in {C}? Major responsibilities?  Major activities? 
3. To the best of your knowledge, what is the degree of participation among all partners? {Do all 
partners have equal funding, for example?}  
4. Draw a diagram, showing the major communication or reporting structures. 
5. What is your idea of the objectives, goals, and motivation of {C} as a whole?  
{U}’s Motivation 
1. How did {U} get involved in {C}? What were the major events? 
Informal Discussion | Beginning | Middle | End | Decision to Join 
2. Why did {U} get involved in {C}?  What was your rationale?  
3. What were the advantages & disadvantages to {U} of joining {C}? Concrete examples 
{C}’s Partner Selection 
1. To the best of your knowledge, how was {U} selected for {C}?  
Major events? Decision-making processes? 
2. To the best of your knowledge, why was {U} selected for {C}? 
3. To the best of your knowledge, was any one partner directly involved in selecting or 
eliminating another partner? 
4. How do the other partners compare to {U}?  Measured by what criteria? 
Retrospective Reflection 
1. If you could make one change to make this process better, what would it be? 
 
I will follow up by e-mail within the next month if necessary to clarify information. 




Partner Negotiation Model 
We understand that partner choice is a very complex process and not at all the rational decision-
making that some would have us believe. Evidence of the following issues? 
Choice Opportunity (Driving Force) some big reason to join – deal-making cycle 
Alliance Catalyst, Principal Investigator – one or more people who made it all happen 
Key Partners who may have helped choose other partners or do other alliance work 
Negotiation – back and forth with the funder, the catalyst, other partners, internally with your 
organization? 
Proposed Partners versus the Actual Partners who signed on 
 
Partner Selection Rationale 
Why was your organization selected for this alliance?  
Hard Constraints:  Were you needed for a specific talent, expertise, geographical reason, etc.?  
What hard constraints were there on alliance partners?  What constraints did the funder put on 
alliance partners? Did you meet some required constraints?  What constraints? 
Resource Availability: Was Resource Availability an issue? In what way? Were a number of 
partners available?  How many other appropriate organizations? 
Ambiguity: From Information Theory, the number of possible ways that issues can be interpreted 
is large.  The more ambiguous the project, the more likely any partner will do. More ambiguous 
goals and looser constraints = Garbage Can (any problem will map to any solution and vice 
versa) 
Social Network: The more positive social capital between partners, the more likely an 
organization will be selected. What was the role of social network or social capital in partner 
selection?  Were partners chosen or did partners join based on who rather than what they knew? 
Did you know any of these partners before? Who?  How?  Did you have previous experience with 
any of these partners?  What experience? 
Politics: What is your definition of politics? (Public Relations, Marketing, Expectations, Biased 
Views, Organizational Expectations, Packaging of the Alliance, Favours Owed Internally or 
Externally)  Did you owe someone a favour or vice versa?  Did you feel pressured to join the 
alliance? 
Reputation: What are some of the factors that you use to judge an institution’s reputation?  How 
much of that does {U} have compared to the other universities in {C}?  How is your reputation in 
relation to the other partners?  Are there disparate reputations among the partners?  If so, are there 
power and control issues?  Other imbalance issues? The higher your reputation, the more likely 
you are to be invited to join. Organizations with similar reputations are more likely to choose 
each other Organizations with disparate reputations will have power and control issues 
Overall: Is our list of Constraints and Issues an ordered list?  An embedded list? A complete list? 
What other issues or constraints were in play? 
Would any partner have done?  Why or why not? 
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Consortium 1 Contacts as of 2003 
 
1. Athabasca University: 
President 
Vice President, Academic  
Executive Director 
2. Brandon University 
3. Royal Roads University 
4. Tele-Universite du Quebec 
5. University of Manitoba 
6. University College of Cape Breton 
7. Open Learning Agency (British Columbia Open University): Director, Education 
8. Laurentian University: Associate Vice President 
9. University of Victoria 
10. Memorial University of Newfoundland:  Director, Technologies 
11. Mount Saint Vincent U:  Director, Education 
12. University of Moncton 
13. University of New Brunswick  
 
Approached, but Did Not Join 
 
University of Waterloo 
University of Guelph 




Consortium 2 Contacts as of 2003 
 
1. Simon Fraser University 
Director, Development  
2. University of Alberta 
Director, Technologies  
3. University of Calgary 
Director, Education  
4. University of Saskatchewan 
Dean, Extension   
Vice President 
5. University of Waterloo 
Associate Vice President 
6. University of Guelph 
Director, Learning 
7. York University 
Vice President 
8. Dalhousie University 
Executive Director, Technology 
Director, Computing  
 
Program Director is at Saskatchewan; Others are Consortium 2 Project Directors 
 
Approached or Inquired, but Did Not Join 
 
University of British Columbia 
McGill University 







Consortia 1 and 2 Social Network 
The social network listed here provides a cross-section of the people and organizations that were 
involved in the formation of the two consortia under study. 
 
1. President, Athabasca University 
2. Program Director, Distance Education and Off-Campus Services, College of Extended Learning, 
University of New Brunswick 
3. Director, Academic Technologies for Learning, Faculty of Extension, University of Alberta 
4. Director, Extension Department, University of Alberta, (February 2001) then later Professor and 
Dean, Extension Division, University of Saskatchewan (December 2001) 
5. Vice President, Academic, University of Saskatchewan  
6. Distance Education Co-ordinator, University of Alberta (September 2000) 
7. Director, Academic Computing Services, Dalhousie (October 2001) 
8. Director, Distance Education and Technology, Continuing Studies, UBC (March 1, 2000) 
9. Directrice, Télé-Université du Québec 
10. Vice President Academic, University of Calgary 
11. Director, NSERC, Advisory Committee on Online Learning (ACOL) 
12. President, McConnell Family Foundation 
13. Associate Vice President, Information and Communications Technology, Professor of Computer 
Science, University of Saskatchewan 
14. Executive Director, Consortium 1 
15. Acting Director, Academic Technologies for Learning, University of Alberta (September 2000, 
January 2002) also Associate Dean, Research, Faculty of Extension 
16. Director, Technology (April 2000 title) University of Waterloo, Consortium 2 catalyst/driver  
17. Distance Learning Specialist and Special Graduate Faculty, Guelph 
18. Associate Vice-President, Academic, Memorial University of Newfoundland 
19. Vice President, University of Saskatchewan  
20. Executive Director, Consortium 2 
21. Director, NSERC, Consortium 2 proposal 
22. Vice President Academic, Athabasca University 
23. Associate Vice President, University of Alberta  
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24. Vice President Research, Dalhousie, Professor, Department of Anatomy and Neurobiology 
25. Professor, University of Alberta 
26. Director, Education, University of Alberta (moved to University of Calgary) 
27. Consortium 2 Project Director, then Consortium 2 Online Program Project Manager (December 
2001), University of Guelph 
28. Interim Dean, University of Alberta 
29. Director, Learning, University of Guelph 
30. Policy Analyst, Industry Canada, Multimedia Group 
31. Director, Teaching, University of Waterloo  
32. Director, International Distance Education, UBC 
33. Vice President Research, University of Waterloo 
34. Director, SSHRC 
35. Interim President & CEO, British Columbia Open University 
36. Manager, Contracts Research & Industrial Grants, University of Waterloo 
37. Associate Director, Academic Technologies for Learning, Faculty of Extension, University of 
Alberta 
38. Educational and Management Consultant, Victoria, BC 
39. Director, Industry Canada,  part of the Connecting Canada mandate, SchoolNet 
40. President, University of Waterloo 
41. Director, Education, University of Waterloo 
42. Director, Faculty Development and Research Coordinator, Communication Skills Program, 
Dalhousie until July 1, 2001, then Director, Instructional Development Centre, Simon Fraser 
43. Director of Distance Learning and Educational Alliances, Pearson Canada  
44. Chair of Communication, Simon Fraser University 
45. Dean, Extension and Community Affairs, University College of Cape Breton 
46. Associate Dean, Atkinson College, York University 
47. President, York University 
48. Director, Education moved to Saskatchewan from Brandon University, thus providing a link 
between Consortium 1 and 2 
49. Associate Vice-President, Student Affairs, Laurentian University 
50. Director, Dalhousie University 
51. Director, SSHRC 
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52. Professor, York University 
53. Executive Director, Alberta Online Consortium  
54. Director, Funding, Industry Canada 
55. Online Program Initiative Contact, University of Guelph 
56. Director, Education, NSERC 
57. Professor, Dalhousie University 
58. Professor, Simon Fraser University 
59. Founding Director, Centre for the Study of Computers in Education, York University 
60. Dean, Continuing Education, University of Manitoba 
61. Director, College of Extended Learning, University of New Brunswick 
62. Professor, York University  
63. Professor, McGill University 
64. President, University of Guelph 
65. Director, HRDC, Skill and Learning Taskforce 
66. Executive Director, Campus Canada 
67. Vice President Academic and Provost, Dalhousie University 
68. President, Royal Roads University 
69. Manager, Application Services, CompCanada Atlas 
70. Associate Vice President, Vice President, Research & Innovation, York University 
71. President, Simon Fraser University 
72. Consultant, York University 
73. Provost and VPA, University of Guelph 
74. Professor, University of Saskatchewan 
75. President and CEO, OLA (March 2000) 
76. Health Sciences Professor, Dalhousie University 
77. Director of Distance Education Learning Technologies, Memorial 
78. Director, Bell Canada University Labs, Guelph 
79. Professor, University of Manitoba 
80. Vice President, University of Waterloo, Consortium 2 catalyst 
81. Professor, Simon Fraser University 
82. President, Laurentian University 
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83. Director, Mount Saint Vincent University 
84. Director, International Distance Education, UBC 
85. Professor, York University 
86. Executive Director, Technology, Dalhousie University moved to Universite du Quebec 
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Glossary 
 
Alliance: Exchange relationship, but no joint ownership (Das, Sen & Sengupta 1998) 
Ambiguity: Fuzzy wording that could lead to multiple meanings or misunderstandings of intent; 
doubtful or uncertain especially from obscurity or indistinctness; capable of being understood 
in two or more possible senses or ways (Merriam-Webster 2004) 
Choice Opportunity: Positive outcome which could result from a partnership; point in time when a 
decision is required; diverse problems and solutions (Cohen et al 1972) 
Consortium: Specialized joint venture, often technology development (Kanter 1989) 
Constraints: restrictions or checks; compelled to avoid or perform some action (M-W 2004) 
Deal: Value proposition; an offer or agreement involving a number of related items or one making 
acceptance of one item dependent on the acceptance of another (M-W 2004) 
Deal-making: Negotiation in preparation to form a partnership 
Driver: A catalyst for the partnership, usually a (key) partner 
Goal: the end toward which effort is directed (Merriam-Webster 2004) 
Hypothesis: Predictions about the relationship among variables; used in quantitative research; 
numeric estimates of population values based on data collected from samples; testing 
employs statistical procedures (Creswell 2003) 
Instance: Number of words in a word search (NVivo 2.0) 
Joint Venture: A separate jointly-owned firm created by two or more firms (Garcie-Canal, 1996) 
Key Partner: A partner useful to the partnership in terms of attracting future partners or providing 
other resources 
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Model: A description or analogy used to help visualize something that cannot be directly observed 
(Merriam-Webster 2004)  
Negotiation: to arrange for or bring about through conference, discussion, and compromise 
(Merriam-Webster 2004) 
Organizational Approval: to accept as satisfactory by administration or upper management in an 
organization; to give formal or official sanction to (Merriam-Webster 2004) 
Organizational Politics: Competition between competing interest groups or individuals for power 
and leadership (within or between or within organizations) 
Partner: A person, institution or organizational unit involved in a partnership; one associated with 
another especially in an action (Merriam-Webster 2004) 
Partnership: Any interorganizational relationship, such as an alliance, consortium, joint venture and 
so on; a relationship resembling a legal partnership and usually involving close cooperation 
between parties having specified and joint rights and responsibilities (Merriam-Webster 
2004) 
Partnership Roles: Either a Partner Negotiation or Operational Role (Sponsor, Driver, Key Partner 
or Director, Project Manager) 
Partner Selection: Finding and choosing good matches for interorganizational relationships 
Passage: Coded term, which could be a word, phrase, sentence, paragraph or text of any length 
representing a specific thought or meaningful unit of text (NVivo 2.0) 
Politics: Competition between competing interest groups or individuals for power and leadership (as 
in a government) (Merriam-Webster 2004) 
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Prestige: Standing or estimation in the eyes of people: weight or credit in general opinion; 
commanding position in people's minds (Merriam-Webster 2004); excellence, often in terms 
of overall quality of people or programs; relative to other institutions; quality of incoming 
students, amount of federal research funding, and athletic programs; generated by excellent 
faculty and students, world class research, successful sports teams; generates revenue; these 
schools try to increase the selectivity of their admissions process, which improves the peer 
group and the worth of the degree (Brewer, Gates et al. 2002) 
Proposition: Less stringent descriptive or illustrative statements used in qualitative research; may 
be followed by stronger directional hypotheses in quantitative research; something offered for 
consideration or acceptance (Merriam-Webster 2004) 
Provider: An institution which offers programs through a partnership, but doesn’t broadly 
participate (Consortium 1) 
Reliability: Stability or consistency of responses (Creswell 2003) 
Reputation: Perceived prestige, or prestige in one area of endeavor; overall quality or character as 
seen or judged by people in general; a place in public esteem or regard: good name (Merriam-
Webster 2004); specific, measurable, related to services offered to students, can be 
continuously improved in quality and variety of services, based on student demand for 
programs and leads to tuition revenue and enrolment-based government funding; these 
schools try to meet student needs (Brewer, Gates et al. 2002); survey of graduates and the 
community at large for highest quality, most innovative, leaders of tomorrow (Maclean’s 
2004) 
Requirements: Specific work to be done by a partner or specific needs for the partnership; 
something essential to the existence or occurrence of something else (M-W 2004) 
Resource Availability: Time or people available to work on a partnership 
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Selection: to choose (as by fitness or excellence) from a number or group; pick out; to make a 
choice (Merriam-Webster 2004) 
Social Network: People known to others in the partnership; a relationship of people who know each 
other or know of each other (Scott 1988); linkages among employees (Cross 2003); tending 
to form cooperative and interdependent relationships with others of one's kind (Merriam-
Webster 2004) 
Sponsor: A person or institution which provides funding or other resources or support 
Theory: A plausible or scientifically acceptable general principle or body of principles offered to 
explain phenomena (Merriam-Webster 2004); an explanation of why things work the way 
they do 
Trust: assured reliance on the character, ability, strength, or truth of someone or something 
(Merriam-Webster 2004) 
Validity: Accuracy, trustworthiness, authentic, credible results (Creswell 2003) 
Verification: to establish the truth, accuracy, or reality of (Merriam-Webster 2004) 
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